Showing posts with label Hassan Rouhani. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hassan Rouhani. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

The Future of OPEC

A very interesting post from www.stratfor.com about OPEC, which supplies most of the world's oil. This follows this post about Iran possibly walking away from its recent deal with the U.S. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries. For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE.


The Future of OPEC

 
The Future of OPEC
Pump jacks in the Kurdish town of Derik, on the border with Turkey and Iraq, Nov. 25. (ACHILLEAS ZAVALLIS/AFP/Getty Images)

Summary

The prospect of revitalized oil production in Iraq and Iran may add to tensions between those two countries and Saudi Arabia over production quotas. On Dec. 4, representatives of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will meet in Vienna to discuss a number of topics. OPEC is facing two challenges. First, OPEC's historically biggest consumer -- the United States -- is rapidly increasing its own domestic production. At the same time, OPEC must deal with plans to expand oil production envisioned both by Iraq and Iran, which could lead to lower prices than the cartel desires. Ultimately, however, emerging markets in Asia will set global demand, and their energy thirst will determine the scale of the problem OPEC faces.

Analysis

OPEC was organized in the early 1960s by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela with the primary goal of unifying the five countries' oil export policies -- and hopefully dictating a high price for their oil. The five countries certainly possessed that power when the cartel was initially formed, and while the cartel still produces about 40 percent of the world's oil, OPEC's dominance has declined over the years. Today, only Saudi Arabia and to a certain extent the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait retain the ability to voluntarily adjust production levels. OPEC's other members -- Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador and Angola -- must maintain production to finance their national budgets. Effectively, this means that OPEC wields nowhere near the power it once did. Even a producer of Saudi Arabia's size is barely able to change the price of oil through boosting or cutting production.
A new wave of oil production outside the cartel has already hit. Production in the United States has increased to an estimated 8 million barrels per day -- the highest level since the 1980s. Elsewhere, production is set to take off in Canada and potentially Brazil. At the same time, increased production outside OPEC is dwarfed by the ambitious expansion plans put forward by OPEC members Iraq and Iran. While production outside the cartel is manageable, together with Iraq and Iran's plans it could represent a significant threat to oil prices in the latter half of the decade.

Iraq and Iran's Ambitions

Iraq's energy sector has been revitalized after the past five years and is now producing nearly 3.5 million barrels per day. Its oil ministry has set several ambitious goals, including production hitting 9 million to 10 million barrels per day by 2020. Iran, too, sees prospects for boosted production on the horizon. Complementing the negotiations with the United States on a possible long-term rapprochement, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has started a significant reform campaign hoping to bring oil production back to the pre-sanction level of 4.2 million barrels per day within six months and increase it to the pre-revolution level of 6 million barrels per day within 18 months. To be clear, both goals are not attainable within their respective time frames, but significant increases are possible.
The amount of production that comes online in Iraq will largely depend on two factors. First, the political system and violence will shape the pace of investment and regulatory procedures, such as issuing contracts and permits. Second and more important, there are logistical limitations to bringing online that level of production in such a short period of time. Some of these limitations can be overcome with proper coordination between international oil companies, oil services providers, the Shia surrounding the Basra region and the various political interest groups in Baghdad. Adroit cooperation between all of these parties is unlikely, meaning Iraq will fall short of Baghdad's lofty goals, but Iraq can reach about 5 million to 6 million barrels per day by 2020, and closer to 6 million to 6.5 million barrels per day within a decade.
For Iran, the challenge is somewhat simpler, since its limitations are largely caused by external sanctions. As seen in other countries, typically when oil production has been interrupted following regime change, sanctions and other causes, production levels rarely reach the level achieved prior to the disruption. However, should sanctions be removed, Iran could quickly revive about half of its offline production within 12 to 18 months -- about 500,000 to 750,000 barrels per day. In the longer term, there are some reasons to believe that Iran could buck the trend and increase its production back to previously achieved levels, and perhaps even increase it, but the time frame would be measured in years, not months. All of this, of course, is subject to geopolitical events that could slow the process down or stop it entirely -- such as internal backlash in Iran and a slow timetable for negotiating with Washington. After bringing shut-in production back online, Iran (like Iraq) is more likely to slowly increase its daily oil production by about 250,000 to 300,000 barrels per year, pushing Rouhani's goals to after 2020.

OPEC Going Forward

OPEC is facing short-term and long-term challenges. In the near term, rising production in the United States and Canada has been unexpectedly quick -- increasing by 1 million barrels per day in each of the past two years. Although most of the U.S. increase has been offset by production taken offline due to instability in Libya, added U.S. exports have already forced Saudi Arabia to reduce production levels at times to maintain prices. U.S. production is set to grow by another 1 million barrels in 2014, potentially straining OPEC's preferential price points.
In the longer term, Iran and Iraq's production is the key issue. Should Iran and Iraq together boost production to a reasonably achievable level of 11 million barrels per day by 2020, that would represent an increase of 5 million to 6 million barrels per day above present levels. OPEC's production quotas have already been a source of tension among its members, but producers have always found ways to skirt around them. That may no longer be possible. While Iran's domestic consumption will increase significantly, the potential export increases are still too high for Saudi Arabia to offset. This will cause stress within the organization among regional rivals Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia may ask Iran and Iraq to voluntarily limit export growth, but without other incentives there is no reason to believe they would do so when it is in their short-term economic interest to boost exports as much as possible.
Increased exports by Iran and Iraq also play into the broader rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over issues such as the Syrian civil war and Iranian influence in Saudi Arabia's border regions as well as its oil-producing Shiite-dominated Eastern Province. Historically, Saudi Arabia has argued for increased production from the cartel to preserve OPEC's market share, since high prices have helped encourage alternative energy development elsewhere, whereas Iran and Iraq have argued for moderate production levels and strong prices. Additionally, while Saudi Arabia can afford to sell oil at $85 per barrel, many of the governments surrounding it need prices at or above $100 per barrel, and Riyadh does not want to see its neighbors engulfed in even more turmoil than they already are due to lower oil revenue. Iran and Iraq are pursuing this boost for their long-term production and believe they can do so without reducing prices by relying on increased demand from developing Asian markets.
Asia is now the world's biggest net importing region -- bigger than Europe and North America combined. Naturally, this has led to increased codependence between OPEC and developing Asian countries, principally India and China. Indeed, China has massive projects with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. China's footprint has expanded dramatically in Venezuela and it imports about 15 percent of its oil from OPEC member Angola. India has also deepened its connections to OPEC countries and has emerged as Nigeria's biggest customer.
As OPEC's biggest customer, Asia will continue its strong demand in the near future, and so stress on OPEC will not necessarily mean lower oil prices. The impact on long-term prices is less certain, however; the price will be determined not only by the size of Asian growth in the future, but by global oil supplies in non-OPEC countries as well. While OPEC historically has been used as a political tool to increase oil prices or place an embargo on exports, as can be seen from the 2008 price spike, OPEC's modern challenge is more concerned with keeping oil prices reasonably low, not artificially raising them or embargoing oil. In order to preserve its long-term health, OPEC will need to preserve relatively low oil prices, both to ensure that developing markets in Asia can afford to keep buying the oil and to prevent alternatives such as shale oil, electric cars or natural gas-to-liquids technology from becoming more economically feasible. Furthermore, tempered oil prices for consumers in Asia will only reinforce the region's economic growth, contributing to increased demand for OPEC's oil.
Editor's note: An earlier version of this analysis misstated OPEC's member countries and mischaracterized production quotas.


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Tuesday, December 3, 2013

Hamas' Shifting Allegiance Reflects New Mideast Dynamics

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about the terror groups in the Middle East. This follows this post about the commercialization of Thanksgiving and Christmas. For a free magazine subscription or to get the book shown for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.

Hamas' Shifting Allegiance Reflects New Mideast Dynamics






article by Good News Editor





Egypt's new parliament is already changing the Egyptians' relationships with their neighbors across their northern border—Israel and the terrorist organization Hamas, which runs the Gaza Strip and is vehemently opposed to Israel's existence.







Hamas campaigns for political power in Ramallah in the West Bank.



Source: WikimediaHamas has been acting as a proxy for Iran, a Persian Shiite state, but being an offshoot of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood it is Sunni Arab and identifies more with the Arab world.



Now Hamas is trying to take full advantage of the changes in Egypt and the rise of Islamists in the region. It is trying to present itself as a pragmatic and reconcilable political alternative to the Fatah party, which controls the West Bank. There is an ongoing struggle between the two for leadership of the recently formed Palestinian unity government.



Hamas is trying to be a resistance movement, reform agent and loyal opposition to Fatah all at the same time. It is working to bolster its relationships with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.



But there is still division in the ranks. For example, some leaders recently said that in the event of a war between Iran and Israel, Hamas would not back Tehran. But a few days later Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar refuted that statement, saying that Hamas would respond "with utmost power" to any "Zionist war on Iran."



Time magazine reports on changes underway in the organization: "[The Feb. 28] announcement that the Hamas leadership has officially relocated from [Iran-aligned] Damascus, and its public declarations of support for the Syrian rebels, suggest a dramatic political break with Iran—and with it the end of any illusion Tehran might have harbored of exerting influence in the new revolutionary Arab mainstream . . .



"Hamas' options and prospects have been altered by the revolutionary tide that has swept aside some key Arab autocracies and empowered Muslim Brotherhood organizations that remain Hamas' natural political kin. The Palestinian public is solidly behind the Syrian rebellion, in which the Muslim Brotherhood is a key element" ("Hamas Signals Break With Iran, but Is That Good for Israel?" Feb. 29, 2012).



George Washington University professor Nathan Brown, an expert on Arab politics, has a commentary at the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with the title "Is Hamas Mellowing?" (Jan. 17, 2012).He writes:



"Over the past few weeks, as Palestinian reconciliation efforts have inched forward, some of Hamas's leaders have provoked interest by apparently staking out new positions. They have not only agreed to enter the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), thus participating in a body that signed the Oslo Accords with Israel, a pact the group has long opposed [since it means ultimately recognizing the Jewish state], but also committed themselves to 'popular resistance,' an alternative to the armed activity through which the group gained international notoriety.



"But for every tentative step by one leader, there is a restatement of old positions—sometimes in very pugnacious form—by another. What is happening to the movement? Is Hamas mellowing? No. Or at least not yet."

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Monday, December 2, 2013

Editorial: The Iran Deal. Good or Bad? And Why?

Editorial

Is the deal with Iran a good one or a bad one? The best case I have heard about it has been from www.Stratfor.com, with VDare's Pat Buchanan also coming out in favor of it. There are many sites that point out that it was a bad deal some of them are these, but there are many more that I've glanced at, but not thoroughly researched. These include www.DebbieSchlusel.com, www.jihadwatch.org, www.hughhewitt.com, and www.redstate.com.

It does seem that it COULD have been a great deal, but the appeasement of the U.S. president kept it from being so.

Tuesday, November 26, 2013

Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about the U.S. and its allies Israel and Saudi Arabia. This follows this post about the U.S. talks with Iran. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran. For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE.


Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement

Geopolitical Weekly


Stratfor By George Friedman



A deal between Iran and the P-5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) was reached Saturday night. The Iranians agreed to certain limitations on their nuclear program while the P-5+1 agreed to remove certain economic sanctions. The next negotiation, scheduled for six months from now depending on both sides' adherence to the current agreement, will seek a more permanent resolution. The key players in this were the United States and Iran. The mere fact that the U.S. secretary of state would meet openly with the Iranian foreign minister would have been difficult to imagine a few months ago, and unthinkable at the beginning of the Islamic republic.



The U.S. goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons before they are built, without the United States having to take military action to eliminate them. While it is commonly assumed that the United States could eliminate the Iranian nuclear program at will with airstrikes, as with most military actions, doing so would be more difficult and riskier than it might appear at first glance. The United States in effect has now traded a risky and unpredictable air campaign for some controls over the Iranian nuclear program.



The Iranians' primary goal is regime preservation. While Tehran managed the Green Revolution in 2009 because the protesters lacked broad public support, Western sanctions have dramatically increased the economic pressure on Iran and have affected a wide swath of the Iranian public. It isn't clear that public unhappiness has reached a breaking point, but were the public to be facing years of economic dysfunction, the future would be unpredictable. The election of President Hassan Rouhani to replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after the latter's two terms was a sign of unhappiness. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei clearly noted this, displaying a willingness to trade a nuclear program that had not yet produced a weapon for the elimination of some sanctions.



The logic here suggests a process leading to the elimination of all sanctions in exchange for the supervision of Iran's nuclear activities to prevent it from developing a weapon. Unless this is an Iranian trick to somehow buy time to complete a weapon and test it, I would think that the deal could be done in six months. An Iranian ploy to create cover for building a weapon would also demand a reliable missile and a launch pad invisible to surveillance satellites and the CIA, National Security Agency, Mossad, MI6 and other intelligence agencies. The Iranians would likely fail at this, triggering airstrikes however risky they might be and putting Iran back where it started economically. While this is a possibility, the scenario is not likely when analyzed closely.



While the unfolding deal involves the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany, two countries intensely oppose it: Israel and Saudi Arabia. Though not powers on the order of the P-5+1, they are still significant. There is a bit of irony in Israel and Saudi Arabia being allied on this issue, but only on the surface. Both have been intense enemies of Iran, and close allies of the United States; each sees this act as a betrayal of its relationship with Washington.



The View from Saudi Arabia

In a way, this marks a deeper shift in relations with Saudi Arabia than with Israel. Saudi Arabia has been under British and later American protection since its creation after World War I. Under the leadership of the Sauds, it became a critical player in the global system for a single reason: It was a massive producer of oil. It was also the protector of Mecca and Medina, two Muslim holy cities, giving the Saudis an added influence in the Islamic world on top of their extraordinary wealth.



It was in British and American interests to protect Saudi Arabia from its enemies, most of which were part of the Muslim world. The United States protected the Saudis from radical Arab socialists who threatened to overthrow the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. It later protected Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait. But it also protected Saudi Arabia from Iran.



Absent the United States in the Persian Gulf, Iran would have been the most powerful regional military power. In addition, the Saudis have a substantial Shiite minority concentrated in the country's oil-rich east. The Iranians, also Shia, had a potential affinity with them, and thereby the power to cause unrest in Saudi Arabia.



Until this agreement with Iran, the United States had an unhedged commitment to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iranians. Given the recent deal, and potential follow-on deals, this commitment becomes increasingly hedged. The problem from the Saudi point of view is that while there was a wide ideological gulf between the United States and Iran, there was little in the way of substantial issues separating Washington from Tehran. The United States did not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranians didn't want the United States hindering Iran's economic development. The fact was that getting a nuclear weapon was not a fundamental Iranian interest, and crippling Iran's economy was not a fundamental interest to the United States absent an Iranian nuclear program.



If the United States and Iran can agree on this quid pro quo, the basic issues are settled. And there is something drawing them together. The Iranians want investment in their oil sector and other parts of their economy. American oil companies would love to invest in Iran, as would other U.S. businesses. As the core issue separating the two countries dissolves, and economic relations open up -- a step that almost by definition will form part of a final agreement -- mutual interests will appear.



There are other significant political issues that can't be publicly addressed. The United States wants Iran to temper its support for Hezbollah's militancy, and guarantee it will not support terrorism. The Iranians want guarantees that Iraq will not develop an anti-Iranian government, and that the United States will work to prevent this. (Iran's memories of its war with Iraq run deep.) The Iranians will also want American guarantees that Washington will not support anti-Iranian forces based in Iraq.



From the Saudi point of view, Iranian demands regarding Iraq will be of greatest concern. Agreements or not, it does not want a pro-Iranian Shiite state on its northern border. Riyadh has been funding Sunni fighters throughout the region against Shiite fighters in a proxy war with Iran. Any agreement by the Americans to respect Iranian interests in Iraq would represent a threat to Saudi Arabia.



The View from Israel

From the Israeli point of view, there are two threats from Iran. One is the nuclear program. The other is Iranian support not only for Hezbollah but also for Hamas and other groups in the region. Iran is far from Israel and poses no conventional military threat. The Israelis would be delighted if Iran gave up its nuclear program in some verifiable way, simply because they themselves have no reliable means to destroy that program militarily. What the Israelis don't want to see is the United States and Iran making deals on their side issues, especially the political ones that really matter to Israel.



The Israelis have more room to maneuver than the Saudis do. Israel can live with a pro-Iranian Iraq. The Saudis can't; from their point of view, it is only a matter of time before Iranian power starts to encroach on their sphere of influence. The Saudis can't live with an Iranian-supported Hezbollah. The Israelis can and have, but don't want to; the issue is less fundamental to the Israelis than Iraq is to the Saudis.



But in the end, this is not the problem that the Saudis and Israelis have. Their problem is that both depend on the United States for their national security. Neither country can permanently exist in a region filled with dangers without the United States as a guarantor. Israel needs access to American military equipment that it can't build itself, like fighter aircraft. Saudi Arabia needs to have American troops available as the ultimate guarantor of their security, as they were in 1990. Israel and Saudi Arabia have been the two countries with the greatest influence in Washington. As this agreement shows, that is no longer the case. Both together weren't strong enough to block this agreement. What frightens them the most about this agreement is that fact. If the foundation of their national security is the American commitment to them, then the inability to influence Washington is a threat to their national security.



There are no other guarantors available. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went to Moscow, clearly trying to get the Russians to block the agreement. He failed. But even if he had succeeded, he would have alienated the United States, and would have gotten instead a patron incapable of supplying the type of equipment Israel might need when Israel might need it. The fact is that neither the Saudis nor the Israelis have a potential patron other than the United States.



U.S. Regional Policy

The United States is not abandoning either Israel or Saudi Arabia. A regional policy based solely on the Iranians would be irrational. What the United States wants to do is retain its relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia, but on modified terms. The modification is that U.S. support will come in the context of a balance of power, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While the United States is prepared to support the Saudis in that context, it will not simply support them absolutely. The Saudis and Israelis will have to live with things that they have not had to live with before -- namely, an American concern for a reasonably strong and stable Iran regardless of its ideology.



The American strategy is built on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has learned that it has interests in the region, but that the direct use of American force cannot achieve those goals, partly because imposing solutions takes more force than the United States has and partly because the more force it uses, the more resistance it generates. Therefore, the United States needs a means of minimizing its interests, and pursuing those it has without direct force.



With its interests being limited, the United States' strategy is a balance of power. The most natural balance of power is Sunni versus Shia, the Arabs against the Iranians. The goal is not war, but sufficient force on each side to paralyze the other. In that sense, a stable Iran and a more self-reliant Saudi Arabia are needed. Saudi Arabia is not abandoned, but nor is it the sole interest of the United States.



In the same sense, the United States is committed to the survival of Israel. If Iranian nuclear weapons are prevented, the United States has fulfilled that commitment, since there are no current threats that could conceivably threaten Israeli survival. Israel's other interests, such as building settlements in the West Bank, do not require American support. If the United States determines that they do not serve American interests (for example, because they radicalize the region and threaten the survival of Jordan), then the United States will force Israel to abandon the settlements by threatening to change its relationship with Israel. If the settlements do not threaten American interests, then they are Israel's problem.



Israel has outgrown its dependence on the United States. It is not clear that Israel is comfortable with its own maturation, but the United States has entered a new period where what America wants is a mature Israel that can pursue its interests without recourse to the United States. And if Israel finds it cannot have what it wants without American support, Israel may not get that support, unless Israel's survival is at stake.



In the same sense, the perpetual Saudi inability to create an armed force capable of effectively defending itself has led the United States to send troops on occasion -- and contractors always -- to deal with the problem. Under the new strategy, the expectation is that Saudi soldiers will fight Saudi Arabia's wars -- with American assistance as needed, but not as an alternative force.



With this opening to Iran, the United States will no longer be bound by its Israeli and Saudi relationships. They will not be abandoned, but the United States has broader interests than those relationships, and at the same time few interests that rise to the level of prompting it to directly involve U.S. troops. The Saudis will have to exert themselves to balance the Iranians, and Israel will have to wend its way in a world where it has no strategic threats, but only strategic problems, like everyone else has. It is not a world in which Israeli or Saudi rigidity can sustain itself.



Send us your thoughts on this report.



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"Israelis, Saudis and the Iranian Agreement is republished with permission of Stratfor."





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Wednesday, November 20, 2013

The U.S.-Iran Talks: Ideology and Necessity

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about the U.S. talks with Iran. This follows this post about U.S. citizens receiving “sensitivity training” over their views about the terrorists the U.S. is fighting. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran. For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE.

The U.S.-Iran Talks: Ideology and Necessity


By George Friedman


The talks between Iran and the Western powers have ended but have not failed. They will reconvene next week. That in itself is a dramatic change from the past, when such talks invariably began in failure. In my book The Next Decade, I argued that the United States and Iran would move toward strategic alignment, and I think that is what we are seeing take shape. Of course, there is no guarantee that the talks will yield a settlement or that they will evolve into anything more meaningful. But the mere possibility requires us to consider three questions: Why is this happening now, what would a settlement look like, and how will it affect the region if it happens?



Precedents

It is important to recognize that despite all of the other actors on the stage, this negotiation is between the United States and Iran. It is also important to understand that while this phase of the discussion is entirely focused on Iran's nuclear development and sanctions, an eventual settlement would address U.S. and Iranian relations and how those relations affect the region. If the nuclear issue were resolved and the sanctions removed, then matters such as controlling Sunni extremists, investment in Iran and maintaining the regional balance of power would all be on the table. In solving these two outstanding problems, the prospect of a new U.S.-Iranian relationship would have to be taken seriously.



But first, there are great obstacles to overcome. One is ideology. Iran regards the United States as the Great Satan. The United States regards Iran as part of the Axis of Evil. For the Iranians, memories of a U.S.-sponsored coup in 1953 and Washington's support for the Shah are vivid. Americans above the age of 35 cannot forget the Iranian hostage crisis, when Iranians seized some 50 U.S. Embassy employees. Iran believes the United States has violated its sovereignty; the United States believes Iran has violated basic norms of international law. Each views the other as barbaric. Add to this that the ideology of radical Islamism regards the United States as corrupt and evil, and the ideology of the United States sees Iran as brutal and repressive, and it would seem that resolution is impossible.



From the American side, there is precedent for reconciling national differences: China. When the United States reached out to China in the 1970s, Beijing was supplying weapons to the North Vietnamese, who used them against American troops. China's rhetoric about U.S. imperialism, replete with "running dogs," portrayed the United States as monstrous. The United States saw China, a nuclear power, as a greater threat for nuclear war than the Soviet Union, since Mao had openly stated -- and seemed to mean it -- that communists ought to welcome nuclear war rather than fear it. Given the extremism and brutality of the Cultural Revolution, the ideological bar seemed insurmountable.



But the strategic interests of both countries superseded ideology. They did not recognize each other, but they did need each other. The relative power of the Soviet Union had risen. There had been heavy fighting between China and the Soviet Union along the Ussuri River in 1969, and Soviet troops were heavily deployed along China's border. The United States had begun to redeploy troops from Europe to Southeast Asia when it became clear it was losing the Vietnam War.



Each side was concerned that if the Soviet Union chose to attack China or NATO separately, it could defeat them. However, if China and the United States collaborated, no Soviet attack would be possible, lest Moscow start a two-front war it couldn't win. It was not necessary to sign a treaty of military alliance or even mention this possibility. Simply meeting, talking and establishing diplomatic relations with China would force the Soviet Union to consider the possibility that Washington and Beijing had a tacit understanding -- or that even without an understanding, an attack on one of them would trigger a response by the other. After all, if NATO or China were defeated, the Soviets would be able to overpower the other at its discretion. Therefore, by moving the relationship from total hostility to minimal accommodation, the strategic balance changed.



In looking at Iran, the most important thing to note is the difference between its rhetoric and its actions. If you listened to Iranian government officials in the past, you would think they were preparing for the global apocalypse. In truth, Iranian foreign policy has been extremely measured. Its one major war, which it fought against Iraq in the 1980s, was not initiated by Iran. It has supported third parties such as Hezbollah and Syria, sending supplies and advisers, but it has been extremely cautious in the use of its own overt power. In the early days of the Islamic republic, whenever Tehran was confronted with American interests, it would pull closer to the Soviet Union, an atheistic country making war in neighboring Afghanistan. It needed a counterweight to the United States and put ideology aside, even in its earliest, most radical days.



New Strategic Interests

Ideology is not trivial, but ultimately it is not the arbiter of foreign relations. Like all countries, the United States and Iran have strategic issues that influence their actions. Iran attempted to create an arc of influence from western Afghanistan to Beirut, the key to which was preserving and dominating the Syrian regime. The Iranians failed in Syria, where the regime exists but no longer governs much of the country. The blowback from this failure has been an upsurge in Sunni militant activity against the Shiite-dominated regime.



But the arc of influence was interrupted elsewhere, particularly Iraq, which has proved to be the major national security challenge facing Iran. Coupled with the failures in Syria, the degradation of Iraq has put Iran on the defensive when, just one year earlier, it was poised to change the balance of power in its favor.



At the same time, Iran found that its nuclear program had prompted a seriously detrimental sanctions regime. Stratfor has long argued that the Iranian nuclear program was primarily a bargaining chip to be traded for guarantees on its security and recognition of its regional power. It was meant to appear threatening, not to be threatening. This is why, for years, Iran was "only months" away from a weapon. The problem was that despite its growing power, Iran could no longer withstand the economic repercussions of the sanctions regime. In light of Syria and Iraq, the nuclear program was a serious miscalculation that produced an economic crisis. The failures in foreign policy and the subsequent economic crisis discredited the policies of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, changed the thinking of the supreme leader and ultimately led to the electoral victory of President Hassan Rouhani. The ideology may not have changed, but the strategic reality had. Rouhani for years had been worried about the stability of the regime and was thus critical of Ahmadinejad's policies. He knew that Iran had to redefine its foreign policy.



The United States has also been changing its strategy. During the 2000s, it tried to deal with Sunni radicals through the direct use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States could not continue to commit its main force in the Islamic world when that very commitment gave other nations, such as Russia, the opportunity to maneuver without concern for U.S. military force. The United States did have a problem with al Qaeda, but it needed a new strategy for dealing with it. Syria provided a model. The United States declined to intervene unilaterally against the al Assad regime because it did not want to empower a radical Sunni government. It preferred to allow Syria's factions to counterbalance each other such that neither side was in control.



This balance-of-power approach was the alternative to direct military commitment. The United States was not the only country concerned about Sunni radicalism. Iran, a Shiite power ultimately hostile to Sunnis, was equally concerned about jihadists. Saudi Arabia, Iran's regional rival, at times opposed Islamist radicals (in Saudi Arabia) and supported them elsewhere (in Syria or Iraq). The American relationship with Saudi Arabia, resting heavily on oil, had changed. The United States had plenty of oil now and the Saudis' complex strategies simply no longer matched American interests. On the broadest level, a stronger Iran, aligned with the United States, would counter Sunni ambitions. It would not address the question of North Africa or other smaller issues, but it would force Saudi Arabia to reshape its policies.



The Arab Spring also was a consideration. A mainstay of Washington's Iran policy was that at some point there would be an uprising that would overthrow the regime. The 2009 uprising, never really a threat to the regime, was seen as a rehearsal. If there was likely to be an uprising, there was no need to deal with Iran. Then the Arab Spring occurred. Many in the Obama administration misread the Arab Spring, expecting it to yield more liberal regimes. That didn't happen. Egypt has not evolved, Syria has devolved into civil war, Bahrain has seen Saudi Arabia repress its uprising, and Libya has found itself on the brink of chaos. Not a single liberal democratic regime emerged. It became clear that there would be no uprising in Iran, and even if there were, the results would not likely benefit the United States.



A strategy of encouraging uprisings no longer worked. A strategy of large-scale intervention was unsustainable. The idea of attacking Iran was unpalatable. Even if the administration agreed with Israel and thought that the nuclear program was intended to produce a nuclear weapon, it was not clear that the program could be destroyed from the air.



Therefore, in the particular case of Iran's nuclear program, the United States could only employ sanctions. On the broader issue of managing American interests in the Middle East, the United States had to find more options. It could not rely entirely on Saudi Arabia, which has dramatically different regional interests. It could not rely entirely on Israel, which by itself could not solve the Iranian problem militarily. These realities forced the United States to recalibrate its relationship with Iran at a time when Iran had to recalibrate its relationship with the United States.



All Things Possible

The first U.S.-Iranian discussions would obviously be on the immediate issue -- the nuclear program and sanctions. There are many technical issues involved there, the most important of which is that both sides must show that they don't need a settlement. No one negotiating anything will simply accept the first offer, not when they expect the negotiations to move on to more serious issues. Walking away from the table for 10 days gives both sides some credibility.



The real negotiations will come after the nuclear and sanctions issues are addressed. They will pertain to U.S.-Iranian relations more broadly. Each side will use the other to its advantage. The Iranians will use the United States to repair its economy, and the Americans will use the Iranians to create a balance of power with Sunni states. This will create indirect benefits for both sides. Iran's financial woes will be an opportunity for American companies to invest. The Americans' need for a balance of power will give Iran weight against its own enemies, even after the collapse of its strategy.



The region will of course look different but not dramatically so. The balance of power idea does not mean a rupture with Saudi Arabia or Israel. The balance of power only works if the United States maintains strong relationships on all sides. The Saudis and Israelis will not like American rebalancing. Their choices in the matter are limited, but they can take comfort from the fact that a strictly pro-Iranian policy is impossible for the United States. The American strategy with China in the 1970s was to try to become the power that balanced the Soviet Union and China. After meeting with the Chinese, Henry Kissinger went to Moscow. Thus, in terms of bilateral relationships, U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Israeli relations can stay the same. But it now creates another relationship and option for the United States. In the end, Iran is still a secondary power and the United States is the primary power. Iran will take advantage of the relationship, and the United States will manage it.



It is hard to imagine this evolution, considering what the United States and Iran have said about each other for the past 34 years. But relations among nations are not about sentiment; they are about interest. If Roosevelt could ally with Stalin, and Nixon with Mao, then it is clear that all things are possible in U.S. foreign policy. For their part, the Persians have endured for millennia, espousing many ideologies but doing what was necessary to survive and prosper. All of this may well fall apart, but there is a compelling logic to believe that it will not, and it will not be as modest a negotiation as it appears now.



Send us your thoughts on this report.


Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the following sentence, including the hyperlink to Stratfor, at the beginning or end of the report.

"The U.S.-Iran Talks: Ideology and Necessity is republished with permission of Stratfor."

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

Current Events & Trends: Avoid involvement in the Middle East?

BLOGGERS NOTE: I WILL BE MOVING FROM FACEBOOK TO TWITTER AND BLOGSPOT SOON!


An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about negotiations with Iran. This follows this post about Russia attempting to rebuild its military prowess. For a free magazine subscription or to get the book shown for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.

Current Events & Trends: Avoid involvement in the Middle East?


article by Jerold Aust, John Ross Schroeder


Bloomberg Businessweek published an article by Peter Beinart, a Daily Beast columnist and university professor, that originally appeared online with the title "Obama Should Give Peace a Chance With Iran" (Sept. 19, 2013).



Its later print title was "The Middle East Is Burning: Let's Stay Out of the Fire" (Sept. 23-29). This piece reflects much of present American thinking and sounds good on the surface. After all, as he points out, "the military is exhausted. The American public is polarized. The government is in debt." Witness the recent congressional budget impasse between the Democrats and the Republicans.



America's leaders don't seem to fully grasp that, like it or not, the nation is already deeply involved in the Middle East. It has been in Iraq twice in the last three decades. And it is now encouraging a revival of the so-called Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Bible and secular history have shown us that no nation can involve itself in Middle Eastern affairs without getting its proverbial fingers badly burnt. This region remains at the center of world tensions and will remain so until Jesus Christ rules over all nations in the age to come.



The city of Jerusalem is a major focal point of Bible prophecy—along with the all the surrounding region of the Middle East. Zechariah 12:3And in that day will I make Jerusalem a burdensome stone for all people: all that burden themselves with it shall be cut in pieces, though all the people of the earth be gathered together against it. makes it clear that God "will make Jerusalem a very heavy stone for all peoples; all who would heave it away will be surely be cut in pieces." Nations will gather at Armageddon in northern Israel to battle and will end up fighting Jesus Christ at His coming. (To understand more, read the article "Armageddon: The End of the World?".)   The present approach to negotiations with Iran can cut both ways. America is looking for a way out of this ongoing nuclear dilemma. Focusing on the friendly diplomatic gestures of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani overlooks the fact that ultimate responsibility for national policy rests with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This Bloomberg article acknowledges the possibility that "Iran's leaders will never help broker a Syrian peace pact that ushers Assad out of power, or accept the kind of tough international oversight necessary to keep the country from getting a nuclear weapon."

If meaningful negotiations do in fact occur without panning out, returning Iran to radical hostility against the West, things could very well turn out worse than ever before. For help in gaining a proper historic and prophetic overview, please read the Bible study aid The Middle East in Bible Prophecy . (Source: Bloomberg Businessweek.)

Friday, August 30, 2013

Obama's Bluff

A timely post about from www.Stratfor.com about the U.S. President’s rational for war against Syria. This follows this post about the Real Butler. This follows this post about Virginia Dare, an interesting historic figure. In the meantime, you can get more involved if you like here and read an interesting book HERE.

Obama's Bluff


Geopolitical Weekly

Stratfor

By George Friedman

Images of multiple dead bodies emerged from Syria last week. It was asserted that poison gas killed the victims, who according to some numbered in the hundreds. Others claimed the photos were faked while others said the rebels were at fault. The dominant view, however, maintains that the al Assad regime carried out the attack.

The United States has so far avoided involvement in Syria's civil war. This is not to say Washington has any love for the al Assad regime. Damascus' close ties to Iran and Russia give the United States reason to be hostile toward Syria, and Washington participated in the campaign to force Syrian troops out of Lebanon. Still, the United States has learned to be concerned not just with unfriendly regimes, but also with what could follow such regimes. Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have driven home the principle that deposing one regime means living with an imperfect successor. In those cases, changing the regime wound up rapidly entangling the United States in civil wars, the outcomes of which have not been worth the price. In the case of Syria, the insurgents are Sunni Muslims whose best-organized factions have ties to al Qaeda.

Still, as frequently happens, many in the United States and Europe are appalled at the horrors of the civil war, some of whom have called on the United States to do something. The United States has been reluctant to heed these calls. As mentioned, Washington does not have a direct interest in the outcome, since all possible outcomes are bad from its perspective. Moreover, the people who are most emphatic that something be done to stop the killings will be the first to condemn the United States when its starts killing people to stop the killings. People would die in any such intervention, since there are simply no clean ways to end a civil war.

Obama's Red Lines

U.S. President Barack Obama therefore adopted an extremely cautious strategy. He said that the United States would not get directly involved in Syria unless the al Assad regime used chemical weapons, stating with a high degree of confidence that he would not have to intervene. After all, Syrian President Bashar al Assad has now survived two years of civil war, and he is far from defeated. The one thing that could defeat him is foreign intervention, particularly by the United States. It was therefore assumed he wouldn't do the one thing Obama said would trigger U.S. action.

Al Assad is a ruthless man: He would not hesitate to use chemical weapons if he had to. He is also a very rational man: He would use chemical weapons only if that were his sole option. At the moment, it is difficult to see what desperate situation would have caused him to use chemical weapons and risk the worst. His opponents are equally ruthless, and we can imagine them using chemical weapons to force the United States to intervene and depose al Assad. But their ability to access chemical weapons is unclear, and if found out, the maneuver could cost them all Western support. It is possible that lower-ranking officers in al Assad's military used chemical weapons without his knowledge and perhaps against his wishes. It is possible that the casualties were far less than claimed. And it is possible that some of the pictures were faked.

All of these things are possible, but we simply don't know which is true. More important is that major governments, including the British and French, are claiming knowledge that al Assad carried out the attack. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made a speech Aug. 26 clearly building the case for a military response, and referring to the regime attack as "undeniable" and the U.S. assessment so far as "grounded in facts." Al Assad meanwhile has agreed to allow U.N. inspectors to examine the evidence onsite. In the end, those who oppose al Assad will claim his supporters concealed his guilt, and the insurgents will say the same thing if they are blamed or if the inspectors determine there is no conclusive evidence of attacks.

The truth here has been politicized, and whoever claims to have found the truth, whatever it actually is, will be charged with lying. Nevertheless, the dominant emerging story is that al Assad carried out the attack, killing hundreds of men, women and children and crossing the red line Obama set with impunity. The U.S. president is backed into a corner.

The United States has chosen to take the matter to the United Nations. Obama will make an effort to show he is acting with U.N. support. But he knows he won't get U.N. support. The Russians, allies of al Assad and opponents of U.N.-based military interventions, will veto any proposed intervention. The Chinese -- who are not close to al Assad, but also oppose the U.N.-sanctioned interventions -- will probably join them. Regardless of whether the charges against al Assad are true, the Russians will dispute them and veto any action. Going to the United Nations therefore only buys time. Interestingly, the United States declared on Sunday that it is too late for Syria to authorize inspections. Dismissing that possibility makes the United States look tough, and actually creates a situation where it has to be tough.

Consequences in Syria and Beyond

This is no longer simply about Syria. The United States has stated a condition that commits it to an intervention. If it does not act when there is a clear violation of the condition, Obama increases the chance of war with other countries like North Korea and Iran. One of the tools the United States can use to shape the behavior of countries like these without going to war is stating conditions that will cause intervention, allowing the other side to avoid crossing the line. If these countries come to believe that the United States is actually bluffing, then the possibility of miscalculation soars. Washington could issue a red line whose violation it could not tolerate, like a North Korean nuclear-armed missile, but the other side could decide this was just another Syria and cross that line. Washington would have to attack, an attack that might not have been necessary had it not had its Syria bluff called.

There are also the Russian and Iranian questions. Both have invested a great deal in supporting al Assad. They might both retaliate were someone to attack the Syrian regime. There are already rumors in Beirut that Iran has told Hezbollah to begin taking Americans hostage if the United States attacks Syria. Russia meanwhile has shown in the Snowden affair what Obama clearly regards as a hostile intent. If he strikes, he thus must prepare for Russian counters. If he doesn't strike, he must assume the Russians and Iranians will read this as weakness.

Syria was not an issue that affected the U.S. national interest until Obama declared a red line. It escalated in importance at that point not because Syria is critical to the United States, but because the credibility of its stated limits are of vital importance. Obama's problem is that the majority of the American people oppose military intervention, Congress is not fully behind an intervention and those now rooting the United States on are not bearing the bulk of the military burden -- nor will they bear the criticism that will follow the inevitable civilian casualties, accidents and misdeeds that are part of war regardless of the purity of the intent.

The question therefore becomes what the United States and the new coalition of the willing will do if the red line has been crossed. The fantasy is that a series of airstrikes, destroying only chemical weapons, will be so perfectly executed that no one will be killed except those who deserve to die. But it is hard to distinguish a man's soul from 10,000 feet. There will be deaths, and the United States will be blamed for them.

The military dimension is hard to define because the mission is unclear. Logically, the goal should be the destruction of the chemical weapons and their deployment systems. This is reasonable, but the problem is determining the locations where all of the chemicals are stored. I would assume that most are underground, which poses a huge intelligence problem. If we assume that perfect intelligence is available and that decision-makers trust this intelligence, hitting buried targets is quite difficult. There is talk of a clean cruise missile strike. But it is not clear whether these carry enough explosives to penetrate even minimally hardened targets. Aircraft carry more substantial munitions, and it is possible for strategic bombers to stand off and strike the targets.

Even so, battle damage assessments are hard. How do you know that you have destroyed the chemicals -- that they were actually there and you destroyed the facility containing them? Moreover, there are lots of facilities and many will be close to civilian targets and many munitions will go astray. The attacks could prove deadlier than the chemicals did. And finally, attacking means al Assad loses all incentive to hold back on using chemical weapons. If he is paying the price of using them, he may as well use them. The gloves will come off on both sides as al Assad seeks to use his chemical weapons before they are destroyed.

A war on chemical weapons has a built-in insanity to it. The problem is not chemical weapons, which probably can't be eradicated from the air. The problem under the definition of this war would be the existence of a regime that uses chemical weapons. It is hard to imagine how an attack on chemical weapons can avoid an attack on the regime -- and regimes are not destroyed from the air. Doing so requires troops. Moreover, regimes that are destroyed must be replaced, and one cannot assume that the regime that succeeds al Assad will be grateful to those who deposed him. One must only recall the Shia in Iraq who celebrated Saddam's fall and then armed to fight the Americans.

Arming the insurgents would keep an air campaign off the table, and so appears to be lower risk. The problem is that Obama has already said he would arm the rebels, so announcing this as his response would still allow al Assad to avoid the consequences of crossing the red line. Arming the rebels also increases the chances of empowering the jihadists in Syria.

When Obama proclaimed his red line on Syria and chemical weapons, he assumed the issue would not come up. He made a gesture to those in his administration who believe that the United States has a moral obligation to put an end to brutality. He also made a gesture to those who don't want to go to war again. It was one of those smart moves that can blow up in a president's face when it turns out his assumption was wrong. Whether al Assad did launch the attacks, whether the insurgents did, or whether someone faked them doesn't matter. Unless Obama can get overwhelming, indisputable proof that al Assad did not -- and that isn't going to happen -- Obama will either have to act on the red line principle or be shown to be one who bluffs. The incredible complexity of intervening in a civil war without becoming bogged down makes the process even more baffling.

Obama now faces the second time in his presidency when war was an option. The first was Libya. The tyrant is now dead, and what followed is not pretty. And Libya was easy compared to Syria. Now, the president must intervene to maintain his credibility. But there is no political support in the United States for intervention. He must take military action, but not one that would cause the United States to appear brutish. He must depose al Assad, but not replace him with his opponents. He never thought al Assad would be so reckless. Despite whether al Assad actually was, the consensus is that he was. That's the hand the president has to play, so it's hard to see how he avoids military action and retains credibility. It is also hard to see how he takes military action without a political revolt against him if it goes wrong, which it usually does.

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Current Events & Trends: Syria's civil war spills over its borders

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about about Syria’s Civil War. This follows this previous post about Syria and Chemical Weapons. For a free magazine subscription or to get the book shown for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.







article by Jerold Aust, John Ross Schroeder





Successful containment of any major difficulty normally means a much better chance of concluding it.



But what was a national Syrian conflict has become so prolonged that it now rages well beyond its borders and even threatens yet another major Middle Eastern war. Nations parry and thrust at each other like wild beasts. Verbal threats are all too common. The psalmist asks, "Why do the nations rage, and the people plot a vain thing?" (Psalm 2:1Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing?



See All...).



Wrote Patrick Cockburn in the London Review of Books: "Over the last year a military stalemate has prevailed, with each side launching offensives in the areas where they are strongest. Both sides have had definite but limited successes" ("Is It the End of Sykes-Picot?" June 6, 2013). Lately foreign countries (and groups within countries) are intensifying their interventions on either one side or the other. Now Syrian President Bashar al-Assad or the rebel groups could possibly gain the upper hand in the near future.



USA Today reported: "The Syrian civil war is increasingly drawing in nations across the Middle East, a regionwide conflict that threatens to pit world powers against each other" ("Syria's Deepening Sectarian War Bleeds Across Borders," May 29, emphasis added throughout). President Assad and the various rebel groups have their backers. Russia and Iran have delivered sophisticated weapons to Damascus, and Israel has used precision air strikes to destroy some of them. Thousands of Hezbollah soldiers have actively intervened on Assad's side and pulled Lebanon into this brutal civil war.



August peace talks are planned by the United States and Russia, but so far rebel groups have apparently declined to participate. Another USA Today communique (this one from Jerusalem) stated, "Israel warned Thursday that it needed to prepare for a 'new era' of war in the Middle East as the Syrian regime claimed the first shipment of anti-aircraft missiles from Russia had arrived" ("Syria Says It Has Advanced Missiles From Russia," June 1). The Syrian foreign minister warned that Damascus "will retaliate immediately" if Israel strikes Syria again.



The dogs of savage wars bring untold suffering and death to any country so afflicted. "Barbarity is now commonplace in the Syrian war. Some 80,000 Syrians have been killed since the Arab Spring arrived in March 2011, and unknown numbers have been tortured and maimed" (Victor Davis Hanson, "Why Some Wars Are So Savage," The Wall Street Journal, May 29). Meanwhile Jordan strives to cope with some 500,000 refugees from Syria.



Since its inception The Good News has kept abreast of major events in the Middle East and explained their overall meaning in the light of biblical prophecy. This strategic region remains the key to the fulfillment of many end-time prophecies leading up to the second coming of Jesus Christ. The United Church of God also publishes a comprehensive Bible study aid exploring the region's historic and prophetic legacy - The Middle East in Bible Prophecy . (Sources: London Review of Books, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal. )

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Friday, August 23, 2013

Syria in the Crosshairs Again over Chemical Weapons


An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/  about Syria and Chemical Weapons. This follows this post about being modest. For a free magazine subscription or to get the book shown for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.

Syria in the Crosshairs






article by Cecil Maranville





World opinion is that Syria appears to have gone one step too far in its deadly game of sponsoring terrorism. The assassination of Rafiq Hariri will have far-reaching consequences for Syria, as well as for the entire Middle East.



Already at odds with Washington for a number of reasons, Damascus finds itself in the crosshairs of the Bush administration, as well as the governments of Europe.



Although Bashar al-Assad's government decried the car bombing that killed popular former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Syria is the prime suspect behind the killing. The United States has recalled its ambassador from Syria, and the European Union is joining the United States in calling for an international investigation, as well as for free elections in Lebanon and the lessening of Syria's presence there.



Syrian officials have variously called the assassination "a terrorist act" and "a horrendous criminal attack." President Assad urged the Lebanese people "to fortify their national unity and to reject those seeking discord." The Syrian foreign minister added: "We hope the Lebanese people will remain united and strong and continue to reject domestic strife and foreign intervention." And the Syrian information minister praised Mr. Hariri for fighting for "Lebanon's growth, prosperity and independence."



Syria acts as if the world doesn't know about its activities in Lebanon, or that it doesn't care. Their official comments are patently meaningless on account of Syria's direct link with terrorism in that country.



Syria has been sponsoring terrorism against Israel for decades, principally from southern Lebanon. Syria is the "foreign power" seeking to destabilize Lebanon and preventing it from becoming independent. Syria maintains a force of approximately 15,000 troops in Lebanon to ensure that the country follows the wishes of Damascus. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1559 last September, reaffirming a call for respect for Lebanon's sovereignty and for the withdrawal of "all foreign troops," which meant the Syrian army.



Satellite of Syria



Lebanon has literally been a satellite of Syria. Mr. Hariri indeed fought for Lebanon's independence, but how bitterly hypocritical of the Syrian president and the information minister to praise him in death for doing so, when he was fighting for independence from Syria! In fact, he resigned from the Lebanese government last October in protest after Damascus pressured Lebanon to extend the term of its pro-Syrian president.



So you see how absurd it is for the Assad regime to wring its hands in shock and horror at the assassination of Hariri.



And it is little wonder that the Lebanese people are scorning diplomatic niceties coming out of Damascus. Thousands have marched in angry protests, attacking Syrians and Syrian interests.



In death, Hariri may have accomplished what he was not able to accomplish in life—free Beirut of Damascus' stranglehold, for Syria may have no choice but to yield to the international pressure to withdraw from Lebanon completely. Even before the assassination, the United States had already levied heavy sanctions against Syria for its support of terrorism, and Washington is poised to turn up the heat.



Israel the reason



Immediately after the death of Hariri, the Israeli government announced that Syria would have to expel the offices of terrorist groups from its territory, end its occupation of Lebanon, allow Lebanese forces to take control of the border with Israel and stop acts of aggression against Israel, before it would reenter negotiations about the sensitive issue of the Golan Heights.



The Golan Heights is a 459-square mile plateau at the southwestern edge of Syria and the northeastern tip of Israel. It's a logical jumping-off point should Syria invade Israel (as it has in past wars). For several years leading up to the 1967 war, snipers used to shoot into Israeli villages from atop this hilly area. But Israel captured the Heights in 1967, officially annexing it in December 1981 during the Begin administration. The international community hasn't recognized Israel's right of ownership and has long pressured it to return the Golan Heights to Syria.



The Golan Heights are also an important source of water for Israel, for within it are the headwaters of the Jordan River valley. The Golan Heights borders on the eastern edge of the Sea of Galilee, a major freshwater source for Israel. Bashar al-Assad's government wants to reopen negotiations for the return of the Golan Heights to Syria (talks broke down five years ago), but sentiment runs high against the idea among Israelis, given the strategic issues involved. With 20,000 settlers in the area, the cost of relocating and compensating them for their losses would amount to about $10 billion.



Israel is the reason for Syria's interest in Lebanon. It's been a staging area for attacking Israel for decades. President Bush said in his recent State of the Union address: "Syria still allows its territory, and parts of Lebanon, to be used by terrorists who seek to destroy every chance of peace in the region." Syria blatantly supports the terrorist group turned political party, Hezbollah, as well as many Palestinian terrorists.



Russia is making matters worse. Recently, it announced the sale to Syria of a sophisticated weapons system (including surface-to-air missiles), ignoring U.S. and Israeli back-channel requests that they cancel the deal. Russia's president justified the sale by declaring, "First of all, we understand and are committed to maintaining the balance of power in the region. We understand our responsibilities" ("Russia Tells Israel Arms Deal With Syria Will Go Ahead," The Daily Star, AFP, Feb. 16, 2005).



"A terrorist bazaar"



President Bashar al-Assad is much less subtle than his late father about Syria's ties to the Hezbollah militia. The elder Assad never had a face-to-face meeting with Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah, although Hafiz al-Assad certainly used the terrorist militia to his advantage. But the current president meets with Nasrallah frequently. Some reports say Bashar al-Assad supplied Nasrallah with missiles when Hezbollah pounded Israel from southern Lebanon in March and April 2002.



Assad is a wild card in the Middle East, as no one knows with certainty whether he has firm control of Syria, or the ability to provide stable leadership for the enigmatic nation. For that matter, no one knows exactly what goes on within this country of 18 million people.



Is the "accidental president" fully in charge, or is the country run by an old guard from his father's days? (Bashar's brother Basil was the designated heir to Hafiz al-Assad, until Basil was killed in a car accident only six years before the elder Assad's death. Bashar was an ophthalmologist practicing in London until his brother's death, when he was recalled to Syria to undergo extensive secret grooming for taking over from his father.)



Jeff Babbin of The National Review Online called the country "a terrorist bazaar" ("Regime Change, Again," Nov. 12, 2003). Washington charges that it has chemical weapons (including a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and possibly VX) and that it is developing offensive biological ones. It has an inventory of Scud and SS-21 short-range missiles armed with chemical warheads.



Violating UN sanctions, Syria earned $3 billion in secret trading with Saddam Hussein's regime. It provided safe haven for many of Saddam's fleeing thugs, as well as for billions of dollars looted from the Iraqi people by his regime. Syria may also have given Hussein a hiding place for his weapons of mass destruction.



World News and Prophecy reported last year on Jordan's serendipitous interception of a terrorist plot to blow up its intelligence headquarters with a mixture of 71 chemicals that would have produced a toxic cloud of death for up to 80,000 people. The chemicals almost certainly came from Syria (or Syrian-controlled Lebanon), whether from Saddam Hussein's cache or from Syria's stockpiles.



That alone demonstrates the critical danger of the Syrian regime.



A journey through time



Israel and Syria have crossed swords many times throughout history. When Syria was, for the most part, a group of city-states, mainly Damascus, Hamath and Zobah, it often clashed with the kings of Israel and Judah. We read of King David killing 22,000 Syrians from Damascus and Zobah (2 Samuel 8:5And when the Syrians of Damascus came to succour Hadadezer king of Zobah, David slew of the Syrians two and twenty thousand men.



See All...).



Interaction between these territories was not always negative. Jesus and His disciples likely spoke the language of the people of Aram, which was Aramaic. When Christ began His ministry, His fame spread through all of Syria (Matthew 4:24And his fame went throughout all Syria: and they brought unto him all sick people that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and those which were possessed with devils, and those which were lunatick, and those that had the palsy; and he healed them.



See All...).



Bible students will recognize the names of Syrian cities where the Church of God took root in the first century, according to the book of Acts. They include Damascus, Antioch, Seleucia and Caesarea Philippi. And, of course, the apostle Paul was struck down and called of God when en route from Jerusalem to Damascus.



Syria was of great strategic importance for many centuries, due to her position at the intersection of three continents (Asia, Africa and Europe), and on a crossroad between the Caspian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Black Sea and the Nile River. She lay upon the famous silk route between China and Europe.



Alexander the Great conquered Syria, and after his death it passed to one of his generals, Seleucus. He and the territory he ruled became the king of the North of the prophecy of Daniel 11. Antiochus Epiphanes, who set up the first "abomination of desolation" in the temple in Jerusalem (Daniel 11:31And arms shall stand on his part, and they shall pollute the sanctuary of strength, and shall take away the daily sacrifice, and they shall place the abomination that maketh desolate.



See All...), was a king of Syria.



Thus, modern Syria stands in the shadow of history. The Syrian Tourism Office accurately claims, "A journey through Syria is a journey through time."



Abomination of desolation yet to come



Bible students know that there is another "abomination of desolation" yet to come. So said Christ in foretelling events that will occur just before His return (Matthew 24:15When ye therefore shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet, stand in the holy place, (whoso readeth, let him understand:)



See All...). By the time of Christ, Syria had come under the control of the Roman Empire, so that great power inherited Daniel's "king of the North" mantle.



The Roman Empire waxed and waned, realizing several resurrections between Christ's time and now. Although this last great empire long since migrated from the Middle East, it still concerned itself with events in this critical region. We believe it will come to life yet again, and that it will precipitate the modern abomination of desolation in Jerusalem. You can read the details of Daniel's prophecies in our booklet The Middle East in Bible Prophecy .



Given the ever-increasing influence of the EU, as well as the historically strategic importance of Syria, it's conceivable that the final king of the North will again envelop Damascus. It is arguably an important Islamic country, if for no other reason than for its strategic location. As we reported in these pages last month, Turkey is presently aggressively petitioning to join the EU, promising that it would be a conduit for expanding European influence into Eurasia. Could the EU's umbrella of influence one day extend over Syria? Time will tell.



Democratic reform next door in Iraq (and perhaps in Lebanon soon) will bring pressure on Syria to come in from the cold of its isolation from the world community of nations. Given the relentless pressure from Washington on state sponsors of terror, Syria will definitely be making changes. WNP