Showing posts with label Ottoman Empire. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ottoman Empire. Show all posts

Friday, June 27, 2014

Balkan Vortex of Violence Threatens Kosovo

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about Kosovo. This follows this post about smuggling across borders. This follows this post about Germany's future designs. This follows this post about previous World Cup expenses. For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632. You can follow me at blogspot here and at twitter here https://twitter.com/brianleesblog. Please consider following both in case one goes down!


Balkan Vortex of Violence Threatens Kosovo





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Some 10 years ago Serbian troops invaded the mostly Muslim province of Kosovo. After U.S. air strikes and NATO intervention, the United Nations began administering the province. But the UN mandate recently expired and Kosovo threatens to declare full independence from Serbia. The behavior of Balkan countries continues to perplex the Western world. Will many more innocent lives be lost in their seemingly futile quest for a stable and peaceful existence? What is the only lasting solution?

The Balkan countries of southeastern Europe have not had an easy history. Few regions of the world have suffered so much violence, murder, ethnic cleansing and reverse ethnic cleansing, as first one nation and then another gained the upper hand. The Balkan catalog of human suffering in the 20th century alone overwhelms the imagination.
Balkan history is long and complicated. The Ottoman Turks crossed the Dardanelles in the 1320s. Serbia, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia were among the Balkan nations conquered by the Turks, and they became a part of the Ottoman Empire. Many chafed under 600 years of Islamic rule. However, this enormous Turkish empire began to fray at the edges in the 19th century, and "in 1912-1913 three regional wars were fought in the Balkans" (Norman Davies, Europe: A History, 1997, p. 874).
Indeed it was an incident in the Balkans that proved to be the catalyst for the beginning of World War I (1914-1918). Norman Davies wrote: "The Bosnian crisis indicated where Europe's most likely flash-point lay. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia in 1908 without a shred of legal justification, having occupied and administered the country for the previous thirty years by international mandate" (ibid.).
So when in June 1914 Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, Bosnia, it provided the spark that eventually led to the loss of many millions of human lives of many nations. Much of the flower of British manhood died in Belgian trenches. Yet World War I also virtually ended the long Ottoman reign. Historians have generally assigned 1920 as the formal year of the empire's final dissolution.
The Balkan countries were now "free" to begin expressing their ethnic, nationalistic, cultural and religious differences by warring among themselves in earnest. Enter Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) of Croatia.
Tito's reign and its aftermath
This formidable personality did what no other individual of that region had done in historical memory. In January 1946 he united virtually all of the Balkan nations and imposed a multinational federation called Yugoslavia but dominated by Serbia. In reality, this group of countries (the new Yugoslavia) constituted a communist dictatorship.
However, Marshall Tito practiced his own partially pro-Western brand of communism—not liking the Russian model of collectivized agriculture and favoring self-management of workers. He proved to be a lingering thorn in the side of the Soviet Union, and so the Soviets formally expelled him from the party in June 1948. His federation had never been part of the Warsaw Pact, and he later became prominently involved in the so-called nonaligned nations movement.
The historic nationality problems, long endemic in the Balkans, were effectively suppressed during Tito's long and ruthless dictatorship (1946-1980). But the cohesive, residual effects of his rule lasted only for about 10 years, and those years were marked by outbreaks of nationalistic restlessness. The formal breakup of the federation followed in the 1990s. "War in Yugoslavia broke out in early June 1991 as soon as the parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia voted for independence" (Misha Glenny, The Balkans, 1998, p. 637).
The leaders who survived Tito simply did not possess his charismatic powers and presence among the Balkan peoples. They could not hold the federation together.
(Marshall Tito's accomplishments are in a minor way indicative of what another far more powerful charismatic personality will bring about in uniting Central Europe—militarily, economically and politically. Ten European rulers will give their powers over to him. His reign will astonish the world. The book of Revelation in the Bible calls him "the beast." To know much more, request or download our free booklets You Can Understand Bible Prophecy , The Book of Revelation Unveiled and Are We Living in the Time of the End? )
Back to Kosovo
This brings us to the Kosovo of just over 10 years ago. In April of 1996 a small number of ethnic Serbs were dining in a café in Kosovo. They were suddenly slaughtered by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) composed of ethnic Albanians. Three other attacks, all attributed to the KLA, occurred that same night. Muslim Albanians compose 90 percent of the population of Kosovo, with a 10 percent minority of Serbs. This is the nub of the problem since Kosovo is still legally and formally a province of Serbia.
In the words of author Misha Glenny, "In Kosovo the death toll mounted on both the Serbian and Albanian sides. The European Union and the United States were awakened to the possibility of war in the province" (ibid., p. 655). American and NATO military action followed in defense of Kosovo, and the UN was soon in virtual charge of the province.
But where are we now in Kosovo? This province wants to become the seventh independent nation to emerge out of the former Yugoslavian federation. The United States and some key European nations support this bid for independence. America is popular in Muslim Kosovo, a rarity in the Islamic world today.
But Serbia strongly opposes independence for Kosovo. Boris Tadic, president of Serbia, firmly stated: "As long as I am President of Serbia, I will never accept the independence of Kosovo" (quoted in Time, Dec. 31, 2007).
Serbia has a powerful backer in Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has clearly said in advance that he will vote against recognition of Kosovo in the United Nations Security Council. Besides sharing Slavic blood and ethnic ties with Serbia, Putin is trying to rebuild Russian clout and influence in the world. He is also leery of setting any precedents that might be interpreted as encouraging breakaway groups in Russian regions like Chechnya.
Would an independent Kosovo become another Taiwan? Would yet another vulnerable Balkan state be forever dependent on outside sources like NATO or the UN for its security? What would become of its Serbian minority?
Of course, Kosovo is far from the only problem in the Balkan mix. Bosnian Serbs would also like to form an independent country or possibly join forces with Serbia. Regional stability remains very far removed from reality and satisfaction among the citizenry is in very short supply. The abject suffering among the Balkan population is and has been immense. Some of these regional problems appear almost insurmountable.
What is the solution?
The apostle Paul sums up the New Testament solution to the kinds of difficulties that are endemic to the Balkans. "For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians:3:27-28, emphasis added throughout). Many of these national and cultural differences fade in relative importance when we repent, become baptized and receive God's Holy Spirit (see Acts:2:38). We begin to see things in a far different light.
According to the Bible, to become truly converted is to lay aside the deeds of the darker side of our human nature. Murdering members of other ethnic groups is not an option for Christians. It is an evil work of the flesh in the biblical sense and a stark violation of the Ten Commandments.
Later Paul repeats the point to the church at Colosse. "But now you yourselves are to put off all these: anger, wrath, malice, blasphemy, filthy language out of your mouth. Do not lie to one another since you have put off the old man with his deeds, and have put on the new man who is renewed in knowledge according to the image of Him [God] who created him, where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcised nor uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave nor free, but Christ is all and in all" (Colossians:3:8-11).
We know that the Balkan population at large is highly unlikely to adopt this biblical solution en masse. But individuals there clearly could. For further help we offer our free booklets The Road to Eternal Life and Transforming Your Life: The Process of Conversion .
The long-term solution is the second coming of Jesus Christ and the beginning of the rule of the Kingdom of God on this earth. Christ's millennial reign will solve all of these world problems. Our free booklet The Gospel of the Kingdom , lays out the overall plan and purpose of God for humankind. You may request a copy in print or download it on our Web site. WNP

Nation Rising Against Nation
Observers are struck by the obvious interconnectedness of the various Balkan nations. Troublesome events in one country often affect neighboring nations negatively. The Balkan mix is continuously potentially explosive.
In spite of 16,000 NATO soldiers stationed in Kosovo, the Slovenian foreign minister described the situation there as "a risk—it is very serious." Slovenia assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the European Union on Jan. 1. He saw Kosovo as potentially the biggest challenge to the Slovenian presidency. The Financial Times headlined its article, "Slovenia Fears Kosovo Partition."
The general history of the Balkans is punctuated with either nations fighting one another or ethnic groups within nations warring with each other. The conflicts there bring to mind the Olivet Prophecy recorded in Matthew 24, Mark 13 and Luke 21.
It was first spoken and later recorded in writing to inform us about what would happen in the time of the end. In it Jesus Christ warned that "nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom" (Matthew:24:7). You may want to request our free booklet Are We Living in the Time of the End? WNP


Thursday, July 5, 2012

Turkey's Strategy

A very interesting post from http://www.stratfor.com/  about Turkey's international strategy. This follows this post about Putin trying to drag the U.S. into a Middle East War. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran and Venezuela. For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read this very interesting book HERE!

Turkey's Strategy



By George Friedman



Turkey is re-emerging as a significant regional power. In some sense, it is in the process of returning to its position prior to World War I when it was the seat of the Ottoman Empire. But while the Ottoman parallel has superficial value in understanding the situation, it fails to take into account changes in how the global system and the region work. Therefore, to understand Turkish strategy, we need to understand the circumstances it finds itself in today.



The end of World War I brought with it the end of the Ottoman Empire and the contraction of Turkish sovereignty to Asia Minor and a strip of land on the European side of the Bosporus. That contraction relieved Turkey of the overextended position it had tried to maintain as an empire stretching from the Arabian Peninsula to the Balkans. In a practical sense, defeat solved the problem of Turkey's strategic interests having come to outstrip its power. After World War I, Turkey realigned its interests to its power. Though the country was much smaller, it was also much less vulnerable than the Ottoman Empire had been.



The Russia Problem

At the same time, a single thread connected both periods: the fear of Russia. For its part, Russia suffered from a major strategic vulnerability. Each of its ports -- St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Murmansk and Odessa -- was accessible only through straits controlled by potentially hostile powers. The British blocked the various Danish straits, the Japanese blocked access to Vladivostok and the Turks blocked access to the Mediterranean. Russian national policy had an ongoing focus of gaining control of the Bosporus both to prevent a blockade and to project power into the Mediterranean.



Therefore, the Russians had a particular interest in reshaping Turkish sovereignty. In World War I, the Ottomans aligned with the Germans, who were fighting the Russians. In the inter-war and World War II periods, when the Soviets were weak or distracted, Turkey remained neutral until February 1945, when it declared war on the Axis. After the war, when the Soviets were powerful and attempted covert operations to subvert both Turkey and Greece, the Turks became closely allied with the United States and joined NATO (despite their distance from the North Atlantic).



From 1945 until 1991 Turkey was locked into a relationship with the United States. The United States was pursuing a strategy of containing the Soviet Union on a line running from Norway to Pakistan. Turkey was a key element because of its control of the Bosporus, but also because a pro-Soviet Turkey would open the door to direct Soviet pressure on Iran, Iraq and Syria. A Soviet-allied or Soviet-influenced Turkey would have broken the center of the American containment system, changing the balance of power. Along with Germany, Turkey was the pivot point of U.S. and NATO strategy.



From a Turkish point of view, there was no other option. The Soviets had emerged from World War II in an extremely powerful position. Western Europe was a shambles, China had become communist and the surplus military capability of the Soviets, in spite of the massive damage they had endured in the war, outstripped the ability of nations on their periphery -- including Turkey -- to resist. Given the importance of the Bosporus and Asia Minor to the Soviets, Turkey was of fundamental interest. Unable to deal with the Soviets alone, Turkey thus moved into an extremely tight, mutually beneficial relationship with the United States.



During the Cold War, Turkey was a strategic imperative of the United States. It faced the Soviets to the north and two Soviet clients, Syria and Iraq, to the south. Israel drew Syria away from Turkey. But this strategic logic dissolved in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union. By then, the union had fragmented. Russian power withdrew from the southern Caucasus and Balkans and uprisings in the northern Caucasus tied the Russian military down. Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan gained independence. Ukraine also became independent, making the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea unclear. For the first time since the early years of the Soviet Union, Turkey was freed from its fear of Russia. The defining element of Turkish foreign policy was gone, and with it, Turkish dependence on the United States.



The Post-Soviet Shift

It took a while for the Turks and Americans to recognize the shift. Strategic relationships tend to stay in place, as much from inertia as intention, after the strategic environment that formed them disappears; it often takes a new strategic reality to disturb them. Thus, Turkey's relationship with the United States remained intact for a time. Its ongoing attempts to enter the European Union continued. Its relationship with Israel remained intact even after the American rationale for sponsoring Turkish-Israeli strategic ties had diminished.



It is much easier to forge a strategic policy in the face of a clear threat than in the face of an undefined set of opportunities. For Turkey, opportunities were becoming increasingly prevalent, but defining how to take advantage of them posed a challenge. For Turkey, the key breakpoint with the past was 2003 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. From Turkey's point of view, the invasion was unnecessary, threatened to empower Iran, and posed domestic political challenges. For the first time since World War II, the Turks not only refused to participate in an American initiative, they also prevented the Americans from using Turkish territory to launch the invasion.



Turkey had encountered a situation where its relationship with the United States proved more dangerous than the threat an alliance with the United States was meant to stave off. And this proved the turning point in post-Soviet Turkish foreign policy. Once Turkey decided not to collaborate with the United States -- its core principle for decades -- its foreign policy could never be the same. Defying the United States did not cause the sky to fall. In fact, as the war in Iraq proceeded, the Turks could view themselves as wiser than the Americans on this subject and the Americans had difficulty arguing back.



That left the Turks free to consider other relationships. One obvious option was joining with Europe, the leading powers of which also opposed the American invasion. That commonality, however, did not suffice to win Turkey EU membership. A host of reasons, from fear of massive Turkish immigration to Greek hostility, blocked Turkey's membership bid. Membership in the European Union was not seen in terms of foreign policy alone; rather, for secularists it symbolized the idea of Turkey as a European country committed to European values. But the decision on membership was not Turkey's to make. Ultimately, the European decision to essentially block Turkey's membership left Turkey with a more dynamic economy than most of Europe and without liability for Greece's debt.



The failure to integrate with Europe and the transformation of ties with the United States from an indispensible relationship to a negotiable (albeit desirable) one finally forced Turkey to create a post-Cold War strategy. That strategy grew out of three facts. First, Turkey faced no immediate existential threat, and even secondary threats were manageable. Second, Turkey was developing rapidly economically and had the most powerful military in its region. And third, Turkey was surrounded by increasingly unstable and dangerous neighbors. Iraq and Syria were both unstable. Iran was increasingly assertive, and a war between Iran and Israel and/or the United States remained a possibility. The Caucasus region was quiet, but the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and ongoing tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia were still significant factors. The Balkans had quieted down after the Kosovo war, but the region remained underdeveloped and potentially unstable. In the past year, North Africa became unstable, Russia became more assertive and the United States began appearing more distant and unpredictable.



Three processes define Turkey's strategy. The first is its rise in relative power. In a region of destabilizing powers, Turkey's relative strength is increasing, which provides Ankara with new options. The second is the possible dangers posed to Turkish interests by the destabilization, which draws Turkey outward, as Ankara seeks ways to manage the instability. The third is the reality that the United States is in the process of redefining its role in the region following the Iraq War and no longer is a stable, predictable force.



The Transitional Stage

Turkey is emerging as a great power. It has not yet become one for a host of reasons, including limited institutions for managing regional affairs, a political base that is not yet prepared to view Turkey as a major power or support regional interventions, and a region that is not yet prepared to view Turkey as a beneficial, stabilizing force. Many steps are required for any power to emerge as a dominant regional force. Turkey is only beginning to take those steps.



At present, Turkish strategy is in a transitional stage. It is no longer locked into its Cold War posture as simply part of an alliance system, nor has it built the foundation of a mature regional policy. It cannot control the region and it cannot simply ignore what is happening. The Syrian case is instructive. Syria is Turkey's neighbor, and instability in Syria can affect Turkey. There is no international coalition prepared to take steps to stabilize Syria. Therefore Ankara has taken a stance in which it refrains from overt action, but keeps its options open should matters become intolerable to Turkey.



When we consider the Turkish periphery as a whole, we see this transitional foreign policy at work, whether in Iraq or in the Caucasus. With Iran, it avoids simply being part of the American coalition while refusing simply to champion the Iranian position. Turkey has not created a regional balance of power, as a mature regional power would. Rather, it has created a Turkish balance of power in the sense that Turkish power is balanced between subordination to the United States and autonomous assertiveness. This period of balancing for an emerging power is predictable; the United States went through a similar phase between 1900 and World War I.



Turkey obviously has two main domestic issues to address as it moves forward. We say "as it moves forward" because no nation ever solves all of its domestic problems before it assumes a greater international role. One is the ongoing tension between the secular and religious elements in its society. This is both a domestic tension and an occasional foreign policy issue, particularly in the context of radical Islamists, where every sign of Islamic religiosity can alarm non-Islamic powers and change their behavior toward Turkey. The other is the Kurdish problem in Turkey, as manifested by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militant group.



The first problem is endemic in most societies these days; it defines American politics as well. It is something nations live with. The PKK problem, however, is unique. The Kurdish issue intersects with regional issues. For example, the question of Iraq's future involves the extent of autonomy enjoyed by Iraq's Kurdish region, which could have an effect on Turkish Kurds. But the major problem for Turkey is that so long as the Kurdish issue persists, foreign powers opposed to Turkey's rise will see the Kurds as a Turkish weakness and could see covert interventions into the Kurdish regions as an opportunity to undermine Turkish power.



Turkey is already wary of Syrian and Iranian efforts to constrain Turkey through Kurdish militancy. The more powerful Turkey gets, the more uncomfortable at least some in the region will become, and this actually increases Turkey's vulnerability to outside intervention. Therefore Turkey must address the Kurdish issue, since regional unrest and separatism fueled by outside enemies could undermine Turkey's power and reverse its current trend toward becoming a great power.



There is a paradox, which is that the more powerful a nation becomes, the more vulnerable it might be. The United States was undoubtedly safer between the Civil War and its intervention in World War I than any time since. So, too, Turkey was likely safer between 1991 and today than it will be when it becomes a great power. At the same time, it is unsafe to be simply a junior ally to a global power given to taking risks with other countries.



The idea of safety among nations in the long run is illusory. It doesn't last. Turkey's current strategy is to make it last as long as possible. This means allowing events around it to take their course on the reasonable assumption that at present, the outcome of these events doesn't threaten Turkey as much as Turkish intervention would. But as we have said, this is a transitional policy. The instability to its south, the rise of an Iranian sphere of influence, a deepening of Russian influence in the Caucasus and the likelihood that at some point the United States might change its Middle East policy again and try to draw Turkey into its coalition -- all of these argue against the transitional becoming permanent.



Turkey is interesting precisely because it is a place to study the transition of a minor country into a great power. Great powers are less interesting because their behavior is generally predictable. But managing a transition to power is enormously more difficult than exercising power. Transitional power is keeping your balance when the world around you is in chaos, and the ground beneath you keeps slipping away.



The stresses this places on a society and a government are enormous. It brings out every weakness and tests every strength. And for Turkey, it will be a while before the transition will lead to a stable platform of power.





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Read more: Turkey's Strategy
Stratfor

Thursday, August 11, 2011

House Foreign Affairs Committee passes resolution calling on Turkey to return Christian churches confiscated by Ottoman Empire

A very interesting post from www.Jihadwatch.org  about Turkey keeping the churches that the Ottoman empire confiscated. This follows this post about Hillary Clinton enforcing speech laws against any criticisim of Islam. This follows this post  about Miss USA 2010 and this article about the recent news about the former ban on offshore drilling which would encourage American energy independence and prevent money from going to hostile countries such as Iran   and Venezuela. For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read this very interesting book HERE!

House Foreign Affairs Committee passes resolution calling on Turkey to return Christian churches confiscated by Ottoman Empire


A rapidly Islamizing Turkey is unlikely to respond with contrition and generosity. "House Panel Approves Resolution Calling on Turkey to Return Confiscated Christian Churches," by Tierney Smith for CNSNews.com, August 5 (thanks to Weasel Zippers):



(CNSNews.com) – The House Foreign Affairs Committee recently voted 43 to one in support of a resolution that calls upon the Republic of Turkey “to safeguard its Christian heritage and to return confiscated church properties” – a step the Turkish Embassy described as “deeply regrettable.”

The resolution (H.Res. 306), introduced by Reps. Edward Royce (R-Calif.) and Howard Berman (D-Calif.), cites the “Ottoman Empire’s oppression and intentional destruction of much of its ancient Christian populations, including over 2,000,000 Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Pontians, and Syrics,” and adds that Turkey “has been responsible for the destruction and theft of much of the Christian heritage within its borders.”



The Ottoman Empire, from 1300 to 1922, was an Islamic-governed empire that covered much of southeastern Europe and parts of North Africa and the Middle East. In 1923, with the empire’s official dissolution, Turkey became one of its successor states.



According to the congressional resolution, which was passed on July 20, Turkey, “through official and unofficial acts of discrimination, intolerance, and intimidation, has hindered the remaining Christians on its territory from freely practicing their ancient faiths.”



The resolution urges the Turkish government to “end all forms of religious discrimination” and, among other related issues, “return to their rightful owners all Christian churches and other places of worship,” and “allow the rightful Christian church and lay owners of Christian church properties, without hindrance or restriction, to preserve, reconstruct, and repair, as they see fit, all Christian churches and other places of worship … within Turkey.”



According to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), a bipartisan federal commission that reviews violations of religious freedom, “The Turkish government continues to impose serious limitations on freedom of religion or belief, thereby threatening the continued vitality and survival of minority religious communities in Turkey."



The USCIRF also says, “Over the previous five decades, the [Turkish] state has, using convoluted regulations and undemocratic laws to confiscate hundreds of religious minority properties, primarily those belonging to the Greek Orthodox community, as well as Armenian Orthodox, Catholics, and Jews. … The state also has closed seminaries, denying these communities the right to train clergy.”



Aram Hamparian, director of the Armenian National Committee of America, told CNSNews.com that Turkey’s human rights violations “are far-reaching and widespread, having been extensively documented by the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and many others.”



He added, “The Turkish Government must sincerely accept responsibility for the genocidal crimes that led to the confiscation of these churches, and then work – in partnership with Christian churches, minority communities, and key stakeholders in the international community -- to restore their rightful ownership.”...





Don't hold your breath, Hamparian. Outrage is a much more likely response.

Posted by Robert