Showing posts with label Intermarium. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Intermarium. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 31, 2013

Current Events & Trends: The German election: the other side of the story


An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about Germany's domination in Europe. This follows this post about the Star of the Wise Men. For a free magazine subscription or to get the book shown for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.

Current Events & Trends: The German election: the other side of the story

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The Jewish Chronicle stated in a front-page article, "Angela Merkel's historic third election victory was warmly greeted by European leaders this week" (Simon Rocker, "Board Welcomes Angela Merkel," Sept. 24, 2013).

Other headlines in British newspapers confirmed this viewpoint:
• "Decisive Win Gives Merkel Strong Hand"
• "Angela Merkel: The German Leader Set to Eclipse Margaret Thatcher"
• "Poland and Germany Should Unite, Says Lech Walesa"
• "Merkel Is Europe's Misunderstood Visionary"
These are only a few of the many positive reactions to Angela Merkel's success. Majority opinion, however, is not always right. One particular columnist expressed a totally different view of Merkel's vision of Europe. Noted author Frederick Forsyth's column in the Daily Express offers an almost biblical insight. His analysis of the German election result reflects a polar opposite position to the generally accepted assessment. He does not misunderstand the German chancellor's vision of Europe.
Forsyth's view follows: "She does not posture, she does not strut as most do. She does not shout the odds, rant or preach like so many. But her smooth destruction of her one-time patron and mentor Helmut Kohl gives the measure of her ruthlessness in pursuit of her goal" (Sept. 27, 2013).
What, according to Forsyth, is her goal? "That is the complete—and I mean total—unification of the countries of Europe, Germany included, into a single super-state. Nothing, absolutely nothing, must be allowed to stand in the way of that divine vision. And that includes the withdrawal of the UK from the EU." This partially explains her friendly, cooperative relationship with Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron. If Britain leaves the European Union, other countries will likely follow suit.
Forsyth concluded: "For the third time in 100 years Germany has made up its collective mind on the future of Europe and does not intend to be gainsaid again by this blasted little offshore nation [Britain] and its dreadfully disobedient people."
This assessment may seem radical—but not to observers who have carefully studied German history and biblical prophecy hand in hand. To understand much more, read the free Bible study aids Are We Living in the Time of the End? and You Can Understand Bible Prophecy . (Sources: The Jewish Chronicle, Daily Express, Financial Times, The Independent, The Telegraph. )

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

World News and Trends: Is Russia a U.S. ally?

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about Russian rivalry with the U.S. This follows this post about the popularity of the Bible.  For a free magazine subscription or to get this book for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886-8632.

World News and Trends: Is Russia a U.S. ally?






article by Jerold Aust, John Ross Schroeder





Vladimir Putin's Russia has covertly and systematically undermined U.S. interests, particularly in the Middle East, yet continues to purport to be America's ally in the war against terrorism.



Russian companies provided Iraq with high-tech military equipment, including advanced antitank missiles, night goggles and GPS jamming equipment, putting coalition soldiers' lives at risk. Russia denied that they were responsible for such sales, claiming that they might have been sold to the Iraqis through third countries. Yet they can't explain why Russian specialists were discovered in Iraq training Saddam's troops to use the high-tech weaponry.



Even worse, coalition forces discovered documents showing that in recent months Russia had provided the Iraqi regime with secret information on Western leaders and had helped train Iraqi agents.



This kind of political underhandedness is not new to Russia. Throughout the 1980s, while the Cold War was at its hottest, U.S. President Ronald Reagan often called the Soviets' bluffs. He went on the attack and labeled them as the "evil empire," thereby keeping their feet to the fire.



Consider this: Russia is building a nuclear reactor in oil-rich Iran, thereby supplying Iran with technology that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. They also continue to arm North Korea in spite of the fact that North Korea has threatened the United States with nuclear attack.



It appears that Russia is pursuing an agenda of seeking to deprive America of its leading role in world politics. Apparently the Cold War is heating up. How can America respond? A temporary answer might be to follow Ronald Reagan's lead. After all, didn't the Soviet Union break up at the end of President Reagan's eight-year term? Obviously, Russia can't aid and abet America's enemies and say it is an ally.



Scripture has the best answer to political intrigue and man's inhumanity to man. One day there will be only one government on earth, and that government will have as its goal the welfare, security and peace for all of mankind (Daniel 2:44And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever.



See All...). To better understand these trends, request our free booklet The United States and Britain in Bible Prophecy and The Book of Revelation Unveiled.



(Sources: The Washington Times, San Francisco Chronicle, The Telegraph [London].)

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Thursday, October 25, 2012

Putin's Evolving Strategy in Europe

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about U.S. embassies. This follows this post about YouTube being fined by Brazil.  This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran . For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read a very interesting book HERE.


Putin's Evolving Strategy in Europe




Stratfor

By George Friedman



This week, Vladimir Putin was sworn in for a third term as Russian president. Putin's return to the presidency was not unexpected; he was never really unseated as Russia's leader, even during Dmitri Medvedev's presidency. But it comes as an anti-incumbent trend is developing in Europe, most recently demonstrated when socialist challenger Francois Hollande defeated Nicolas Sarkozy in France's presidential elections this week. In response to these changes, Putin will have to adjust Russia's approach in Europe.



Putin's Plans for Russia and Beyond

Russia has been on the path to resurgence since Putin won the presidency in 1999. He inherited a broken, weak and chaotic Russia. As Stratfor has noted over the years, Putin did not seek to re-create the Soviet Union. He is a student of geopolitics, and he understands Russia's constraints and the overreaching that led to the fall of the Soviet Union. Putin's mission was to return Russia to stability and security -- a massive undertaking for the leader of a country that not only is the world's largest but also is internally diverse and surrounded by potentially hostile powers.



During his first presidential term, Putin launched a comprehensive series of reforms that recentralized power over the Russian regions, cracked down on militancy in the Russian Caucasus, purged the oligarch class and centralized the economy and political system. Putin implemented an autocratic regime and used the military and Russia's security apparatus (including the Federal Security Service), following the example of previous leaders, from the czars to the Soviet rulers. Putin's maneuvers were the natural evolution of how a successful leader rules Russia.



With Russia strong and steady, Putin was able to focus on his country's near abroad. However, the countries surrounding Russia were hostile to the Kremlin's view, with NATO and the European Union pushing ever closer to Russia's borders and forming partnerships with numerous former Soviet states. The czars and Soviet rulers used two primary tactics to counter such a situation.



The first tactic was to mobilize Russia's military to push out foreign influence, whether directly (as Moscow has done with Georgia) or indirectly (by forging military alliances with former Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan). Although Putin's Russia could do this for one or two countries, it could not use this tactic everywhere in its periphery.



The second tactic was to create alliances of convenience in Europe to help Moscow divide pan-European and NATO expansion and sentiment against Russia while bolstering Russia economically, financially and technologically. Czarist Russia made such arrangements with the United Kingdom during the Napoleonic Wars and with France ahead of World War I, and Soviet leaders formed an alliance of convenience with Germany ahead of World War II. It is not that Russia ever trusted any of these countries (or vice versa), but the Russian and European leaderships shared an inherent understanding that certain alliances are necessary to shape the dynamics on the Continent.



During Putin's era, Russia set its sights on what it considered three of the four premier European powers: Germany, France and Italy. The Kremlin considers the United Kingdom the fourth main power, but London's firm and traditional alliance with the United States has made it resistant to Russia's overtures. The Kremlin saw Germany, France and Italy as the countries holding the economic, political and military heft that, if unified within Western alliance structures, could oppose Russia in Europe. In order to forge partnerships with these countries, Putin built relationships with their rulers.



Putin's Personal Approach

Germany was Russia's natural first choice for a partnership; not only is it the core of Europe, but it is also the European state that the Kremlin fears most. Moreover, Putin has an affinity for Germany that dates back to his days with the KGB, when he was stationed in Dresden, Germany. In the early 2000s, Putin was able to use his fluency in German to develop a strong friendship with then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Schroeder saw the relationship first as an economic opportunity, since Russia is the world's largest energy producer and exporter and also a place for potential heavy investment.



During Schroeder's chancellorship, trade between Germany and Russia boomed, and Russia gave Germany special benefits as an energy partner. Germany -- in accordance with Putin's plan -- began supporting Russia's position in Europe on specific strategic issues. Schroeder's Germany was alone among Western governments in not vociferously supporting Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004-2005. Schroeder also led European opposition to U.S. efforts to begin the NATO accession process for Ukraine and Georgia.



As his friendship with Putin grew, Schroeder purchased an estate outside Moscow near Putin's home and even sought Putin's assistance in adopting two Russian children. Schroeder's ejection from office in 2005 did not end their friendship -- or Schroeder's usefulness to Putin. Despite widespread German criticism, even from Schroeder's own party, the former chancellor accepted a position with Russian state natural gas firm Gazprom to lead the Nord Stream project, a pipeline designed specifically to maximize Russia's energy leverage over Belarus, Ukraine and Poland.



Having created a strong relationship with Berlin, Putin established a similar relationship with France's then-President Jacques Chirac. France's position is different from Germany's in that France is not connected economically or politically with Russia. However, Paris understands the history of strong Berlin-Moscow ties and what those mean for all of Europe. France thus has an interest in making sure it is not left out when Russia and Germany meet. The relationship between Chirac and Putin took this a step further.



At the beginning of their relationship, Putin and Chirac allied politically against the U.S.-led war in Iraq. This was important to Moscow because it undermined NATO's unity on a critical issue. More important for Russia's interests, Chirac lobbied against NATO's expansion to include the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltics were admitted despite Chirac's objections, and when the next NATO summit occurred -- in Latvia -- Chirac invited Putin to the meeting as his guest.



Putin was close friends with the French and German leaders, but he was like a brother to Italy's then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. This relationship was more personal, because Italy was not as strategic (or threatening) as the other two European powers. Putin and Berlusconi vacationed together, spent birthdays together and bought each other expensive gifts. In 2011, when Berlusconi was on trial for sexual improprieties, Putin publically defended his friend, saying the allegations were "made out of envy." The Putin-Berlusconi friendship led to relationships between Russian and Italian energy companies, banks and military industrial projects. Most notable, Putin was able to use his relationship with Berlusconi to get Gazprom access to Italian state-linked energy giant ENI's assets throughout North Africa, particularly in Libya.



Putin's personal connections with Germany, France and Italy did not change with the leadership shifts in each country from 2005 to 2007, nor did they change when Putin left the presidential spotlight to become prime minister in 2008. Putin used the momentum built under the previous governments to forge relationships -- even if not as personal -- with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and (for a time) Italy's then-Prime Minister Romano Prodi. Putin's circle of friends and associates helped him shape some of Russia's most important strategies in Europe: complicating NATO expansion, pushing Moscow's agenda with NATO, expanding military relationships and becoming capable of invading Georgia without European or NATO intervention. It is not that all of this was possible because of Putin's personal relationships with the leaders of Italy, France and Germany, but those connections facilitated many of the deals that made Russia's progress possible.



Changes Across Europe

As Putin returns to the presidency, he faces a very different Europe -- one in which nearly all of his close friends are out of power. As prime minister, Putin focused on Russia's internal issues while Europe became embroiled in a political and financial crisis that has affected the Continent as a whole. Europe is not as concerned as it once was with the wider world (including Russia). Instead, each state is focused on keeping itself -- and some form of the European alliance -- intact.



Voters have ejected two of the three Russian-friendly European governments during these crises. Berlusconi and his political machine were forced from power in favor of technocrat and now Prime Minister Mario Monti. Monti lacks the political mandate or the will to become involved in geopolitical alignments like a close relationship with Russia. France's Chirac has retired from politics, and Sarkozy was voted out of office the day before Putin was inaugurated. France's Hollande surrounds himself with politicians who have not been in government at any point when Putin was in charge in Russia. This leaves Merkel, whose ties with Putin are the weakest in the Russian leader's European circle. Furthermore, Merkel is concerned with holding Europe together, leaving little time or interest for Russia's plans for Europe.



Thus, Putin's tactic of using personal relationships to help strengthen Russia's position in Europe seems to be outdated. The French and Italian governments are still young, so Putin could try to build relationships with Hollande and Monti. But, like Germany, France and Italy are more interested in what is happening in Europe than in Russia.



This new attitude toward Russia already has surfaced in Rome. In the first talks between the new Italian government and the Russian government, Italian President Giorgio Napolitano made it clear that the Moscow-Rome relationship would undergo a "depersonalization." The first evidence of this was Italy's embrace of U.S. ballistic missile defense plans for Europe. Italy -- like France -- long supported Russia's position on missile defense in Europe. Although this did not prevent Washington from moving forward with its plans, it did create disagreements within NATO. Italy's shift toward unity with NATO and the United States comes just before what was to be a NATO-Russia summit in Chicago, but Russia has been disinvited.



The changes in Europe's leadership and focus come amid Russia's adjustments to other new dynamics in Europe. Before the Continent's financial and political crises, Russia had forged a new strategy for foreign policy regarding Europe in which strategic European partners -- especially Germany, France and Italy -- would invest heavily in Russia's economy and financial sector. With Europe nearly broke, however, this strategy has been cut back and could be abandoned altogether. Russia is proceeding with European partners on some projects, but Moscow must financially step up more than it anticipated for these projects to succeed. It is an expensive foreign policy choice.



Russia's main goal regarding Europe is to keep European powers divided while extracting what Moscow wants financially and technologically. The days have passed when Putin could call a friend in Europe to help with NATO or with technological deficiencies. Russia has to design a new strategy to deal with a very different Europe and adhere to its deeper imperatives rather than rely on personal and political relationships, which are fleeting compared to the forces of geopolitics.





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Thursday, August 30, 2012

Poland's Strategy

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about Poland's problems. This follows this post about Russia continuing the Cold War of the Soviet Union. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran . For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read a very interesting book HERE.


Poland's Strategy



Stratfor

By George Friedman



Polish national strategy pivots around a single, existential issue: how to preserve its national identity and independence. Located on the oft-invaded North European Plain, Poland's existence is heavily susceptible to the moves of major Eurasian powers. Therefore, Polish history has been erratic, with Poland moving from independence -- even regional dominance -- to simply disappearing from the map, surviving only in language and memory before emerging once again.





.For some countries, geopolitics is a marginal issue. Win or lose, life goes on. But for Poland, geopolitics is an existential issue; losing begets national catastrophe. Therefore, Poland's national strategy inevitably is designed with an underlying sense of fear and desperation. Nothing in Polish history would indicate that disaster is impossible.



To begin thinking about Poland's strategy, we must consider that in the 17th century, Poland, aligned with Lithuania, was one of the major European powers. It stretched from the Baltic Sea almost to the Black Sea, from western Ukraine into the Germanic regions. By 1795, it had ceased to exist as an independent country, divided among three emerging powers: Prussia, Russia and Austria.





.It did not regain independence until after World War I -- it was created by the Treaty of Versailles (1919) -- after which it had to fight the Soviets for its existence. Poland again was brought under the power of a foreign nation when Germany invaded in 1939. Its statehood was formalized in 1945, but it was dominated by the Soviets until 1989.



Informed by its history, Poland understands that it must retain its independence and avoid foreign occupation -- an issue that transcends all others psychologically and practically. Economic, institutional and cultural issues are important, but the analysis of its position must always return to this root issue.



Poland's Elusive Security

Poland has two strategic problems. The first problem is its geography. The Carpathian Mountains and the Tatra Mountains provide some security to Poland's south. But the lands to the east, west and southwest are flat plains with only rivers that provide limited protection. This plain was the natural line of attack of great powers, including Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany.





.During the 17th century, the Germans were fragmented in the Holy Roman Empire, while Russia was still emerging as a coherent power. The North European Plain was an opportunity for Poland. Poland could establish itself on the plain. It could protect itself against a challenge from any direction. But Poland becomes extremely difficult to defend when multiple powers converge from different directions. If Poland is facing three adversaries, as it did in the late 18th century with Prussia, Russia and Austria, it is in an impossible position.



For Poland, the existence of a powerful Germany and Russia poses an existential problem, the ideal solution to which is to become a buffer that Berlin and Moscow respect. A secondary solution is an alliance with one for protection. The latter solution is extremely difficult because dependence on Russia or Germany invites the possibility of absorption or occupation. Poland's third solution is to find an outside power to guarantee its interests.



This is what Poland did in the 1930s with Britain and France. This strategy's shortcomings are obvious. First, it may not be in the interests of the security guarantor to come to Poland's assistance. Second, it may not be possible at the time of danger for them to help Poland. The value of a third-party guarantee is only in deterring attack and, failing that, in the willingness and ability to honor the commitment.



Since 1991, Poland has sought a unique solution that was not available previously: membership in multilateral organizations such as the European Union and NATO. Such memberships are meant to provide protection outside the bilateral system. Most important, these memberships bring Germany and Poland into the same political entity. Ostensibly, they guarantee Polish security and remove the potential threat of Germany.



This solution was quite effective while Russia was weak and inwardly focused. But Polish history teaches that Russian dynamics change periodically and that Poland cannot assume Russia will remain weak or benign in perpetuity. Like all nations, Poland must base its strategy on the worst-case scenario.



The solution also is problematic in that it assumes NATO and the European Union are reliable institutions. Should Russia become aggressive, NATO's ability to field a force to resist Russia would depend less on the Europeans than on the Americans. The heart of the Cold War was a struggle of influence across the North European Plain, and it involved 40 years of risk and expense. Whether the Americans are prepared to do this again is not something Poland can count on, at least in the context of NATO.



Moreover, the European Union is not a military organization; it is an economic free trade zone. As such, it has some real value to Poland in the area of economic development. That isn't trivial. But the extent to which it contains Germany is now questionable. The European Union is extremely stressed, and its future is unclear. There are scenarios under which Germany, not wanting to shoulder the cost of maintaining the European Union, may loosen its ties with the bloc and move closer to the Russians. The emergence of a Germany not intimately tied to a multinational European entity but with increasing economic ties with Russia is Poland's worst-case scenario.



Obviously, close ties with NATO and the European Union are Poland's first strategic solution, but the viability of NATO as a military force is less than clear and the future of the European Union is clouded. This is at the heart of Poland's strategic problem. When it was independent in the 20th century, Poland sought multilateral alliances to protect itself from Russia and Germany. Among these alliances was the Intermarium, an interwar concept promoted by Polish Gen. Jozef Pilsudski that called for an alignment comprising Central European countries from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea that together could resist Germany and Russia. The Intermarium concept never took hold, and none of these multilateral alliances has proved sufficient to address Polish concerns.



A Matter of Time

Poland has three strategies available to it. The first is to do everything it can to keep NATO and the European Union viable and Germany contained within them. Poland doesn't have the power to ensure this. The second is to create a relationship with Germany or Russia that guarantees its interests. Obviously, the ability to maintain those relationships is limited. The third strategy is to find an outside power prepared to guarantee its interests.



That power is currently the United States. But the United States, after the experiences in the Islamic world, is moving toward a more distant, balance-of-power approach to the world. This does not mean the United States is indifferent to what happens in northern Europe. The growth of Russian power and potential Russian expansionism that would upset the European balance of power obviously would not be in Washington's interest. But as the United States matures as a global power, it will allow the regional balance of power to stabilize naturally rather than intervene if the threat appears manageable.



In the 1930s, Poland's strategy was to find a guarantor as a first resort. It assumed correctly that its own military capability was insufficient to protect itself from the Germans or the Soviets, and certainly insufficient to protect itself from both. Therefore, it assumed that it would succumb to these powers without a security guarantor. Under these circumstances, no matter how much it increased its military power, Poland could not survive by itself.



The Polish analysis of the situation was not incorrect, but it missed an essential component of intervention: time. Whether an intervention on Poland's behalf consisted of an attack in the west or a direct intervention in Poland, the act of mounting such an intervention would take more time than the Polish army was able to buy in 1939.



This points to two aspects of any Polish relationship to the United States. On one hand, the collapse of Poland as Russia resurges would deprive the United States of a critical bulwark against Moscow on the North European Plain. On the other hand, intervention is inconceivable without time. The Polish military's ability to deter or delay a Russian attack sufficiently to give the United States -- and whatever European allies might have the resources and intent to join the coalition -- time to evaluate the situation, plan a response and then respond must be the key element of Polish strategy.



Poland may not be able to defend itself in perpetuity. It needs guarantors whose interests align with its own. But even if it has such guarantors, the historical experience of Poland is that it must, on its own, conduct a delaying operation of at least several months to buy time for intervention. A joint Russo-German attack, of course, simply cannot be survived, and such multifront attacks are not exceptional in Polish history. That cannot be dealt with. A single-front attack could be, but it will fall on Poland to mount it.



This is a question of economics and national will. The economic situation in Poland has improved dramatically over recent years, but building an effective force takes time and money. The Poles have time, since the Russian threat at this point is more theoretical than real, and their economy is sufficiently robust to support a significant capability.



The primary issue is national will. In the 18th century, the fall of Polish power had as much to do with internal disunity among the Polish nobility as it had to do with a multifront threat. In the interwar period, there was will to resist, but it did not always include the will to absorb the costs of defense, preferring to believe that the situation was not as dire as it was becoming. Today, the will to believe in the European Union and in NATO, rather than to recognize that nations ultimately must guarantee their own national security, is an issue for Poland to settle.



Some diplomatic moves are possible. Polish involvement in Ukraine and Belarus is strategically sound -- the two countries provide a buffer that secures Poland's eastern border. Poland likely would not win a duel with the Russians in these countries, but it is a sound maneuver in the context of a broader strategy.



Poland can readily adopt a strategy that assumes permanent alignment with Germany and permanent weakness and lack of aggressiveness of Russia. They might well be right, but it is a gamble. As the Poles know, Germany and Russia can change regimes and strategies with startling speed. A conservative strategy requires a bilateral relationship with the United States, founded on the understanding that the United States is relying on the balance of power and not the direct intervention of its own forces except as a last resort. That means that Poland must be in a position to maintain a balance of power and resist aggression, buying enough time for the United States to make decisions and deploy. The United States can secure the North European Plain well to the west of Poland and align with stronger powers to the west. A defense to the east requires Polish power, which costs a great deal of money. That money is hard to spend when the threat might never materialize.





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Monday, August 20, 2012

Kosovo News

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about Kosovo and Serbia. This follows this post about the Abonination of Desolation.  For a free magazine subscription or to get this book for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886-8632.


 A blog post by Darris McNeely


Stratfor is reporting that Serbia has reclaimed control of a 30-mile span of railroad in northern Kosovo, in defiance of Kosovo’s new government, The Associated Press reported March 3, citing comments from a senior Serbian official. Earlier, several dozen Serbian railroad workers blocked a freight trains passage on the line, demanding to be transferred to Serbia’s state-owned rail line and saying they would not work for Kosovo’s railroad company.



Friday, August 17, 2012

The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World

A very interesting book review from http://www.amazon.com/ about foreign policy advice for the next decade. This follows this post about the U.S. in the post "jihad-war: world. This follows this post about America breaking up due to unrestricted immigration.  This follows this post about how to Report Illegal Immigrants! For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and  HERE and you can read another very interesting book HERE.





The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World


George Friedman  
If there is a more informative thinker writing today, you let me know - EXTRAORDINARY - 5 STARS !!!! 

By A Customer TOP 500 REVIEWERVINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover
Amazon Verified PurchaseIn the 1950's John Von Neumann was acknowledged as the greatest mathematician of the 20th century. A man so smart that the United States military said that when you asked Von Neumann a question, if he answered you, there was no need to think about it any longer. He was that far ahead of everyone else in the room. Author George Friedman is an extraordinary thinker, and he is paid to think, which makes for an interesting profession. Born in Hungary, and educated at the City College of New York, he has a Ph.D. in government from Cornell. He then teaches for 20 years at Dickinson College.



His real deal however is that for years he would brief senior commanders in the armed services, and you can't blow smoke when you do this. People simply get onto you, and they do not suffer fools gladly. For years now, he has run Stratfor which is a think tank specializing in intelligence matters. They also have a paid subscription service for those who are interested in current, cutting edge information on geo-political matters. He has authored more than a half dozen books, all of which have been profoundly interesting and what I call page-turners.



In this book, The Next Decade, Friedman only goes out ten years in time compared to his previous work when he went out 100 years. It is the author's contention that with the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has become pre-eminent in the world militarily, politically, economically, and no one is even close. We have become an EMPIRE like it or not. Now we may be an Empire that doesn't like being an Empire similar to ancient Rome or Great Britain in the 19th century, but it doesn't change facts, and the facts are we are what we are.



The second theme of this book is that since we are an Empire, we must learn to manage the Empire, and at this, it does not seem that we have given it much thought. The author does a thorough job of going through three Presidents, Lincoln, FDR and Reagan, all of whom were great influences in the creation of our Empire. As Great Britain was the pivot point of the world up until WWI, the United States is now the pivot point or fulcrum of the world and that is not going to change. His feelings on China are darn right fascinating. He believes the so-called Chinese miracle will come to an end fairly soon, and China's growth rate will slow down to that of a mature economic power. This may well be. It is also Friedman's opinion that in another five years if China's growth continues, they will still have a billion people living in abject poverty. You don't read this kind of thinking anywhere else.



Is An EMPIRE Worth the Price of a Republic?



Friedman very clearly brings forth a concept that the very creation of an empire means a loss of liberty to some extent for its citizens. The question becomes how great a loss, but it is obvious that the author worries about this loss of liberty. Do we want our government to install sufficient numbers of computers at the National Security Agency to monitor one billion phone calls? What does this mean for democracy in America, and the loss of personal freedom associated with it? This is really the big question for the author, and it needs to be thought about and answered.



On the foreign policy side, the author believes that terrorism cannot be eradicated from the earth, but sufficiently damaged as to bring it under control. Al Qaeda has sought to create chaos in the Muslim world, and reconstitute an Islamic Caliphate, which was a theocracy established by Mohammad in the 7th century. Clearly, this is not going to happen. At the same time, the United States invades Iraq, and then re-invades Afghanistan recently, a process Friedman refers to as slamming into the Muslim world. These are really spoiling attacks, and they cost us dearly in terms of treasure, and energy.



We have put a trillion dollars into Iraq and we don't even know the amount for Afghanistan, although we do know that one American solider costs us one million dollars per year to send overseas. That amounts to a billion dollars per 1,000 soldiers, a number that is not even comprehendible under normal thinking. Friedman's answer seems to be that the United States should encourage regional balances of power. If we continue to build up Japan, South Korea and Indonesia, than we do not have to worry about China. This is because China will be concerned with their newly powerful neighbors.



He feels that we have not created a proper working relationship with Russia, and we have driven the Russians into a working relationship with the Germans of all people. At first it does not make sense, but then when you follow his logic and this author always has impeccable logic, it does make sense. The Germans do not want any more immigration. They have massive problems with the people coming into the country now including the Arabs. At the same time, the Germans have massive technological expertise, on a par with America. The Russians have massive manpower and not technology. You can combine the two and both Germany and Russia will benefit. It makes sense, and this is why you read Friedman. So what is the answer for America in the event this alliance becomes stronger? The answer is we re-invigorate Poland, to offset the power created by Germany and its new friend Russia.



CONCLUSION



I have always looked forward to George Friedman's next new book. His thinking is refreshing, it's original, it's provocative, but most of all, it is always brilliant and cutting edge. Every time I read Friedman, I feel like I am the President of the United States getting a briefing on a topic. It is that good. When he talks about the United States being a DEEP POWER, and Europe being a WEAK POWER, it all becomes clear. It hits it right on the head when he says that we Americans don't like being an Empire. We don't want an Empire, but we like the BENEFITS OF ONE. We want all the growth potential of OPEN MARKETS but we don't want the PAIN that comes from it. In politics we want and have enormous INFLUENCE in the world, but we don't want other people's RESENTMENT, and it goes hand in hand.



Finally, we are a COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC. As a 200 year old country, we were built on TRADE. That is why we have the largest navy in history-to protect the sea lanes. As the dominant power on the earth we have to manage our power. We could choose not to, but if we choose to be oblivious to our power, than the author likens us to a rampaging elephant and that doesn't seem helpful. Read the book and enlighten yourself. We are citizens of the most important country ever created. We owe it to ourselves to be individually responsible for our country's acts. Buy the book today, and thank you for reading this review.



Richard C. Stoyeck

5Machiavelli for the 21st Century
By Mercenary Trader

Format:Hardcover
Amazon Verified PurchaseGeorge Friedman's "The Next Decade" could alternately be described as Machiavelli 101 or a crash course in realpolitik.



Friedman's central thrust is this: America is an accidental empire - like it or hate it, the world must deal with it - and it is thus in the United States' best interest to maintain the "balance of power" at all costs.



The balance of power is predicated on status quo. When you are at the top of the heap (as America is in Friedman's view), any major shifts threaten to destabilize the top dog's position. As the British and Roman empires did before it, the American empire must anticipate and prevent such shifts, blocking up-and-comers from excessive power accumulation.



As Friedman sees it, a century is about events but a decade is about people. The main actor over the next ten years will be the POTUS, or President of the United States. In his role as shaper of strategy and manager of expectations, the POTUS must act as a classic "prince" in the Machiavelli mold.



This role also involves double-dealing with the populace, in terms of appearing to meet unreasonable demands (such as overwhelming focus on the war on terrorism) while actually focusing on more critical things (behind-the-scenes issues too nuanced or complicated to explain).



To safeguard America's interests, Friedman endorses what one might call an enlightened amorality - doing what is necessary for the sake of the greater good. Friedman argues for a middle ground between the idealists and the realists, pointing out unworkable flaws at both extremes. The idealists are ill-equipped to function in the real world, while the realists find themselves lost without a guiding moral compass. Ruthless execution in commitment to moral principle is the solution Friedman endorses.



It is easy to see how many people, Americans and non-Americans alike, will be offended by this book. Some will resent the broad brush strokes Friedman uses. Others will resent the hard-nosed subordination of idealistic principles, or strongly disagree with certain controversial forecasts.



But in many ways this book is more valuable as a high level thinking exercise than a blueprint for world events. It is useful to understand, if only in abstract, the various drivers that shape international relations - many of them deliberately unspoken.



Within the text, Friedman makes many provocative assertions. For example:



* Increased global interdependence via free trade can actually increase, rather than decrease, the danger of war.



* Osama Bin Laden's goal in attacking the U.S. was to encourage local overthrow of Middle Eastern governments (by demonstrating that seemingly invulnerable power structures are actually weak).



* Iran calculatingly embraced a "North Korea" strategy of appearing crazy and unstable for greater advantage at the negotiation table.



* It will be in America's best interests (from a balance of power standpoint) to back away from Israel - and strike up an uneasy strategic partnership with Iran.



* The European Union was formed out of necessity as a counterbalance to the consolidated power of America and the USSR.



* Poland will be a regional linchpin, especially in terms of counterbalancing a Germany-Russia linkage.



* The U.S. will need a nurturing relationship with China to contain a growing power imbalance with Japan (rather than the other way round).



Again, the most helpful thing about "The Next Decade" is not necessarily the accuracy of the fault lines portrayed, but the illumination of critical thinking as applied by geopolitical strategists in today's world.



As a trader with a global macro focus, my biggest criticism - and the reason the book only gets four stars - is because of the short shrift given to the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis.



In his chapter on the financial crisis, Friedman tips his hand early by saying "there was nothing at all extraordinary about what happened in 2008." (Really!) For the next few pages, the tendency to engage in sweeping generalities overlooks critical details that still shape the world situation today.



Friedman seems oblivious to the fact that the Federal Reserve, the banking system it serves, and Wall Street on the whole have their own internal geopolitics - a mix of influence, legacy and corruption that impacts the global economy greatly.



One is willing to give Friedman a partial pass in this area, as macroeconomics and monetary policy are not his chosen forte. Still, though, the weighting of various financial crisis variables seemed unacceptably light, given how money and finance could aggressively shape some potentially dramatic outcomes in the next few years. (Weimar Germany anyone? Panic of 1907?)



All in all, "The Next Decade" is a fast read (243 pages, written in plain English) that will certainly make you think, whether you whole-heartedly adopt Friedman's view or disagree with every page. The book could prove an especially fruitful exercise for traders and investors seeking to hone their big picture skills, via the extra practice of connecting dots and putting puzzle pieces together.



JS

The 2010s in the Eyes of a Top-Flight Thinker
By Eric Mayforth

Format:HardcoverAs hard as it is to believe, it has been more than a decade since the big ball fell in Times Square to denote the arrival of the twenty-first century. The first ten years of the century were dominated by the 9/11 attacks and the response to them that followed, as well as the financial crisis that rocked the world late in the decade. In "The Next Decade," George Friedman turns his attention to the second decade of the century.



Friedman argues that the United States is now an empire in that we can "rarely take a step without threatening some nation or benefiting another," and that we have an effect on so many countries--in some cases the impact is huge.



The author is concerned that America will lose the soul of its republic, and describes the type of president the country will need in order to balance the demands of empire with the retention of the republic, and showed how Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan balanced various demands in the past in order to further America's best interest.



The Middle East was the central focus of attention for our foreign policy in the last decade, and Friedman puts forth proposed solutions for relations with Israel and Iran in the new decade. He supports a balance of power approach that prevents coalitions from forming against U.S. interests and avoids the necessity of America becoming bogged down in any one region of the world, and also offers his opinion concerning the viability of the total elimination of the threat from terrorists.



Europe was repeatedly a flashpoint in the twentieth century, and the author devotes two chapters of the book to Russia and Europe--he thinks that one of the great dangers that Europe will face in the 2010s is a renewed entente between Russia and Germany and what the United States can do to prevent such an alliance. Other chapters discuss the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.



The majority of "The Next Decade" is devoted to foreign policy, but Friedman does look back at the 2008 financial crisis and the effect it will have on governments around the world in the near future. The author closes with a chapter on technology and demography, and discusses how those two areas will present challenges that must be addressed in the next ten years.



When the Soviet Union fell, many believed that history as we knew it was coming to an end. The first decade of the century proved otherwise, and whether or not you agree with Friedman on every issue, this book is an outstanding guide by one of America's best thinkers to "The Next Decade."

Thursday, August 9, 2012

Germany's Merkel Controlling the World's Financial Markets!!

A very interesting post from http://www.stratfor.com/ about the global influence of Angela Merkel. This follows this post about the fall of Syria's current regime.  This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran and Venezuela. For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read a very interesting book HERE.


Financial Markets, Politics and the New Reality




Stratfor

By George Friedman



Louis M. Bacon is the head of Moore Capital Management, one of the largest and most influential hedge funds in the world. Last week, he announced that he was returning one quarter of his largest fund, about $2 billion, to his investors. The reason he gave to The New York Times was that he had found it difficult to invest given the impossibility of predicting the European situation. He was quoted as saying, "The political involvement is so extreme -- we have not seen this since the postwar era. What they are doing is trying to thwart natural market outcomes. It is amazing how important the decision-making of one person, Angela Merkel, has become to world markets."



The purpose of hedge funds is to make money, and what Bacon essentially said was that it is impossible to make money when there is heavy political involvement, because political involvement introduces unpredictability in the market. Therefore, prudent investment becomes impossible. Hedge funds have become critical to global capital allocation because their actions influence other important actors, and their unwillingness to invest and trade has significant implications for capital availability. If others follow Moore Capital's lead, as they will, there will be greater difficulty in raising the capital needed to address the problem of Europe.



But more interesting is the reasoning. In Bacon's remarks, there is the idea that political decisions are unpredictable, or less predictable than economic decisions. Instead of seeing German Chancellor Merkel as a prisoner of non-market forces that constrain her actions, conventional investors seem to feel that Europe is now subject to Merkel's whims. I would argue that political decisions are predictable and that Merkel is not making decisions as much as reflecting the impersonal forces that drive her. If you understand those impersonal forces, it is possible to predict political behaviors, as you can market behaviors. Neither is an exact science, but properly done, neither is impossible.



Political Economy

In order to do this, you must begin with two insights. The first is that politics and the markets always interact. The very foundation of the market -- the limited liability corporation -- is political. What many take as natural is actually a political contrivance that allows investors to limit their liability. The manner in which liability is limited is a legal issue, not a market issue, and is designed by politicians. The structure of risk in modern society revolves around the corporation, and the corporation is an artifice of politics along with risk. There is nothing natural about a nation's corporate laws, and it is those corporate laws that define the markets.



There are times when politics leave such laws unchanged and times when politics intrude. The last generation has been a unique time in which the prosperity of the markets allowed the legal structure to remain generally unchanged. After 2008, that stability was no longer possible. But active political involvement in the markets is actually the norm, not the exception. Contemporary investors have taken a dramatic exception -- the last generation -- and lacking a historical sense have mistaken it for the norm. This explains the inability of contemporary investors to cope with things that prior generations constantly faced.



The second insight is the recognition that thinkers such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who modern investors so admire, understood this perfectly. They never used the term "economics" by itself, but only in conjunction with politics; they called it political economy. The term "economy" didn't stand by itself until the 1880s when a group called the Marginalists sought to mathematize economics and cast it free from politics as a stand-alone social science discipline. The quantification of economics and finance led to a belief -- never held by men like Smith -- that there was an independent sphere of economics where politics didn't intrude and that mathematics allowed markets to be predictable, if only politics wouldn't interfere.



Given that politics and economics could never be separated, the mathematics were never quite as predictive as one would have thought. The hyper-quantification of market analysis, oblivious to overriding political considerations, exacerbated market swings. Economists and financiers focused on the numbers instead of the political consequences of the numbers and the political redefinitions of the rules of corporate actors, which the political system had invented in the first place.



The world is not unpredictable, and neither is Europe nor Germany. The matter at hand is neither what politicians say they want to do nor what they secretly wish to do. Indeed, it is not in understanding what they will do. Rather, the key to predicting the political process is understanding constraints -- the things they can't do. Investors' view that markets are made unpredictable by politics misses two points. First, there has not been a market independent of politics since the corporation was invented. Second, politics and economics are both human endeavors, and both therefore have a degree of predictability.



Merkel's Constraints

The European Union was created for political reasons. Economic considerations were a means to an end, and that end was to stop the wars that had torn Europe apart in the first half of the 20th century. The key was linking Germany and France in an unbreakable alliance based on the promise of economic prosperity. Anyone who doesn't understand the political origins of the European Union and focuses only on its economic intent fails to understand how it works and can be taken by surprise by the actions of its politicians.



Postwar Europe evolved with Germany resuming its prewar role as a massive exporting power. For the Germans, the early versions of European unification became the foundation to the solution of the German problem, which was that Germany's productive capacity outstripped its ability to consume. Germany had to export in order to sustain its economy, and any barriers to free trade threatened German interests. The creation of a free trade zone in Europe was the fundamental imperative, and the more nations that free trade zone encompassed, the more markets were available to Germany. Therefore, Germany was aggressive in expanding the free trade zone.



Germany was also a great supporter of Europewide standards in areas such as employment policy, environmental policy and so on. These policies protect larger German companies, which are able to absorb the costs, from entrepreneurial competition from the rest of Europe. Raising the cost of entry into the marketplace was an important part of Germany's strategy.



Finally, Germany was a champion of the euro, a single currency controlled by a single bank over which Germany had influence in proportion to its importance. The single currency, with its focus on avoiding inflation, protected German creditors against European countries inflating their way out of debt. The debt was denominated in euros, the European Central Bank controlled the value of the euro, and European countries inside and outside the eurozone were trapped in this monetary policy.



So long as there was prosperity, the underlying problems of the system were hidden. But the 2008 crisis revealed the problems. First, most European countries had significant negative balances of trade with Germany. Second, European monetary policy focused on protecting the interests of Germany and, to a lesser extent, France. The regulatory regime created systemic rigidity, which protected existing large corporations.



Merkel's policy under these circumstances was imposed on her by reality. Germany was utterly dependent on its exports, and its exports in Europe were critical. She had to make certain that the free trade zone remained intact. Secondarily, she had to minimize the cost to Germany of stabilizing the system by shifting it onto other countries. She also had to convince her countrymen that the crisis was due to profligate Southern Europeans and that she would not permit them to take advantage of Germans. The truth was that the crisis was caused by Germany's using the trading system to flood markets with its goods, its limiting competition through regulations, and that for every euro carelessly borrowed, a euro was carelessly lent. Like a good politician, Merkel created the myth of the crafty Greek fooling the trusting Deutsche Bank examiner.



The rhetoric notwithstanding, Merkel's decision-making was clear. First, under no circumstances could she permit any country to leave the free trade zone of the European Union. Once that began she could not predict where it would end, save that it might end in German catastrophe. Second, for economic and political reasons she had to be as aggressive as possible with defaulting borrowers. But she could never be so aggressive as to cause them to decide that default and withdrawal made more sense than remaining in the system.



Merkel was not making decisions; she was acting out a script that had been written into the structure of the European Union and the German economy. Merkel would create crises that would shore up her domestic position, posture for the best conceivable deal without forcing withdrawal, and in the end either craft a deal that was not enforced or simply capitulate, putting the problem off until the next meeting of whatever group.



In the end, the Germans would have to absorb the cost of the crisis. Merkel, of course, knew that. She attempted to extract a new European structure in return for Germany's inevitable capitulation to Europe. Merkel understood that Europe, and one of the foundations of European prosperity, was cracking. Her solution was to propose a new structure in which European countries accepted Brussels' oversight of their domestic budgets as part of a systemic solution by the Germans. Some countries outright rejected this proposal, while others agreed, knowing it would never be implemented. Merkel's attempt to recoup by creating an even more powerful European apparatus was bound to fail for two reasons. First and most important, giving up sovereignty is not something nations do easily -- especially not European nations and not to what was effectively a German structure. Second, the rest of Europe knew that it didn't have to give in because in the end Germany would either underwrite the solution (by far the most likely outcome) or the free trade zone would shatter.



If we understand the obvious, then Merkel's actions were completely understandable. Germany needed the European Union more than any other country because of its trade dependency. Germany could not allow the union to devolve into disconnected nations. Therefore, Germany would constantly bluff and back off. The entire Greek drama was the exemplar of this. It was Merkel who was trapped and, being trapped, she was predictable.



The euro question was interesting because it intersected the banking system. But in focusing on the euro, investors failed to understand that it was a secondary issue. The European Union was a political institution and European unity came first. The lenders were far more concerned about the fate of their loans than the borrowers were. And whatever the shadow play of the European Central Bank, they would wind up doing the least they could do to avert default -- but they would avert default. The euro might have been what investors traded, but it was not what the game was about. The game was about the free trade zone and Franco-German unity. Merkel was not making decisions based on the euro, but on other more pressing considerations.



Modern Trading

The investors' problem is that they mistake the period between 1991 and 2008 as the norm and keep waiting for it to return. I saw it as a freakish period that could survive only until the next major financial crisis -- and there always is one. While the unusual period was under way, political and trade issues subsided under the balm of prosperity. During that time, the internal cycles and shifts of the European financial system operated with minimal external turbulence, and for those schooled in profiting from these financial eddies, it was a good time to trade.



Once the 2008 crisis hit external factors that were always there but quiescent became more overt. The internal workings of the financial system became dependent on external forces. We were in the world of political economy, and the political became like a tidal wave, making the trading cycles and opportunities that traders depended on since 1991 irrelevant. And so, having lost money in 2008, they could never find their footing again. They now lived in a world where Merkel was more important than a sharp trader.



Actually, Merkel was not more important than the trader. They were both trapped within constraints about which they could do nothing. But if those constraints were understood, Merkel's behavior could be predicted. The real problem for the hedge funds was not that they didn't understand what they were doing, but the manner in which they had traded in the past simply no longer worked. Even understanding and predicting what political leaders will do is of no value if you insist on a trading model built for a world that no longer exists.



What is called high velocity trading, constantly trading on the infinitesimal movements of a calm but predictable environment, doesn't work during a political tidal wave. And investors of the last generation do not know how to trade in a tidal wave. When we recall the two world wars and the Cold War, we see that this was the norm for the century and that fortunes were made. But the latest generation of investors wants to control risk rather than take advantage of new realities.



However we feel about the performance of the financial community since 2007, there must be a system of capital allocation. That can be operated by the state, but there is empirical evidence that the state isn't very good at making investment decisions. But then, the performance of the financial community has been equally unacceptable, with more than its share of mendacity to boot. The argument for private capital allocation may be theoretically powerful, but the fact is that the empirical validation of the private model hasn't been there for several years.



A strong argument can be made -- corruption and stupidity aside -- that the real problem has been a failure of imagination. We have re-entered an era in which political factors will dominate economic decisions. This has been the norm for a very long time, and traders who wait for the old era to return will be disappointed. Politics can be predicted if you understand the constraints under which a politician such as Merkel acts and don't believe that it is simply random decisions. But to do that, you have to return to Adam Smith and recall the title of his greatest work, The Wealth of Nations. Note that Smith was writing about nations, about politics and economics -- about political economy.





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Read more: Financial Markets, Politics and the New Reality
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Thursday, June 7, 2012

Is Greece European?

A very interesting post from http://www.stratfor.com/ about Greece, which is having strained relations with the EU and Germany in particular. This follows this post about the key nation of Romania, which could be a useful ally of the United States in the event of a Eurasian or European military threat. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran and Venezuela. For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read this very interesting book HERE!

Is Greece European?

By Robert D. Kaplan



Greece is where the West both begins and ends. The West -- as a humanist ideal -- began in ancient Athens where compassion for the individual began to replace the crushing brutality of the nearby civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. The war that Herodotus chronicles between Greece and Persia in the 5th century B.C. established a contrast between West and East that has persisted for millennia. Greece is Christian, but it is also Eastern Orthodox, as spiritually close to Russia as it is to the West, and geographically equidistant between Brussels and Moscow. Greece may have invented the West with the democratic innovations of the Age of Pericles, but for more than a thousand years it was a child of Byzantine and Turkish despotism. And while Greece was the northwestern bastion of the anciently civilized Near East, ever since history moved north into colder climates following the collapse of Rome, the inhabitants of Peninsular Greece have found themselves at the poor, southeastern extremity of Europe.



Modern Greece in particular has struggled against this bifurcated legacy. In an early 20th century replay of the Greco-Persian Wars, Greece's post-World War I military struggle with Turkey led to a signal Greek defeat and as a consequence, more than a million ethnic Greeks from Asia Minor escaped to Greece proper, further impoverishing the country. (This Greek diaspora in Asia Minor was a massive source of revenue until the Greeks were expelled.) Not only did World War I have a bloody and epic coda in Greece, so did World War II, which was followed by a civil war between rightists and communists. Greece's ultimate escape from the Warsaw Pact was a rather close-run affair: again, the effect of Greece's unstable geographical location between East and West.



Greece struggled on. As recently as the mid-1970s it was governed by a particularly brutal military dictatorship (led by colonels from the backwater of the Peloponnese), which lasted for seven years, and fear of another coup persisted during the initial stage of its reborn democracy. Even though the Olympic tradition began in Greece in antiquity and the first modern Olympics were held in Greece in 1896, Greece was denied the right to host the centenary modern Olympics in 1996 owing to the country's lack of preparedness in organization and infrastructure. Greece did host the 2004 Olympics, but the financial strain that the games put on Greece contributed to the country's economic fragility in the run-up to the current debt crisis.



It is not entirely an accident that Greece is the most economically troubled country in the European Union. The fact that it is located at Europe's southeastern back door also has something to do with it. For Greece's economic and political development bear marks of a legacy not wholly in the modern West.



Roughly three-quarters of Greek businesses are family-owned and rely on family labor, making meritocratic promotion difficult for those outside the family. Tax cheating is rampant. The economy suffers from a profound lack of competitiveness, even as Greece is mainly a service economy, relying on tourism, in which manufacturing constitutes a weak sector. Of course, these features have much to do with bad policies enacted over the years and decades, but they are also products of history and culture, which are, in turn, products of geography. Indeed, Greece lacks enough productive land to be an agricultural power.



Then there is political underdevelopment. Long into the 20th century, Greek political parties had a paternalistic, coffeehouse quality, centered on big personalities -- chieftains in all but name -- with little formal organizational support. George Papandreou, the grandfather of the recent prime minister of the same name, actually headed a party called the "George Papandreou Party." Political parties have been family businesses to a greater extent in Greece than in other Western democracies. The party in power not only dominated the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, as is normal and proper in a democracy, but the middle- and lower-echelons, too. State institutions from top to bottom were often overly politicized.



Moreover, rather than having a moderate left-wing party and a modern conservative one, as is common throughout Western Europe, in Greece through the early 1990s there was a hard-left party, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which during the Cold War openly sympathized with radical Arab regimes like Hafez al Assad's Syria and Moammar Gadhafi's Libya, and a somewhat reactionary right-wing party, New Democracy. The drift of both those leading parties toward the center is a relatively recent affair.



And so the creation of late of a hard-left party, SYRIZA, and a hard-right neo-Nazi movement, Golden Dawn (vaguely reminiscent of the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974), both harbor distant echoes of Greece's mid-20th century past. Ironically, while Greece's extreme economic crisis created these radical groupings in the first place, if these new parties fare badly in the upcoming poll it might indicate a firm rejection of extremism by Greek voters and a permanent turn toward the center -- toward political modernity, that is.



There is a tendency in all of this to throw one's hands up at the specter of the Greeks and declare them too much trouble than they're worth, at least for Europe. But such an attitude reeks of hypocrisy, even as it denies Western self-interest. When Greece joined the European Union in 1981, its economy was manifestly not ready; Brussels had made a rank political decision, not an economic one -- just as it would in admitting Greece to the eurozone in 2002. In both cases, the ground-level, domestic reality of the Greek economy was swept aside in favor of an abstract quasi-historical vision of Europe stretching from Iberia to the eastern Mediterranean.



Of course, Greece, during the 1980s -- when I lived there for seven years -- might have used the influx of cash from the European Union in order to discipline and reform its economy. Instead, then PASOK Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou used the money to swell the ranks of the bureaucracy. Thus, did Greece remain underdeveloped, and the dream-gamble of Brussels failed. The saddest irony is that the sins of the hard-left Andreas Papandreou were visited upon his well-meaning, center-left son, George, who had his short tenure as prime minister from 2009 to 2011 poisoned by his father's economic legacy.



But Western self-interest now demands that even if Greece leaves the eurozone -- and that is a big "if" -- it nevertheless remains anchored in the European Union and NATO. For whether Greece drops the euro or not, it faces years of severe economic hardship. That means, given its geographic location, Greece's political orientation should never be taken for granted. For example, the Chinese have invested heavily in developing part of the port of Piraeus, adjacent to Athens, even as Russia's economic and intelligence ties to the Greek area of Cyprus are extremely close. It has been speculated in the media that with Greece short of cash and Russia enjoying a surplus, were the Russians ejected from ports in Syria in the wake of a regime change there, Moscow would find a way to eventually make use of Greek naval facilities. Remember that Greece and Cyprus both have modern European histories mainly because they were claimed by Western powers for strategic reasons.



In other words, from the point of geography and geopolitics, Greece will be in play for years to come.





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Read more: Is Greece European? By Robert D. Kaplan
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