Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about the U.S. and its allies Israel and Saudi Arabia. This follows this post about the U.S. talks with Iran. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran. For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE.


Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement

Geopolitical Weekly


Stratfor By George Friedman



A deal between Iran and the P-5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) was reached Saturday night. The Iranians agreed to certain limitations on their nuclear program while the P-5+1 agreed to remove certain economic sanctions. The next negotiation, scheduled for six months from now depending on both sides' adherence to the current agreement, will seek a more permanent resolution. The key players in this were the United States and Iran. The mere fact that the U.S. secretary of state would meet openly with the Iranian foreign minister would have been difficult to imagine a few months ago, and unthinkable at the beginning of the Islamic republic.



The U.S. goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons before they are built, without the United States having to take military action to eliminate them. While it is commonly assumed that the United States could eliminate the Iranian nuclear program at will with airstrikes, as with most military actions, doing so would be more difficult and riskier than it might appear at first glance. The United States in effect has now traded a risky and unpredictable air campaign for some controls over the Iranian nuclear program.



The Iranians' primary goal is regime preservation. While Tehran managed the Green Revolution in 2009 because the protesters lacked broad public support, Western sanctions have dramatically increased the economic pressure on Iran and have affected a wide swath of the Iranian public. It isn't clear that public unhappiness has reached a breaking point, but were the public to be facing years of economic dysfunction, the future would be unpredictable. The election of President Hassan Rouhani to replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after the latter's two terms was a sign of unhappiness. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei clearly noted this, displaying a willingness to trade a nuclear program that had not yet produced a weapon for the elimination of some sanctions.



The logic here suggests a process leading to the elimination of all sanctions in exchange for the supervision of Iran's nuclear activities to prevent it from developing a weapon. Unless this is an Iranian trick to somehow buy time to complete a weapon and test it, I would think that the deal could be done in six months. An Iranian ploy to create cover for building a weapon would also demand a reliable missile and a launch pad invisible to surveillance satellites and the CIA, National Security Agency, Mossad, MI6 and other intelligence agencies. The Iranians would likely fail at this, triggering airstrikes however risky they might be and putting Iran back where it started economically. While this is a possibility, the scenario is not likely when analyzed closely.



While the unfolding deal involves the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany, two countries intensely oppose it: Israel and Saudi Arabia. Though not powers on the order of the P-5+1, they are still significant. There is a bit of irony in Israel and Saudi Arabia being allied on this issue, but only on the surface. Both have been intense enemies of Iran, and close allies of the United States; each sees this act as a betrayal of its relationship with Washington.



The View from Saudi Arabia

In a way, this marks a deeper shift in relations with Saudi Arabia than with Israel. Saudi Arabia has been under British and later American protection since its creation after World War I. Under the leadership of the Sauds, it became a critical player in the global system for a single reason: It was a massive producer of oil. It was also the protector of Mecca and Medina, two Muslim holy cities, giving the Saudis an added influence in the Islamic world on top of their extraordinary wealth.



It was in British and American interests to protect Saudi Arabia from its enemies, most of which were part of the Muslim world. The United States protected the Saudis from radical Arab socialists who threatened to overthrow the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. It later protected Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. But it also protected Saudi Arabia from Iran.



Absent the United States in the Persian Gulf, Iran would have been the most powerful regional military power. In addition, the Saudis have a substantial Shiite minority concentrated in the country's oil-rich east. The Iranians, also Shia, had a potential affinity with them, and thereby the power to cause unrest in Saudi Arabia.



Until this agreement with Iran, the United States had an unhedged commitment to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iranians. Given the recent deal, and potential follow-on deals, this commitment becomes increasingly hedged. The problem from the Saudi point of view is that while there was a wide ideological gulf between the United States and Iran, there was little in the way of substantial issues separating Washington from Tehran. The United States did not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranians didn't want the United States hindering Iran's economic development. The fact was that getting a nuclear weapon was not a fundamental Iranian interest, and crippling Iran's economy was not a fundamental interest to the United States absent an Iranian nuclear program.



If the United States and Iran can agree on this quid pro quo, the basic issues are settled. And there is something drawing them together. The Iranians want investment in their oil sector and other parts of their economy. American oil companies would love to invest in Iran, as would other U.S. businesses. As the core issue separating the two countries dissolves, and economic relations open up -- a step that almost by definition will form part of a final agreement -- mutual interests will appear.



There are other significant political issues that can't be publicly addressed. The United States wants Iran to temper its support for Hezbollah's militancy, and guarantee it will not support terrorism. The Iranians want guarantees that Iraq will not develop an anti-Iranian government, and that the United States will work to prevent this. (Iran's memories of its war with Iraq run deep.) The Iranians will also want American guarantees that Washington will not support anti-Iranian forces based in Iraq.



From the Saudi point of view, Iranian demands regarding Iraq will be of greatest concern. Agreements or not, it does not want a pro-Iranian Shiite state on its northern border. Riyadh has been funding Sunni fighters throughout the region against Shiite fighters in a proxy war with Iran. Any agreement by the Americans to respect Iranian interests in Iraq would represent a threat to Saudi Arabia.



The View from Israel

From the Israeli point of view, there are two threats from Iran. One is the nuclear program. The other is Iranian support not only for Hezbollah but also for Hamas and other groups in the region. Iran is far from Israel and poses no conventional military threat. The Israelis would be delighted if Iran gave up its nuclear program in some verifiable way, simply because they themselves have no reliable means to destroy that program militarily. What the Israelis don't want to see is the United States and Iran making deals on their side issues, especially the political ones that really matter to Israel.



The Israelis have more room to maneuver than the Saudis do. Israel can live with a pro-Iranian Iraq. The Saudis can't; from their point of view, it is only a matter of time before Iranian power starts to encroach on their sphere of influence. The Saudis can't live with an Iranian-supported Hezbollah. The Israelis can and have, but don't want to; the issue is less fundamental to the Israelis than Iraq is to the Saudis.



But in the end, this is not the problem that the Saudis and Israelis have. Their problem is that both depend on the United States for their national security. Neither country can permanently exist in a region filled with dangers without the United States as a guarantor. Israel needs access to American military equipment that it can't build itself, like fighter aircraft. Saudi Arabia needs to have American troops available as the ultimate guarantor of their security, as they were in 1990. Israel and Saudi Arabia have been the two countries with the greatest influence in Washington. As this agreement shows, that is no longer the case. Both together weren't strong enough to block this agreement. What frightens them the most about this agreement is that fact. If the foundation of their national security is the American commitment to them, then the inability to influence Washington is a threat to their national security.



There are no other guarantors available. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went to Moscow, clearly trying to get the Russians to block the agreement. He failed. But even if he had succeeded, he would have alienated the United States, and would have gotten instead a patron incapable of supplying the type of equipment Israel might need when Israel might need it. The fact is that neither the Saudis nor the Israelis have a potential patron other than the United States.



U.S. Regional Policy

The United States is not abandoning either Israel or Saudi Arabia. A regional policy based solely on the Iranians would be irrational. What the United States wants to do is retain its relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia, but on modified terms. The modification is that U.S. support will come in the context of a balance of power, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While the United States is prepared to support the Saudis in that context, it will not simply support them absolutely. The Saudis and Israelis will have to live with things that they have not had to live with before -- namely, an American concern for a reasonably strong and stable Iran regardless of its ideology.



The American strategy is built on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has learned that it has interests in the region, but that the direct use of American force cannot achieve those goals, partly because imposing solutions takes more force than the United States has and partly because the more force it uses, the more resistance it generates. Therefore, the United States needs a means of minimizing its interests, and pursuing those it has without direct force.



With its interests being limited, the United States' strategy is a balance of power. The most natural balance of power is Sunni versus Shia, the Arabs against the Iranians. The goal is not war, but sufficient force on each side to paralyze the other. In that sense, a stable Iran and a more self-reliant Saudi Arabia are needed. Saudi Arabia is not abandoned, but nor is it the sole interest of the United States.



In the same sense, the United States is committed to the survival of Israel. If Iranian nuclear weapons are prevented, the United States has fulfilled that commitment, since there are no current threats that could conceivably threaten Israeli survival. Israel's other interests, such as building settlements in the West Bank, do not require American support. If the United States determines that they do not serve American interests (for example, because they radicalize the region and threaten the survival of Jordan), then the United States will force Israel to abandon the settlements by threatening to change its relationship with Israel. If the settlements do not threaten American interests, then they are Israel's problem.



Israel has outgrown its dependence on the United States. It is not clear that Israel is comfortable with its own maturation, but the United States has entered a new period where what America wants is a mature Israel that can pursue its interests without recourse to the United States. And if Israel finds it cannot have what it wants without American support, Israel may not get that support, unless Israel's survival is at stake.



In the same sense, the perpetual Saudi inability to create an armed force capable of effectively defending itself has led the United States to send troops on occasion -- and contractors always -- to deal with the problem. Under the new strategy, the expectation is that Saudi soldiers will fight Saudi Arabia's wars -- with American assistance as needed, but not as an alternative force.



With this opening to Iran, the United States will no longer be bound by its Israeli and Saudi relationships. They will not be abandoned, but the United States has broader interests than those relationships, and at the same time few interests that rise to the level of prompting it to directly involve U.S. troops. The Saudis will have to exert themselves to balance the Iranians, and Israel will have to wend its way in a world where it has no strategic threats, but only strategic problems, like everyone else has. It is not a world in which Israeli or Saudi rigidity can sustain itself.



Send us your thoughts on this report.



Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the following sentence, including the hyperlink to Stratfor, at the beginning or end of the report.

"Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement is republished with permission of Stratfor."





Read more: Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement
Stratfor

Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter
Stratfor on Facebook

Editorial: Changing the subject from Obamacare!

Editorial

Last week was an attempt to get away from the failings of Obamacare, and that is far more than website failures. The two attempts were the end of the Senate Filibuster, and the Iran deal (appeasement?). The next attempt is likely to be another gun control attempt.

Are the distractions succeeeding in what the President wants to do?

The U.S.-Iran Talks: Ideology and Necessity

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about the U.S. talks with Iran. This follows this post about U.S. citizens receiving “sensitivity training” over their views about the terrorists the U.S. is fighting. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran. For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE.

The U.S.-Iran Talks: Ideology and Necessity


By George Friedman


The talks between Iran and the Western powers have ended but have not failed. They will reconvene next week. That in itself is a dramatic change from the past, when such talks invariably began in failure. In my book The Next Decade, I argued that the United States and Iran would move toward strategic alignment, and I think that is what we are seeing take shape. Of course, there is no guarantee that the talks will yield a settlement or that they will evolve into anything more meaningful. But the mere possibility requires us to consider three questions: Why is this happening now, what would a settlement look like, and how will it affect the region if it happens?



Precedents

It is important to recognize that despite all of the other actors on the stage, this negotiation is between the United States and Iran. It is also important to understand that while this phase of the discussion is entirely focused on Iran's nuclear development and sanctions, an eventual settlement would address U.S. and Iranian relations and how those relations affect the region. If the nuclear issue were resolved and the sanctions removed, then matters such as controlling Sunni extremists, investment in Iran and maintaining the regional balance of power would all be on the table. In solving these two outstanding problems, the prospect of a new U.S.-Iranian relationship would have to be taken seriously.



But first, there are great obstacles to overcome. One is ideology. Iran regards the United States as the Great Satan. The United States regards Iran as part of the Axis of Evil. For the Iranians, memories of a U.S.-sponsored coup in 1953 and Washington's support for the Shah are vivid. Americans above the age of 35 cannot forget the Iranian hostage crisis, when Iranians seized some 50 U.S. Embassy employees. Iran believes the United States has violated its sovereignty; the United States believes Iran has violated basic norms of international law. Each views the other as barbaric. Add to this that the ideology of radical Islamism regards the United States as corrupt and evil, and the ideology of the United States sees Iran as brutal and repressive, and it would seem that resolution is impossible.



From the American side, there is precedent for reconciling national differences: China. When the United States reached out to China in the 1970s, Beijing was supplying weapons to the North Vietnamese, who used them against American troops. China's rhetoric about U.S. imperialism, replete with "running dogs," portrayed the United States as monstrous. The United States saw China, a nuclear power, as a greater threat for nuclear war than the Soviet Union, since Mao had openly stated -- and seemed to mean it -- that communists ought to welcome nuclear war rather than fear it. Given the extremism and brutality of the Cultural Revolution, the ideological bar seemed insurmountable.



But the strategic interests of both countries superseded ideology. They did not recognize each other, but they did need each other. The relative power of the Soviet Union had risen. There had been heavy fighting between China and the Soviet Union along the Ussuri River in 1969, and Soviet troops were heavily deployed along China's border. The United States had begun to redeploy troops from Europe to Southeast Asia when it became clear it was losing the Vietnam War.



Each side was concerned that if the Soviet Union chose to attack China or NATO separately, it could defeat them. However, if China and the United States collaborated, no Soviet attack would be possible, lest Moscow start a two-front war it couldn't win. It was not necessary to sign a treaty of military alliance or even mention this possibility. Simply meeting, talking and establishing diplomatic relations with China would force the Soviet Union to consider the possibility that Washington and Beijing had a tacit understanding -- or that even without an understanding, an attack on one of them would trigger a response by the other. After all, if NATO or China were defeated, the Soviets would be able to overpower the other at its discretion. Therefore, by moving the relationship from total hostility to minimal accommodation, the strategic balance changed.



In looking at Iran, the most important thing to note is the difference between its rhetoric and its actions. If you listened to Iranian government officials in the past, you would think they were preparing for the global apocalypse. In truth, Iranian foreign policy has been extremely measured. Its one major war, which it fought against Iraq in the 1980s, was not initiated by Iran. It has supported third parties such as Hezbollah and Syria, sending supplies and advisers, but it has been extremely cautious in the use of its own overt power. In the early days of the Islamic republic, whenever Tehran was confronted with American interests, it would pull closer to the Soviet Union, an atheistic country making war in neighboring Afghanistan. It needed a counterweight to the United States and put ideology aside, even in its earliest, most radical days.



New Strategic Interests

Ideology is not trivial, but ultimately it is not the arbiter of foreign relations. Like all countries, the United States and Iran have strategic issues that influence their actions. Iran attempted to create an arc of influence from western Afghanistan to Beirut, the key to which was preserving and dominating the Syrian regime. The Iranians failed in Syria, where the regime exists but no longer governs much of the country. The blowback from this failure has been an upsurge in Sunni militant activity against the Shiite-dominated regime.



But the arc of influence was interrupted elsewhere, particularly Iraq, which has proved to be the major national security challenge facing Iran. Coupled with the failures in Syria, the degradation of Iraq has put Iran on the defensive when, just one year earlier, it was poised to change the balance of power in its favor.



At the same time, Iran found that its nuclear program had prompted a seriously detrimental sanctions regime. Stratfor has long argued that the Iranian nuclear program was primarily a bargaining chip to be traded for guarantees on its security and recognition of its regional power. It was meant to appear threatening, not to be threatening. This is why, for years, Iran was "only months" away from a weapon. The problem was that despite its growing power, Iran could no longer withstand the economic repercussions of the sanctions regime. In light of Syria and Iraq, the nuclear program was a serious miscalculation that produced an economic crisis. The failures in foreign policy and the subsequent economic crisis discredited the policies of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, changed the thinking of the supreme leader and ultimately led to the electoral victory of President Hassan Rouhani. The ideology may not have changed, but the strategic reality had. Rouhani for years had been worried about the stability of the regime and was thus critical of Ahmadinejad's policies. He knew that Iran had to redefine its foreign policy.



The United States has also been changing its strategy. During the 2000s, it tried to deal with Sunni radicals through the direct use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States could not continue to commit its main force in the Islamic world when that very commitment gave other nations, such as Russia, the opportunity to maneuver without concern for U.S. military force. The United States did have a problem with al Qaeda, but it needed a new strategy for dealing with it. Syria provided a model. The United States declined to intervene unilaterally against the al Assad regime because it did not want to empower a radical Sunni government. It preferred to allow Syria's factions to counterbalance each other such that neither side was in control.



This balance-of-power approach was the alternative to direct military commitment. The United States was not the only country concerned about Sunni radicalism. Iran, a Shiite power ultimately hostile to Sunnis, was equally concerned about jihadists. Saudi Arabia, Iran's regional rival, at times opposed Islamist radicals (in Saudi Arabia) and supported them elsewhere (in Syria or Iraq). The American relationship with Saudi Arabia, resting heavily on oil, had changed. The United States had plenty of oil now and the Saudis' complex strategies simply no longer matched American interests. On the broadest level, a stronger Iran, aligned with the United States, would counter Sunni ambitions. It would not address the question of North Africa or other smaller issues, but it would force Saudi Arabia to reshape its policies.



The Arab Spring also was a consideration. A mainstay of Washington's Iran policy was that at some point there would be an uprising that would overthrow the regime. The 2009 uprising, never really a threat to the regime, was seen as a rehearsal. If there was likely to be an uprising, there was no need to deal with Iran. Then the Arab Spring occurred. Many in the Obama administration misread the Arab Spring, expecting it to yield more liberal regimes. That didn't happen. Egypt has not evolved, Syria has devolved into civil war, Bahrain has seen Saudi Arabia repress its uprising, and Libya has found itself on the brink of chaos. Not a single liberal democratic regime emerged. It became clear that there would be no uprising in Iran, and even if there were, the results would not likely benefit the United States.



A strategy of encouraging uprisings no longer worked. A strategy of large-scale intervention was unsustainable. The idea of attacking Iran was unpalatable. Even if the administration agreed with Israel and thought that the nuclear program was intended to produce a nuclear weapon, it was not clear that the program could be destroyed from the air.



Therefore, in the particular case of Iran's nuclear program, the United States could only employ sanctions. On the broader issue of managing American interests in the Middle East, the United States had to find more options. It could not rely entirely on Saudi Arabia, which has dramatically different regional interests. It could not rely entirely on Israel, which by itself could not solve the Iranian problem militarily. These realities forced the United States to recalibrate its relationship with Iran at a time when Iran had to recalibrate its relationship with the United States.



All Things Possible

The first U.S.-Iranian discussions would obviously be on the immediate issue -- the nuclear program and sanctions. There are many technical issues involved there, the most important of which is that both sides must show that they don't need a settlement. No one negotiating anything will simply accept the first offer, not when they expect the negotiations to move on to more serious issues. Walking away from the table for 10 days gives both sides some credibility.



The real negotiations will come after the nuclear and sanctions issues are addressed. They will pertain to U.S.-Iranian relations more broadly. Each side will use the other to its advantage. The Iranians will use the United States to repair its economy, and the Americans will use the Iranians to create a balance of power with Sunni states. This will create indirect benefits for both sides. Iran's financial woes will be an opportunity for American companies to invest. The Americans' need for a balance of power will give Iran weight against its own enemies, even after the collapse of its strategy.



The region will of course look different but not dramatically so. The balance of power idea does not mean a rupture with Saudi Arabia or Israel. The balance of power only works if the United States maintains strong relationships on all sides. The Saudis and Israelis will not like American rebalancing. Their choices in the matter are limited, but they can take comfort from the fact that a strictly pro-Iranian policy is impossible for the United States. The American strategy with China in the 1970s was to try to become the power that balanced the Soviet Union and China. After meeting with the Chinese, Henry Kissinger went to Moscow. Thus, in terms of bilateral relationships, U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Israeli relations can stay the same. But it now creates another relationship and option for the United States. In the end, Iran is still a secondary power and the United States is the primary power. Iran will take advantage of the relationship, and the United States will manage it.



It is hard to imagine this evolution, considering what the United States and Iran have said about each other for the past 34 years. But relations among nations are not about sentiment; they are about interest. If Roosevelt could ally with Stalin, and Nixon with Mao, then it is clear that all things are possible in U.S. foreign policy. For their part, the Persians have endured for millennia, espousing many ideologies but doing what was necessary to survive and prosper. All of this may well fall apart, but there is a compelling logic to believe that it will not, and it will not be as modest a negotiation as it appears now.



Send us your thoughts on this report.


Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the following sentence, including the hyperlink to Stratfor, at the beginning or end of the report.

"The U.S.-Iran Talks: Ideology and Necessity is republished with permission of Stratfor."

The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World

A very interesting book review from http://www.amazon.com/ about foreign policy advice for the next decade. This follows this post about the U.S. in the post "jihad-war: world. This follows this post about America breaking up due to unrestricted immigration.  This follows this post about how to Report Illegal Immigrants! For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and  HERE and you can read another very interesting book HERE.





The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World


George Friedman  
If there is a more informative thinker writing today, you let me know - EXTRAORDINARY - 5 STARS !!!! 

By A Customer TOP 500 REVIEWERVINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover
Amazon Verified PurchaseIn the 1950's John Von Neumann was acknowledged as the greatest mathematician of the 20th century. A man so smart that the United States military said that when you asked Von Neumann a question, if he answered you, there was no need to think about it any longer. He was that far ahead of everyone else in the room. Author George Friedman is an extraordinary thinker, and he is paid to think, which makes for an interesting profession. Born in Hungary, and educated at the City College of New York, he has a Ph.D. in government from Cornell. He then teaches for 20 years at Dickinson College.



His real deal however is that for years he would brief senior commanders in the armed services, and you can't blow smoke when you do this. People simply get onto you, and they do not suffer fools gladly. For years now, he has run Stratfor which is a think tank specializing in intelligence matters. They also have a paid subscription service for those who are interested in current, cutting edge information on geo-political matters. He has authored more than a half dozen books, all of which have been profoundly interesting and what I call page-turners.



In this book, The Next Decade, Friedman only goes out ten years in time compared to his previous work when he went out 100 years. It is the author's contention that with the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has become pre-eminent in the world militarily, politically, economically, and no one is even close. We have become an EMPIRE like it or not. Now we may be an Empire that doesn't like being an Empire similar to ancient Rome or Great Britain in the 19th century, but it doesn't change facts, and the facts are we are what we are.



The second theme of this book is that since we are an Empire, we must learn to manage the Empire, and at this, it does not seem that we have given it much thought. The author does a thorough job of going through three Presidents, Lincoln, FDR and Reagan, all of whom were great influences in the creation of our Empire. As Great Britain was the pivot point of the world up until WWI, the United States is now the pivot point or fulcrum of the world and that is not going to change. His feelings on China are darn right fascinating. He believes the so-called Chinese miracle will come to an end fairly soon, and China's growth rate will slow down to that of a mature economic power. This may well be. It is also Friedman's opinion that in another five years if China's growth continues, they will still have a billion people living in abject poverty. You don't read this kind of thinking anywhere else.



Is An EMPIRE Worth the Price of a Republic?



Friedman very clearly brings forth a concept that the very creation of an empire means a loss of liberty to some extent for its citizens. The question becomes how great a loss, but it is obvious that the author worries about this loss of liberty. Do we want our government to install sufficient numbers of computers at the National Security Agency to monitor one billion phone calls? What does this mean for democracy in America, and the loss of personal freedom associated with it? This is really the big question for the author, and it needs to be thought about and answered.



On the foreign policy side, the author believes that terrorism cannot be eradicated from the earth, but sufficiently damaged as to bring it under control. Al Qaeda has sought to create chaos in the Muslim world, and reconstitute an Islamic Caliphate, which was a theocracy established by Mohammad in the 7th century. Clearly, this is not going to happen. At the same time, the United States invades Iraq, and then re-invades Afghanistan recently, a process Friedman refers to as slamming into the Muslim world. These are really spoiling attacks, and they cost us dearly in terms of treasure, and energy.



We have put a trillion dollars into Iraq and we don't even know the amount for Afghanistan, although we do know that one American solider costs us one million dollars per year to send overseas. That amounts to a billion dollars per 1,000 soldiers, a number that is not even comprehendible under normal thinking. Friedman's answer seems to be that the United States should encourage regional balances of power. If we continue to build up Japan, South Korea and Indonesia, than we do not have to worry about China. This is because China will be concerned with their newly powerful neighbors.



He feels that we have not created a proper working relationship with Russia, and we have driven the Russians into a working relationship with the Germans of all people. At first it does not make sense, but then when you follow his logic and this author always has impeccable logic, it does make sense. The Germans do not want any more immigration. They have massive problems with the people coming into the country now including the Arabs. At the same time, the Germans have massive technological expertise, on a par with America. The Russians have massive manpower and not technology. You can combine the two and both Germany and Russia will benefit. It makes sense, and this is why you read Friedman. So what is the answer for America in the event this alliance becomes stronger? The answer is we re-invigorate Poland, to offset the power created by Germany and its new friend Russia.



CONCLUSION



I have always looked forward to George Friedman's next new book. His thinking is refreshing, it's original, it's provocative, but most of all, it is always brilliant and cutting edge. Every time I read Friedman, I feel like I am the President of the United States getting a briefing on a topic. It is that good. When he talks about the United States being a DEEP POWER, and Europe being a WEAK POWER, it all becomes clear. It hits it right on the head when he says that we Americans don't like being an Empire. We don't want an Empire, but we like the BENEFITS OF ONE. We want all the growth potential of OPEN MARKETS but we don't want the PAIN that comes from it. In politics we want and have enormous INFLUENCE in the world, but we don't want other people's RESENTMENT, and it goes hand in hand.



Finally, we are a COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC. As a 200 year old country, we were built on TRADE. That is why we have the largest navy in history-to protect the sea lanes. As the dominant power on the earth we have to manage our power. We could choose not to, but if we choose to be oblivious to our power, than the author likens us to a rampaging elephant and that doesn't seem helpful. Read the book and enlighten yourself. We are citizens of the most important country ever created. We owe it to ourselves to be individually responsible for our country's acts. Buy the book today, and thank you for reading this review.



Richard C. Stoyeck

5Machiavelli for the 21st Century
By Mercenary Trader

Format:Hardcover
Amazon Verified PurchaseGeorge Friedman's "The Next Decade" could alternately be described as Machiavelli 101 or a crash course in realpolitik.



Friedman's central thrust is this: America is an accidental empire - like it or hate it, the world must deal with it - and it is thus in the United States' best interest to maintain the "balance of power" at all costs.



The balance of power is predicated on status quo. When you are at the top of the heap (as America is in Friedman's view), any major shifts threaten to destabilize the top dog's position. As the British and Roman empires did before it, the American empire must anticipate and prevent such shifts, blocking up-and-comers from excessive power accumulation.



As Friedman sees it, a century is about events but a decade is about people. The main actor over the next ten years will be the POTUS, or President of the United States. In his role as shaper of strategy and manager of expectations, the POTUS must act as a classic "prince" in the Machiavelli mold.



This role also involves double-dealing with the populace, in terms of appearing to meet unreasonable demands (such as overwhelming focus on the war on terrorism) while actually focusing on more critical things (behind-the-scenes issues too nuanced or complicated to explain).



To safeguard America's interests, Friedman endorses what one might call an enlightened amorality - doing what is necessary for the sake of the greater good. Friedman argues for a middle ground between the idealists and the realists, pointing out unworkable flaws at both extremes. The idealists are ill-equipped to function in the real world, while the realists find themselves lost without a guiding moral compass. Ruthless execution in commitment to moral principle is the solution Friedman endorses.



It is easy to see how many people, Americans and non-Americans alike, will be offended by this book. Some will resent the broad brush strokes Friedman uses. Others will resent the hard-nosed subordination of idealistic principles, or strongly disagree with certain controversial forecasts.



But in many ways this book is more valuable as a high level thinking exercise than a blueprint for world events. It is useful to understand, if only in abstract, the various drivers that shape international relations - many of them deliberately unspoken.



Within the text, Friedman makes many provocative assertions. For example:



* Increased global interdependence via free trade can actually increase, rather than decrease, the danger of war.



* Osama Bin Laden's goal in attacking the U.S. was to encourage local overthrow of Middle Eastern governments (by demonstrating that seemingly invulnerable power structures are actually weak).



* Iran calculatingly embraced a "North Korea" strategy of appearing crazy and unstable for greater advantage at the negotiation table.



* It will be in America's best interests (from a balance of power standpoint) to back away from Israel - and strike up an uneasy strategic partnership with Iran.



* The European Union was formed out of necessity as a counterbalance to the consolidated power of America and the USSR.



* Poland will be a regional linchpin, especially in terms of counterbalancing a Germany-Russia linkage.



* The U.S. will need a nurturing relationship with China to contain a growing power imbalance with Japan (rather than the other way round).



Again, the most helpful thing about "The Next Decade" is not necessarily the accuracy of the fault lines portrayed, but the illumination of critical thinking as applied by geopolitical strategists in today's world.



As a trader with a global macro focus, my biggest criticism - and the reason the book only gets four stars - is because of the short shrift given to the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis.



In his chapter on the financial crisis, Friedman tips his hand early by saying "there was nothing at all extraordinary about what happened in 2008." (Really!) For the next few pages, the tendency to engage in sweeping generalities overlooks critical details that still shape the world situation today.



Friedman seems oblivious to the fact that the Federal Reserve, the banking system it serves, and Wall Street on the whole have their own internal geopolitics - a mix of influence, legacy and corruption that impacts the global economy greatly.



One is willing to give Friedman a partial pass in this area, as macroeconomics and monetary policy are not his chosen forte. Still, though, the weighting of various financial crisis variables seemed unacceptably light, given how money and finance could aggressively shape some potentially dramatic outcomes in the next few years. (Weimar Germany anyone? Panic of 1907?)



All in all, "The Next Decade" is a fast read (243 pages, written in plain English) that will certainly make you think, whether you whole-heartedly adopt Friedman's view or disagree with every page. The book could prove an especially fruitful exercise for traders and investors seeking to hone their big picture skills, via the extra practice of connecting dots and putting puzzle pieces together.



JS

The 2010s in the Eyes of a Top-Flight Thinker
By Eric Mayforth

Format:HardcoverAs hard as it is to believe, it has been more than a decade since the big ball fell in Times Square to denote the arrival of the twenty-first century. The first ten years of the century were dominated by the 9/11 attacks and the response to them that followed, as well as the financial crisis that rocked the world late in the decade. In "The Next Decade," George Friedman turns his attention to the second decade of the century.



Friedman argues that the United States is now an empire in that we can "rarely take a step without threatening some nation or benefiting another," and that we have an effect on so many countries--in some cases the impact is huge.



The author is concerned that America will lose the soul of its republic, and describes the type of president the country will need in order to balance the demands of empire with the retention of the republic, and showed how Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan balanced various demands in the past in order to further America's best interest.



The Middle East was the central focus of attention for our foreign policy in the last decade, and Friedman puts forth proposed solutions for relations with Israel and Iran in the new decade. He supports a balance of power approach that prevents coalitions from forming against U.S. interests and avoids the necessity of America becoming bogged down in any one region of the world, and also offers his opinion concerning the viability of the total elimination of the threat from terrorists.



Europe was repeatedly a flashpoint in the twentieth century, and the author devotes two chapters of the book to Russia and Europe--he thinks that one of the great dangers that Europe will face in the 2010s is a renewed entente between Russia and Germany and what the United States can do to prevent such an alliance. Other chapters discuss the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.



The majority of "The Next Decade" is devoted to foreign policy, but Friedman does look back at the 2008 financial crisis and the effect it will have on governments around the world in the near future. The author closes with a chapter on technology and demography, and discusses how those two areas will present challenges that must be addressed in the next ten years.



When the Soviet Union fell, many believed that history as we knew it was coming to an end. The first decade of the century proved otherwise, and whether or not you agree with Friedman on every issue, this book is an outstanding guide by one of America's best thinkers to "The Next Decade."