China Is No Longer Predictable

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com  analyzing China. This follows this post about the unlikelihood of a war between Israel and Iran. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran . For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read a very interesting book HERE.


China Is No Longer Predictable by Robert D. Kaplan




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Stratfor

By Robert D. Kaplan



The United States has had it easy over the past third of a century in regards to China. Washington has been able to proclaim moral superiority over the Communist Party dictatorship in Beijing, even as those very dictators provided Washington with a stable, businesslike relationship that fostered immense opportunities for American companies in China and for the American economy overall. China's rulers, ever since Deng Xiaoping consolidated power in 1978, may have been nominally communists, but they have also been professionals and technocrats who have ruled in a self-effacing, collegial style. Yes, they may oppress dissidents, but they have also been enlightened autocrats by the standards of the suffocating rulers who have governed in the Middle East.



But the purging of the pseudo populist boss of the megacity of Chongqing, Bo Xilai, may indicate that a less predictable period in Chinese politics lies ahead. Bo was something not seen in China since Mao Zedong: a leader with real charisma. Bo may indicate that the age of the technocrats will give way to the age of politicians -- and politicians, even in liberal democracies, exploit people's emotions. That could lead to more erratic, nationalistic rulers.



It is famously said that democracies don't go to war against each other. But the problem is not democracy; the problem is a vast and unruly state like China in the messy, decadeslong process of liberalization. The truth is that these Communist dictators in Beijing, whom the media love to hate, may turn out to have been the most benign and easy-to-deal-with Chinese leaders that Americans will see in their lifetime. President Hu Jintao is as good as it gets from the point of view of a State Department policy planner.



China's autocrats have for many years been nervously riding a domestic tiger. With communism no longer a philosophical organizing principle for the state, they have had to justify their rule by delivering double-digit annual economic growth -- or close to that -- to provide jobs for a potentially restive younger generation. Thus, even while China has amassed impressive new air and sea power, it has -- by and large -- not tried to employ that power in a particularly hostile way. China's communist rulers have had too much domestically to worry about without creating new problems for themselves by constantly challenging the United States or its allies on the high seas. While China's push to acquire air-sea power most specifically dates to 1996, when Beijing was humiliated by Washington's ability to drive two aircraft carrier strike groups through waters near the Taiwan Strait, the building of a substantial air force and navy have so far been part of the natural, organic process of a new and rising great power. At least so far, it has not been particularly destabilizing to the world or regional order, unlike Iran's push to develop a nuclear capability as part of a drive for Near Eastern leadership. China's rulers may be dictatorial, but they are not radical and messianic.



But what if future Chinese politicians who are variants of Bo Xilai dial up nationalist rhetoric? Or what if the Communist Party itself, in order to stave off such challenges in the first place, dials up nationalism on its own? Or what if the factionalism of the Party moves into higher gear, with each faction trying to outdo the other regarding its national-patriotic bona fides? It is political competition itself, in whatever form, that carries the potential to make future Chinese leaders rasher and more hot-blooded than the present ones. Of course, an utterly profound domestic crisis might have the opposite effect, shrinking China's power projection ability. But while that is certainly possible, it is still unlikely.



The point is, decentralization of power -- which counts as one form of democratization -- is likely to occur in China at some stage, given that oscillations between centralization and decentralization have long been a feature of Chinese history, as one dynasty has replaced another. And the next bout of decentralization may alter Washington's perception of Chinese military strength for the worse. Washington now sees China's air and naval rise as a cause for concern but not as an imminent danger. That could change if China's domestic politics do.



Chinese political instability could well play out for years, making the past third of a century under authoritarian rule appear from hindsight as a relatively simple and clear-cut age in terms of devising a policy toward the Middle Kingdom. Until recently, Washington's diplomacy toward Beijing was a matter of dealing with a relatively small number of top officials; while crises have involved hard and tense negotiations, the number of players was limited. But as we go forward, the number of players could expand exponentially in Beijing, and many of them will not be as smooth, professional and predictable as the likes of Hu Jintao. Witness the fraught and convoluted negotiations over the fate of the blind Chinese dissident, Chen Guangcheng, whose own emotional instability became a factor complicating the talks. That could be a harbinger of coming difficulties.



Democratization in its initial stages in any society means a diminution of the power of elites, and with the exception of totalitarian states -- which China is not anymore -- the fall of the elites may lead to more intemperate policies in the short run. Democracies are only stable when they have evolved to the point where they are run by bureaucratic and political elites -- take, for example, Europe, the United States, Japan and Singapore.



In fact, America's founders were the epitome of an aristocratic elite. And when that elite gave way to Jacksonian frontiersmen in the early 19th century, American politics became a more unruly affair, culminating in the Civil War. Finally, the late 19th and 20th centuries saw a whole new meritocratic elite take over the halls of government in Washington.



Meanwhile, the problem with authoritarian systems is that if they remain in place for decades, the only people who end up capable of running ministries and formulating policies are the authoritarian elites themselves. Thus, toppling such systems entails serious risks. The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe were helped along the path to stability by liberal elements within the former communist power structures who actually knew how to govern. One can only hope that China's eventual transition will go as smoothly as that of Poland and the Czech Republic.



But while Poland, for example, is a uniethnic country, China is a sprawling multiethnic one. The country has significant, geographically based minorities (Tibetans, Uighur Turks, Inner Mongolians) living generally in the high plateaus and peripheries around the ethnic Han Chinese core, which inhabits the lowlands closer to the Pacific. These ethnic minorities have deep grievances against the dominant Hans, as demonstrated by acts of protest over the years. Therefore, democratization in China could lead to significant eruptions by minorities seeking some form of self-determination. China's Han core also contains divisions within it. China's Communist autocrats know all of this, and that is one reason they fear the very liberalization the West recommends.



But change should come to China, and because of the country's continental geography, which harbors a variety of subject peoples, such change will likely manifest disorder. And that disorder will test the ability of officials in Beijing to a yet unseen level, for it will be just part of a larger ferment within Chinese society.



Interpreting China, even as it becomes freer, may ironically become more difficult for the West.





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In Brief... Japan Rethinking Joining the Nuclear Club?

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about Japan's possible nuclear plans. This follows this post about New Age star people.    For a free magazine subscription or to get this book for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886-8632.

In Brief... Japan Rethinking Joining the Nuclear Club?



article by Cecil Maranville

BLOGGER'S NOTE: See also http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/08/15/hk-activists-boat-nears-disputed-islands/





Just when things cool down between nuclear neophytes India and Pakistan, another alarm is sounded by Japan as it contemplates arming itself with nuclear weapons. That's all Asia needs, another house with the ultimate weapon in global warfare.



As the International Herald Tribune reports, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda recently became the most senior Tokyo official to open the door to nuclear weapons. Fukuda said Japan's "peace constitution" does not rule out nuclear weapons. The times have "changed to the point that even revising the constitution is being talked about," he noted. "Depending upon the world situation, circumstances and public opinion could require Japan to possess nuclear weapons" ("So Much for Japan's Nuclear Taboo," Robyn Lim, June 13, 2002, www.iht.com/articles/61117.htm  ).



In 1998 North Korea tested a long-range missile over Japan. It is believed North Korea possesses nuclear capability. China has nuclear weapons targeted on Japan. All this has Japan rethinking prior commitments to abstain from the nuclear club. Japan's policy here is based on three principles, "that it cannot make or possess nuclear weapons, or allow them to be introduced into the country" (ibid.).



One of the rules of international politics is that things change. A nation must always put its own interests ahead of others if it is to survive. As long as Japan chooses to be protected under the American nuclear umbrella, it will likely not choose to arm itself with weapons of mass destruction. If Japan chooses another option, then to survive in its hostile neighborhood it may see no other alternative than to go nuclear.



Adding to potential instability is another recent report that China is negotiating to buy eight submarines from Russia. This would increase their tactical ability to blockade Taiwan and challenge U.S. naval supremacy in the seas near China ( International Herald Tribune, June 25, 2002, www.iht.com/articles/62411.html  ).



Such a deal would "very significantly enhance" the Chinese navy's "ability to influence events in the East China Sea," said Bernard Cole, an expert on the Chinese navy at the National War College in Washington, D.C. How? "First, by enforcing a blockade against Taiwan, if Beijing adopts that course of action, and also by posing a serious problem for opposing naval forces attempting to operate in the area. No part of naval warfare is more difficult than detecting, localizing or neutralizing submarines" (ibid.).



Since Taiwan broke with Communist China in 1949, the mainland has sought to reconnect their "lost brothers." One of the main pillars of American foreign policy has been its pledge to protect Taiwan's sovereignty. Conversely, China has sought to remove American influence from the region and will stop at nothing to accomplish this geopolitical imperative.



Despite its military deficiencies, compared to America's technological superiority, China continues to move ahead with plans to become the dominant Asian power. China's impact in this region will continue to grow in the coming years. How this will affect American interests and other international relations will be an important area to watch.




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