Showing posts with label AQAP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AQAP. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 14, 2015

Obama watched the NFL Playoffs instead of attending the Paris march for victims of jihad

A very interesting post from www.jihadwatch.org about the President of the U.S. This follows this post about Islam in Germany. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries. For more, you can read two very interesting books HERE.
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Obama watched the NFL Playoffs instead of attending the Paris march for victims of jihad

obama-footballLook: he told Charlie Hebdo not to mock Muhammad. They didn’t heed him. He told Israel to make more concessions to the “Palestinians.” They didn’t heed him. So maybe he stayed away because he has scant sympathy for the victims. And hey, it was the Playoffs.
This Paris march was more show than substance, and severely compromised any message it might have had by including jihad leader Mahmoud Abbas, but Obama’s absence was glaring.
“Too little too late? Kerry says he WILL go to Paris but only after U.S. was shamed for snubbing historic weekend rally of world leaders,” by Simon Tomlinson and Francesca Chambers, Daily Mail, January 12, 2015:
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said he will now travel to Paris after the U.S. government was shamed for not joining a rally yesterday for victims of the French terror attacks.
The rally was attended by 40 world leaders, including British Prime Minister David Cameron and Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, and a million people.
A staggering 3.7 million people gathered across France today to stage further defiant marches in a moving tribute to the 17 people killed in hostage sieges last week.
Kerry said at a news conference that U.S. officials had been ‘deeply engaged’ with French authorities almost immediately after the first attack occurred and had offered intelligence assistance.
As to criticism about the lack of a senior U.S. official at Sunday’s March, Kerry said: ‘I really think that this is sort of quibbling a little bit in the sense that our Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland was there and marched, our ambassador was there and marched, many people from the embassy were there and marched.
‘As everybody knows, I have been here in India for a prior planned event,’ he added.
‘I would have personally very much wanted to have been there but couldn’t do so because of the commitment that I had here and it is important to keep these kinds of commitments.’
Kerry was in the Indian city of Ahmedabad on Sunday for a long-scheduled appearance at an international investment conference, and to prepare for President Barack Obama’s trip to India later this month.
But another high-ranking administration official, Attorney General Eric Holder, was in Paris at the time for a terrorism summit, and he didn’t attend the march, either.
It it not known why Holder didn’t join other world leaders on the streets of Paris. The Department of Justice did not return DailyMail.com’s request for comment on the matter.
The outgoing AG did have time to appear on four different American news shows on Sunday that aired during the rally, though it was not immediately clear if the interviews were pre-taped.
Calling France the United States’ ‘oldest ally,’ President Obama said Friday, ‘I want the people of France to know that the United States stands with you today, stands with you tomorrow.’
Two days later no U.S. officials, save for the relatively unknown deputy secretary of state and U.S. ambassador to France Jane Hartley, stood with the French at the unity march against barbarity, however.
According to an administration official, President Obama spent part of his Sunday afternoon watching a National Football League game on television….

Wednesday, August 14, 2013

Fort Hood jihad mass murderer: "I don’t think what I did was wrong because it was for the greater cause of helping my Muslim brothers"

A very interesting post from www.jihadwatch.org about the Fort Hood jihadist murderer. This follows this post about an Islamic Immigrant doctor’s fraud. This follows this post about  Reza Aslan's new book about Jesus. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran . For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE.









In everything Hasan says about his murders, he links them to his Islamic faith. Yet anyone who dared to suggest that perhaps the texts and teachings of the Islamic faith should be examined so as to understand his motives and goals more fully would be denounced as "Islamophobic."



"Fort Hood Gunman Told Panel That Death Would Make Him a Martyr," by Manny Fernandez for the New York Times, August 12 (thanks to Kenneth):



KILLEEN, Tex. — One year after he waged a deadly shooting rampage at the Fort Hood Army base here in November 2009, Major Nidal Malik Hasan told a panel of military mental health experts that he wished he had been killed during the attack because it would have meant God had chosen him for martyrdom.

His statements to the panel, detailed in documents released by Major Hasan to The New York Times through his civilian lawyer, provided the first account of the shooting in Major Hasan’s own words and suggested that he believed the Army’s pursuit of the death penalty offered him salvation. Paralyzed by police officers who ended the attack when they shot him four times, he viewed the possibility of death as a badge of honor, according to the documents.



“I’m paraplegic and could be in jail for the rest of my life,” Major Hasan told the panel. “However, if I died by lethal injection I would still be a martyr.”



Major Hasan, 42, an American-born Muslim of Palestinian descent whose long-delayed court-martial began last week in a Fort Hood courtroom, said in the documents and in previous statements in and out of court that he carried out the attack to wage jihad for what he has called the illegal and immoral wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the documents, he described in blunt and unapologetic terms how he killed soldiers as he stepped into a medical processing building on Nov. 5, 2009. He said he wore earplugs to muffle the sound of his semiautomatic weapon, and shot into areas that had the “greatest density of soldiers.” In the end, 13 people were dead.



“I don’t think what I did was wrong because it was for the greater cause of helping my Muslim brothers,” he told the military panel.



The three pages of documents were from a 49-page report of a military panel known as a sanity board, which concluded that Major Hasan was fit to stand trial.



The civilian lawyer who released the pages, John P. Galligan, used to represent Major Hasan in the case but was released by him in 2011. Mr. Galligan continues to provide legal assistance to Major Hasan and meets with him regularly. He has provided other documents at Major Hasan’s request, including other pages of the sanity board report, to Fox News. Army prosecutors were given a summary of the report, but Mr. Galligan said that they had not seen these newly released pages.



The documents shed light on the dispute that has developed between Major Hasan and his team of Army defense lawyers. Major Hasan has split from the lawyers and is representing himself, though the judge overseeing his military trial ordered them to remain as standby counsel. Last week, Major Hasan’s former lead Army defense lawyer, Lt. Col. Kris R. Poppe, asked the judge to limit their role because Major Hasan’s goal was a death sentence and helping him reach that goal violated their moral and professional responsibilities. The judge ordered the lawyers to continue in their current role. The lawyers are appealing.



In court, Major Hasan denied that he had a death wish. He wanted to elaborate, but the judge closed the session. The documents suggested that Colonel Poppe had accurately depicted Major Hasan’s desire to be put to death.



In the report, Major Hasan told the panel that he went to morning prayers at a Killeen mosque that day and then returned to his apartment, where he shredded his birth certificate and other documents. He said he would not need the documents because he would either be killed or in jail.



Major Hasan said he wanted to get to the medical processing building before 3 p.m. when a large number of people would be there, according to the report. He drove to the base, wearing fatigues with his rank and name tag. Major Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, said he had no doubts about his plan, but expressed reservations about some of the consequences, like the end of his medical career.



He said he walked into the building around 1 p.m. with a cellphone to his ear, pretending to talk to someone. Members of the sanity board panel asked him what he would have done had he seen someone he knew.



“I don’t know,” Major Hasan said. “I may not have aimed at them.”



He said he did not want to kill civilians and so told a civilian working at a front desk that the officer in charge needed her. Once she left, he shouted “Allahu akbar,” Arabic for “God is great,” and started firing his FN Five-Seven handgun.



He then went outside to a nearby auditorium to “shoot more targets,” but when he realized there was a graduation ceremony taking place he decided not to go inside because in the gowns, civilians were indistinguishable from soldiers, he said.



He told the panel he did not hear the officers coming toward him because of his ear plugs. He denied having remorse and justified his actions by saying that the soldiers he killed were “going against the Islamic Empire.”



Posted by Robert

Tuesday, August 6, 2013

What's Behind Islamic Terror?

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/  about Islamic terrorism in places such as Yemen. This follows this post about purgatory. For a free magazine subscription or to get the book shown for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886-8632.



article by Becky Sweat



The world is horrified by regular bloody terrorist attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such attacks have also been carried out in Western nations such as the United States, Britain and Spain. What's behind this blood-soaked trend, and where is it leading?

Nearly nine years after the Sept. 11 attacks, it's painfully obvious that the threat of Islamic terrorism isn't going away. Just this past year, there were 12 known terrorist incidents and plots in the United States.

In December 2009, 23-year-old Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up himself and everyone else on board a transatlantic airliner as it prepared to land in Detroit.

In November, U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan gunned down 33, killing 13, in his one-man attack on fellow soldiers at Fort Hood in Texas.

Before that, in September, Najibullah Zazi, a 24-year-old Afghan-born American and an al-Qaeda recruit, was arrested just days before he apparently planned to carry out a "martyrdom operation" to blow up New York City subway trains.

Last May, four Muslim Americans were caught planning to bomb two Bronx synagogues and shoot down airliners.

Increasing radicalization, increasing threat

These are just some of the plots to launch attacks on American soil in 2009. From December 2001 to December 2008, 20 other terror plots were uncovered in the United States. Except for the Fort Hood massacre, all of these were averted.

But despite the good record of apprehending terrorists, counterterrorism specialists are still very concerned. They see an accelerated radicalization among American Muslims, which they believe is leading to an increase in terrorist incidents in the United States. That's amid regular rumblings from al-Qaeda's leadership threatening to attack the American homeland, U.S. interests around the world and other Western nations.

"The terrorism threat eased up for a couple of years after 9/11, and then the last couple years it has gotten much worse," says Daniel Byman, a former intelligence officer and the director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

Like many terrorism experts, Byman is concerned about the growing number of American Muslims becoming involved in terrorist activity. Almost all of the domestic plots since December 2001 were carried out by people who were born or lived in the United States. Many of them were affiliated with al-Qaeda and trained at one of their terror camps in Pakistan or Yemen.

Byman also believes that, while most all of the planned attacks over the last nine years were foiled, al-Qaeda is proving to be "a very resilient, unwavering, persistent and determined enemy—rising to every challenge the West throws at them."

A case in point is Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the al-Qaeda operative who tried to blow up the plane to Detroit in December. He may have failed in the end, but he did manage to evade nearly every security hurdle the United States put in place after the 9/11 attacks—which shows al-Qaeda is always testing the aviation system to see what works and what doesn't.

While Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders hide out in the Pakistani tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, regional al-Qaeda groups have been forming, primarily in weak and failing states, which can be safe havens for terrorists.

Presently al-Qaeda has regional operations in Yemen, Somalia, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Intelligence officials are concerned al-Qaeda-linked extremists are now migrating to the vast Saharan territories of Mali, Mauritania and Niger—remote areas without any real state control, which will allow them to build new havens where they can gather recruits and train.

"When the Taliban was in power and protecting Bin Laden in Afghanistan, things were pretty clear cut. The U.S. knew who to attack and where they were," observes Emilio Viano, a terrorism expert and a professor at American University in Washington, D.C. "Al-Qaeda is a much more serious threat today because they're not just in one central location anymore. They're on the loose, and they're very difficult to identify and find."

The changing face of terrorism

In one sense, terrorism—planned and organized violence against civilians to generate fear and panic in society—is not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, rebels, revolutionaries and rogue governments have used terror tactics to push political or societal change. However, the Islamic terrorism we're seeing now is considerably different from what was seen throughout history, or even compared to the Middle Eastern ter-rorism that emerged in the 1960s and '70s.

Middle Eastern terrorism got its start with movements like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). These groups used small-scale bombings, assassinations, airline hijackings, hostage taking and embassy takeovers to call attention to their cause.

They had definite political goals (the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the elimination of Israel), just like others did in modern history, such as the Irish rebels, Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, Basque separatists in northern Spain and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.

During the 1980s and '90s, Middle Eastern terrorism started changing. By the time of al-Qaeda's attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, it had morphed into something the world had never seen before.

"Militant Islam replaced secular Palestinian nationalists as the ideology of terror," explains political violence and terrorism expert Mark Ensalaco of the University of Dayton. "Jihad against apostates and infidels replaced the liberation of Palestine as the cause. Militant Islam was sworn to the destruction of the State of Israel, but now destruction of apostate Arab regimes and expulsion of Americans from Muslim lands became new strategic objectives of terror.

"Militant Islam proclaimed the murder of Americans, who had rarely been targeted by Palestinian terrorists, to be a religious duty. Terror became far more lethal with the advent of mass casualty suicide attacks" ( Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11, 2008, p. 6).

"The terrorist groups we are now facing are much more interested in conducting mass casualty attacks than the groups in the 1970s," says terrorism expert Brian Nichi-poruk, a political scientist with the Rand Corporation, a nonprofit think tank based in Santa Monica, California. "In their attacks they obviously want to kill—and kill a lot more people, as opposed to just targeting specific people for assassinations, or holding a few key people hostage until their demands are met."

Suicide bombings were unheard of before the Iranian-backed terror group Hezbollah introduced them in the early 1980s, he states.

Mass terror as a political tool

Adds Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, director of the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C.: "The assumption through the 1970s, '80s and '90s was that terrorist groups would not carry out mass casualty attacks because terrorism was about fear. That is, these groups wanted to accomplish a fundamentally political objective, and part of what they needed to do was to win people over to the 'justness' of their cause.

"If they were to kill too many people, then they would end up losing the public. What happened on 9/11 and the evidence that al-Qaeda has searched out weapons of mass destruction puts that assumption to rest."

One other distinction worth clarifying is that "while the Palestinian terror groups back in the 1970s and '80s were primarily politically motivated and held left-wing ideologies such as Marxism and nationalism, some, like the PLO and PFLP, had a bit of religious ideology mixed in with their goals," Gartenstein-Ross notes.

Similarly, while the Islamic extremists today operate under a "religious" banner, there are still political aspects to their objectives. Their ultimate goal is to establish a worldwide caliphate (Islamic empire) and to unite all Muslims.

To do this, in al-Qaeda's view, they must drive Westerners and non-Muslims out of all Muslim nations, especially Saudi Arabia (as it is the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam's two holiest shrines), destroy Israel and overthrow governments it deems to be "non-Islamic" or democratic. Even Muslim governments must be destroyed, from al-Qaeda's perspective, if they have become "too Western."

The last objective, in particular, requires a lot of "political maneuvering" on the part of the Islamic extremists. Nichiporuk says what the radicals try to do is "create mass unrest and mayhem in the pro-Western Muslim countries that exist—places like Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan—and see if they can create an uprising against the government where they can bring it down, gain control, and impose a fundamentalist Islamic regime."

Origins of modern Islamic terrorism

Exactly what happened during the last two decades of the 20th century to bring about the change from Palestinian nationalism to militant Islam? Several factors were at play. But all extremist movement threads ultimately lead back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

In Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11, Mark Ensalaco writes: "The Iranian revolution gave the struggle against oppression a religious intensity that surpassed anything secular Palestinian or pan-Arab nationalism could ever generate. Although Iranians are Persian not Arab, and Shi'a [Shiite] not Sunni, the potency of the Ayatollah's message was tremendous: Because Muslims had strayed from the one true path, Muslims chaffed under the yoke of Western imperialism.

"Muslim holy places in Jerusalem were desecrated by Zionism; Muslim states were mired in political corruption; only the revival of Islam could lead to the restoration of the Muslim land, including Palestine, to the Dar al-Islam, the abode of Islam. Islam demanded more than the liberation of Palestine, it demanded the establishment of Islamic governments faithful to the Qur'an [or Koran] and the Sharia, or Islamic law, throughout the Muslim world.

"And for this Muslims must be prepared to sacrifice themselves in jihad, holy war. Islamist thought was far more radical than the pan-Arab nationalism that competed with it for decades" (p. 123).

The Ayatollah Khomeini's oratory alone was enough to get many Muslims fired up—Shiite and Sunni alike. Adding fuel to the fire were America's early run-ins with Iran's new government and Hezbollah, the Lebanese-based terrorist organization Iran helped establish in 1982 and continues to support.

Three events in particular made the United States look weak in the eyes of the Islamic radicals: the United States' failed attempt at rescuing American hostages in Iran in 1979, U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 after Hezbollah's devastating attack on Marine barracks, and the U.S. military pullout of Somalia in 1993-94 without completing the mission.

In his 2009 book Inside the Revolution, Middle East specialist Joel Rosenberg explained that these defeats "emboldened the extremists," gave them "fodder for their propaganda" and "allowed them credibility to bring more young Radicals into the cause" (p. 9).

The birth of al-Qaeda

One such radical was a wealthy Saudi national by the name of Osama bin Laden. Throughout the 10-year war in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation, Bin Laden recruited, trained and financed the thousands of foreign mujahadeen, or holy warriors.

Bin Laden wanted these fighters to continue the "holy war" beyond Afghanistan, so in September 1988 he formed al-Qaeda ("the Base"). By 1990, just a year after the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda had established cells, recruiters and fund-raising operations in 50 countries and by 1993 had trained more than 6,000 Arabs to export jihad throughout the world.

The Soviet withdrawal quickly accelerated al-Qaeda's growth: "In nine years, more than fifteen thousand Soviet soldiers and airmen were killed in Afghanistan, and another thirty thousand or so were injured. Hundreds of Soviet jets and helicopters were shot down. And all the while bin Laden passionately argued that the mujahadeen's victories against the Soviet infidels were proof that Allah was on their side" (Rosenberg, p. 112).

In the last decade, not only has the al-Qaeda franchise spread throughout the Middle East and around the world, but so has its jihadist ideology. That ideology, says Michael O'Hanlon, director of research and senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, "is really what's driving this rise in violence. We haven't seen such a violent ideology mixed with religion in a long time."

And truly, it's a lot easier for violent ideology to spread these days. Today, Gartenstein-Ross observes, "the Internet is one of the main ways al-Qaeda is able to broadcast its ideology and remain so potent. A couple decades ago, that wasn't a factor, so it was more difficult for ideas to spread and networks to form."

Terrorist groups use e-mail, chat rooms, e-groups, Web sites, blogs, forums, virtual message boards and resources like Facebook, Twitter, Paltalk and YouTube to communicate with fellow jihadists, make contact with like-minded individuals and promote their jihadist ideology. Usually they do so with little risk of identification by authorities.

Finally, one other factor that has facilitated the growth of terrorism has been the changing structure of world power. "The U.S. is losing its preeminence in the world, economically and consequently also politically," declares Viano.

He continues: "The U.S. has increasingly less financial resources to be able to devote to fighting terrorism, and the extremist groups know that. And really, the U.S. is a lot less popular than it used to be, and there are fewer nations that will cooperate with it in fighting international terrorism. A lot of terrorist groups may even figure they'll actually gain some favor with the home audiences if they attack America, which wouldn't have been the case 30 years ago. It's all made the U.S. an easier target for terrorism."

What the West is really up against

Of the 50-plus terrorist organizations in the world today, the two that are the biggest threat to the West are al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. Many of the others are relatively small movements and are focused on political issues in their region. But both al-Qaeda and Hezbollah see themselves in a holy war against the United States, Israel and the entire Western world.

Ever since the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda has become synonymous with terror in the United States. "They're the ones who have demonstrated the willingness to use mass casualty attacks and stop at nothing to achieve their objectives," says Nichiporuk.

In 1998 Bin Laden made his organization's objectives very clear when he issued his infamous fatwa (religious ruling) urging fellow Muslims to "kill Americans and their allies, civilians and military." In the summer of 2002, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, a Kuwaiti-born spokesman for al-Qaeda, posted the following statement on the Internet: "Al Qaeda has the right to kill four million Americans ... and injure and cripple hundreds of thousands."

Experts break up the al-Qaeda threat into three distinct entities. The first is the core organization that carried out the 9/11 attacks, comprising Bin Laden and his small circle of close, trusted associates.

The second layer of the network is composed of al-Qaeda's affiliate groups across the globe—regional franchises that have recently formed or extremist groups that have taken on the "al-Qaeda" label. There are cells in at least 100 countries that operate in conjunction with the various regional organizations. Also included in this second layer are terror organizations that maintain their independence for various reasons, but still espouse al-Qaeda's jihadist ideology and cooperate with the core group.

The third layer of the network is what was mentioned in the introduction—the so-called "homegrown" terrorism. Gartenstein-Ross defines it as "terrorism that is carried out by people who are born, raised and/or radicalized within a Western milieu."

The threat of homegrown terrorism

Gartenstein-Ross says homegrown terrorists "are very valuable to al-Qaeda, since they are Westerners (from America or Europe), fit in with Western society better than Middle Easterners do, have the right travel documents, have the command of the English language or the relevant European language, and know how to not raise suspicions."

Typically, homegrown extremists are indoctrinated inside the United States (or another Western nation), with help from extremist Web sites or jihadist clerics. Then many, but not all, travel to an al-Qaeda training camp in the Middle East or Pakistan for terror training and logistical support. Some are then assigned to go on a suicide assignment. This is how Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab almost blew up the airliner bound for Detroit last December.

Counterterrorism officials believe the accelerated radicalization among American Muslims has been driven by a wave of English-language online propaganda and the spread of radical ideology in American mosques. There are a growing number of mosques in the United States, totaling 1,200 today, reported Joel Rosenberg in Inside the Revolution (p. 141). Between 50 and 80 percent are believed to be under control of extremists or dominated by their theology.

Rosenberg also quotes findings from a 2007 study by the Pew Research Center on the attitudes of Muslims in America. The study found that 5 percent of them had a "favorable" view of al-Qaeda. "Moreover, nearly three in 10 (27 percent) said they either didn't know or refused to answer the question about their view of al Qaeda. Out of 2,350,000 Muslims, this means there are at least 117,500 Muslims inside the U.S. who like what Osama bin Laden and his colleagues are doing and have a favorable view of their terrorist network."

Further, "if those who refused to answer the question were disguising their own support for al Qaeda, there could be another 600,000 or more Radical Muslims or Radical-leaning Muslims or sympathizers inside the country" (p. 144). Clearly, America has a large "pool" for potential homegrown terrorists.

Hezbollah, another major threat

That's the al-Qaeda side of the equation (extremist Sunnis). The Shiite side is Hezbollah. Founded in part in response to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and supported by Iran, many counterterrorism officials, like Nichiporuk, believe Hezbollah is "primarily a problem for Israel" and would probably only attack American interests if the United States got into a conflict with Iran.

Still, he acknowledges that "Hezbollah is a very dangerous, very capable terrorist organization" with a worldwide network of cells throughout Europe, Africa, South America and North America.

Others, like Joel Rosenberg, believe Hezbollah is not only dangerous but all too ready to attack the U.S. homeland. In Inside the Revolution, he cites a long list of statements by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, threatening to destroy America and Israel. He also lists Hezbollah's many attacks against U.S. interests in the 1980s and 1990s.

The fact that Iran is close to having a nuclear bomb and is directly tied to Hezbollah adds to the severity of the situation. "Yet, inexplicably," Rosenberg writes, "despite Hezbollah's history of killing Americans, Israelis, and Iraqis—and their clear plans to kill many more—the U.S. has done precious little to crush Hezbollah as it has sought to crush al Qaeda. Nor has it done much to bring Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah or his forces to justice. This has served to embolden Nasrallah, who is convinced that Allah is with him" (p. 95).

Some people speculate about whether Hezbollah and al-Qaeda might ever pull off a U.S. attack together. In spite of their theological differences and conflicting political strategies, both are intent on destroying the West, and there has been some cooperation between the two organizations in the past. For instance, in the early 1990s, Hezbollah trained al-Qaeda operatives in truck bombing techniques. Unquestionably, though, they are both highly formidable threats on their own.

The WMD threat

The ultimate concern, of course, is that extremists would obtain a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)—in particular, a nuclear bomb. In a December 2008 report titled World at Risk, the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism concluded that "unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by 2013."

Former CIA Director George Tenet stated in his 2007 book At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA that he is convinced al-Qaeda is trying to obtain nuclear capabilities: "They understand that bombings by cars, trucks, trains, and planes will get them some headlines, to be sure. But if they manage to set off a mushroom cloud, they will make history. Such an event would place al-Qa'ida on a par with the superpowers and make good bin Laden's threat to destroy our economy and bring death into every American household" (p. 279).

Al-Qaeda's nuclear intentions have been well documented. In 1998 Osama bin Laden said he felt a "religious duty" to acquire nuclear weapons. In 2003 al-Qaeda sought and received a fatwa from a radical Saudi cleric authorizing the use of nuclear weapons against American civilians. Since the early 1990s, al-Qaeda has been trying to buy or steal the nuclear material needed to assemble a bomb and to recruit nuclear scientists to help the group with its aims. It's becoming more doable all the time.

Just how doable? Harvard University's Matthew Bunn, an expert on nuclear theft and terrorism, explains: "At sites in dozens of countries around the world, the security measures in place for plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)—the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons—are dangerously inadequate, amounting in some cases to no more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence...

"If a technically sophisticated terrorist group could get the HEU or plutonium they need, they might well be able to make at least a crude nuclear bomb. Making one does not take a Manhattan project: more than 90 percent of that 1940s-era effort was devoted to making the nuclear material, not making the bomb; and that was before the basic principles of nuclear bombs were widely known, as they are today" ("Reducing the Greatest Risks of Nuclear Theft and Terrorism," Daedalus, Oct. 1, 2009).

Sooner or later, terrorists may well succeed in their bomb-making efforts. Or they may simply acquire one already assembled.

National Review reported the consensus of some of the world's leading terrorism experts at a December 2009 Heritage Foundation meeting: "If Iran, the world's leading sponsor of terrorism, is not prevented from acquiring nukes, the result will be a nuclear proliferation 'cascade.' Before long, so many countries would have so many nuclear devices that the chances of terrorist groups getting their hands on at least a few would increase exponentially" (Clifford May, "Apocalypse When?" Nov. 26, 2009).

In January Gen. James Jones, White House national security adviser, told a USA Today reporter that his "biggest nightmare scenario" was "the acquisition of a weapon of mass destruction by a terrorist organization. The difference between a nation-state doing so and a rogue group of a terrorist organization is that nation-states can be controlled. They know if they're going to use one what's going to happen. But terrorist groups will have no such limitation" (What's the Next U.S. Terror Threat?" Jan. 25, 2009).

What's the answer?

If you are familiar with Bible prophecy, you may not be shocked by all this. The Bible foretells a time of unparalleled fear and terror in the days leading up to the return of Jesus Christ to the earth to establish the Kingdom of God.

Jesus Christ told His disciples that before His second coming "there will be great distress, unequaled from the beginning of the world until now—and never to be equaled again" (Matthew 24:21For then shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time, no, nor ever shall be.

See All..., New International Version, emphasis added throughout). He spoke of "wars and rumors of wars" and peoples and nations rising up against each other (verses 6-7).

There's also a prophetic reference to terrorism in the Bible, specifically for America and other English-speaking peoples.

Regular readers of this magazine understand that the lineage of Americans and other English-speaking peoples can be traced back to the Old Testament nation of Israel. In Leviticus 26:16-17 [16] I also will do this unto you; I will even appoint over you terror, consumption, and the burning ague, that shall consume the eyes, and cause sorrow of heart: and ye shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies shall eat it.

[17] And I will set my face against you, and ye shall be slain before your enemies: they that hate you shall reign over you; and ye shall flee when none pursueth you.



See All..., God tells the Israelites that "sudden terror" and military defeat will be the result of their sin, with Americans and those of other Israelite nations "flee[ing] even when no one is pursuing you" (NIV).

That's not to say terrorism is an out-of-control problem at present. It isn't. The United States has spent billions on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, on intelligence and surveillance operations, and in beefing up airport and port security—all to combat terror threats. U.S. efforts have been successful. Al-Qaeda's core has had to go into hiding, hindering the group's operations. Dozens of attacks on the U.S. homeland since 9/11 have been prevented. But there is only so much human governments can do.

"Terrorism is a problem we can only manage. We can try to reduce both the frequency of it and the consequences of it, but we're not going to be able to eradicate it," O'Hanlon says. The threat of new and more serious attacks is always looming, he says, and realistically it's not possible to prevent 100 percent of the plots. Terrorism is bound to get worse before Jesus Christ returns.

The good news, though, is that when Jesus Christ does return, terrorism at last will become a thing of the past. God's new government will not only control it, but address the root causes and truly stop it.

Of that time we're told: "Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore. But everyone shall sit under his vine and under his fig tree, and no one shall make them afraid" (Micah 4:3-4 [3] And he shall judge among many people, and rebuke strong nations afar off; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.

[4] But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig tree; and none shall make them afraid: for the mouth of the LORD of hosts hath spoken it.



See All...). God speed that day! GN


Thursday, May 17, 2012

Terrorism and the Exceptional Individual

A very interesting post from http://www.stratfor.com/ about an Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) terrorist. This follows this post about the House of Representatives attempting to take a stand against U.S. becoming a dhimmi state.   This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries such as Iran and Venezuela. For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read a very interesting book HERE!



Terrorism and the Exceptional Individual





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Stratfor


By Scott Stewart






There has been a lot of chatter in intelligence and academic circles about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) bombmaker Ibrahim al-Asiri and his value to AQAP. The disclosure last week of a thwarted AQAP plot to attack U.S. airliners using an improved version of an "underwear bomb" used in the December 2009 attempted attack aboard a commercial airplane and the disclosure of the U.S. government's easing of the rules of engagement for unmanned aerial vehicle strikes in Yemen played into these discussions. People are debating how al-Asiri's death would affect the organization. A similar debate undoubtedly will erupt if AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi is captured or killed.






AQAP has claimed that al-Asiri trained others in bombmaking, and the claim makes sense. Furthermore, other AQAP members have received training in constructing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) while training and fighting in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This means that al-Asiri is not the only person within the group who can construct an IED. However, he has demonstrated creativity and imagination. His devices consistently have been able to circumvent existing security measures, even if they have not always functioned as intended. We believe this ingenuity and imagination make al-Asiri not merely a bombmaker, but an exceptional bombmaker.






Likewise, al-Wahayshi is one of hundreds -- if not thousands -- of men currently associated with AQAP. He has several deputies and numerous tactical field commanders in various parts of Yemen. Jihadists have had a presence in Yemen for decades, and after the collapse of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, numerous Saudi migrants fleeing the Saudi government augmented this presence. However, al-Wahayshi played a singular role in pulling these disparate jihadist elements together to form a unified and cohesive militant organization that has been involved not only in several transnational terrorist attacks but also in fighting an insurgency that has succeeded in capturing and controlling large areas of territory. He is an exceptional leader.






Individuals like al-Asiri and al-Wahayshi play critical roles in militant groups. History has shown that the loss of exceptional individuals such as these makes a big difference in efforts to defeat such organizations.






Exceptional Individuals


One of Stratfor's core geopolitical tenets is that at the strategic level, geography is critical to shaping the limits of what is possible -- and impossible -- for states and nations to achieve in the long run. Quite simply, historically, the strategic political and economic dynamics created by geography are far more significant than the individual leader or personality, no matter how brilliant. For example, in the U.S. Civil War, Robert E. Lee was a shrewd general with a staff of exceptional military officers. However, geographic and economic reality meant that the North was bound to win the civil war despite the astuteness and abilities of Lee and his staff.






But as the size of an organization and the period of time under consideration shrink, geopolitics is little more than a rough guide. At the tactical level, intelligence takes over from geopolitics, and individuals' abilities become far more important in influencing smaller events and trends within the greater geopolitical flow. This is the level where exceptional military commanders can win battles through courage and brilliance, where exceptional businessmen can revolutionize the way business is done through innovative new products or ways of selling those products and where the exceptional individuals can execute terrorist tradecraft in a way that allows them to kill scores or even hundreds of victims.






Leadership is important in any type of organization, but it is especially important in entrepreneurial organizations, which are fraught with risk and require unique vision, innovation and initiative. For example, hundreds of men founded automobile companies in the early 1900s, but Henry Ford was an exceptional individual because of his vision to make automobiles a widely available mass-produced commodity rather than just a toy for the rich. In computer technology, Steve Jobs was exceptional for his ability to design devices with an aesthetic form that appealed to consumers, and Michael Dell was exceptional for his vision of bypassing traditional sales channels and selling computers directly to customers.






These same leadership characteristics of vision, daring, innovation and initiative are evident in the exceptional individuals who have excelled in the development and application of terrorist tradecraft. Some examples of exceptional individuals in the terrorism realm are Ali Hassan Salameh, the operations chief of Black September, who not only revolutionized the form that terrorist organizations take by instituting the use of independent, clandestine cells, but also was a visionary in designing theatrical attacks intended for international media consumption. Some have called Palestinian militant leader Abu Ibrahim the "grandfather of all bombmakers" for his innovative IED designs during his time with Black September, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and his own group, the 15 May Organization. Ibrahim was known for creating sophisticated devices that used plastic explosives and a type of electronic timer called an "e-cell" that could be set for an extended delay. Another terrorism innovator was Hezbollah's Imad Mughniyeh, who helped pioneer the use of large suicide truck bombs to attack hardened targets, such as military barracks and embassies.






In the jihadist realm, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is being tried by a military tribunal in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was such an individual. Not only did Mohammed mastermind the 9/11 attacks for al Qaeda in which large hijacked aircraft were transformed into guided missiles, but he also was the operational planner behind the coordinated attacks against two U.S. embassies in August 1998 and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Mohammed's other innovations included the idea to use modular IEDs concealed in baby dolls to attack 10 aircraft in a coordinated attack (Operation Bojinka) and the shoe bomb plot. Mohammed's video beheading of journalist Daniel Pearl in February 2002 started a grisly trend that was followed not only by jihadists in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia but also by combatants in Mexico's drug war.






Leadership


One of the places where exceptional individuals have been most evident in the terrorist realm is in leadership roles. Although on the surface it might seem like a simple task to find a leader for a militant group, in practice, effective militant leaders are hard to come by. This is because militant leadership requires a rather broad skill set. In addition to personal attributes such as ruthlessness, aggressiveness and fearlessness, militant leaders also must be charismatic, intuitive, clever and inspiring. This last attribute is especially important in an organization that seeks to recruit operatives to conduct suicide attacks. Additionally, an effective militant leader must be able to recruit and train operatives, enforce operational security, raise funds, plan operations and methodically execute the plan while avoiding the security forces that are constantly hunting down the militants.






The trajectory of al Qaeda's franchise in Saudi Arabia is a striking illustration of the importance of leadership to a militant organization. Under the leadership of Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, the Saudi al Qaeda franchise was extremely active in 2003 and 2004. It carried out a number of high-profile attacks inside Saudi Arabia and put everyone there, from the Saudi monarchy to multinational oil companies, in a general state of panic. With bombings, ambushes and beheadings, it seemed as if Saudi Arabia was on its way to becoming the next Iraq. However, after the June 2004 death of al-Muqrin, the organization began floundering. The succession of leaders appointed to replace al-Muqrin lacked his operational savvy, and each one proved ineffective at best. (Saudi security forces quickly killed several of them.) Following the unsuccessful February 2006 attack against the oil facility at Abqaiq, the group atrophied further, succeeding in carrying out only one more attack -- an amateurish small-arms assault in February 2007 against a group of French tourists.






The disorganized remaining jihadists in Saudi Arabia ultimately grew frustrated at their inability to operate on their own. Many of them traveled to places such as Iraq or Pakistan to train and fight. In January 2009, many of the militants who remained in the Arabian Peninsula joined with al Qaeda's franchise in Yemen to form a new group -- AQAP -- under the leadership of al-Wahayshi, the leader of al Qaeda in Yemen who served under Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan before being arrested in Iran. An extradition deal between the Yemeni and Iranian governments returned al-Wahayshi to Yemen in 2003. He subsequently escaped from a high-security prison outside Sanaa in 2006.






Al Qaeda in Yemen's operational capability improved under al-Wahayshi's leadership, and its operational tempo increased (although those operations were not terribly effective). Considering this momentum, it is not surprising that the frustrated members of the all-but-defunct Saudi franchise agreed to swear loyalty to al-Wahayshi and join his new umbrella group, AQAP. The first widely recognized product of this merger was the attempted assassination of Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef on Aug. 28, 2009, using a device designed by al-Asiri and carried by his brother, Abdullah al-Asiri.






As with the Saudi group, the fortunes of other al Qaeda regional franchises have risen or fallen based on the ability of the franchise's leadership. In Indonesia, for example, following the arrests and killings of several top jihadist commanders, the capabilities of the regional jihadist franchise there were deeply degraded. Al Qaeda announced with great fanfare in August 2006 that a splinter of the Egyptian jihadist group Gamaah al-Islamiyah had become al Qaeda's franchise in Egypt, and in November 2007 al Qaeda announced that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group had become a regional franchise. But neither of these franchises ever really began operations. While a great degree of the groups' ineffectiveness could have resulted from the oppressive natures of the Egyptian and Libyan governments -- and those governments' aggressive efforts to control the new al Qaeda franchises -- Stratfor believes the groups' failures also stem in large part from their lack of effective, dynamic leadership.






Arms Race


Leadership is not the only factor that influences a militant group's ability to carry out terrorist attacks. Groups planning to conduct bombing attacks also require a proficient bombmaker, and an innovative bombmaker like Abu Ibrahim or Hamas' Yahya Ayyash can greatly expand a group's operational reach and effectiveness. This is especially true for groups hoping to conduct attacks in the United States and Europe.






As outlined in last week's Security Weekly, those planning terrorist attacks against aircraft have been in a continual arms race with airline security measures. Every time security is changed to adapt to a particular threat, whether it be 9/11-style hijackings, shoe bombs, liquid bombs or underwear bombs, the terrorist planner must come up with a new attack plan to defeat the enhanced security measures. This is where innovation and imagination become critical. A master bombmaker might be able to show a pupil how to build a simple IED or maybe even something like a shoe bomb. The pupil may even become quite proficient at assembling such devices. But unless the pupil is innovative and imaginative, he will not be able to invent and perfect the next technology needed to stay ahead of security countermeasures.






There is a big difference between a technician and an inventor, and perhaps the best way to illustrate this principle is by drawing a parallel to the music world. A student can learn to play the saxophone, and perhaps even to mimic a jazz recording note for note. But it is quite another thing for that student to develop the ability to improvise a masterful solo like saxophonist John Coltrane could. In music, individuals like Coltrane are rare, and in terrorism, so are exceptional bombmakers -- masters of destruction who can create imaginative and original IEDs capable of defeating security measures.






Following the death of Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP's English-language preacher, we noted that we did not believe his death would have much operational impact on the group due to his role as the group's English-language ideologue. That argument was based upon the fact that al-Wahayshi, al-Asiri and AQAP operational leader Qasim al-Raymi, who were much more responsible for the group's operations, were still alive. However, if the group were to lose an exceptional individual -- such as its dynamic and effective leader, al-Wahayshi, or its imaginative and creative bombmaker, al-Asiri -- the loss would make a significant difference unless the group could find someone equally capable to replace that individual.










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Read more: Terrorism and the Exceptional Individual
Stratfor

Thursday, October 6, 2011

Yemen: Fallout from the al-Awlaki Airstrike

A very interesting post from the very interesting website www.stratfor.com about the death of al-Alwaki of al-Qaeda. This follows this post about the recent attempt on the Pentegon. This follows this post about an impending Execution in Iran. This follows this article about the recent news about the former ban on offshore drilling which would encourage American energy independence and prevent money from going to hostile countries such as Iran  and Venezuela. For more that you can do to get involved click HERE and read this very interesting book HERE!

Yemen: Fallout from the al-Awlaki Airstrike



By Scott Stewart



U.S.-born Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, an ideologue and spokesman for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda’s franchise in Yemen, was killed in a Sept. 30 airstrike directed against a motorcade near the town of Khashef in Yemen’s al-Jawf province. The strike, which occurred at 9:55 a.m. local time, reportedly was conducted by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and may have also involved fixed-wing naval aircraft. Three other men were killed in the strike, one of whom was Samir Khan, the creator and editor of AQAP’s English-language magazine Inspire.



Al-Awlaki has been targeted before; in fact, he had been declared dead on at least two occasions. The first time followed a December 2009 airstrike in Shabwa province, and the second followed a May 5 airstrike, also in Shabwa. In light of confirmation from the U.S. and Yemeni governments and from statements made by al-Awlaki’s family members, it appears that he is indeed dead this time. We anticipate that AQAP soon will issue an official statement confirming the deaths of al-Awlaki and Khan.



As STRATFOR noted Sept. 30, the deaths of both al-Awlaki and Khan can be expected to greatly hamper AQAP’s efforts to radicalize and equip English-speaking Muslims. The group may have other native English speakers, but individuals who possess the charisma and background of al-Awlaki or the graphics and editorial skills of Khan are difficult to come by in Yemen. The al Qaeda franchise’s English-language outreach is certain to face a significant setback.



This deaths of al-Awlaki and Khan and the impact their deaths will have on AQAP’s outreach efforts provide an opportunity to consider the importance of individuals — and their personal skill sets — to militant organizations, especially organizations seeking to conduct transnational media and ideological operations.





Bridging the Gap Between Militant Ideology and Operations



When considering militant groups with transnational objectives and reach such as AQAP, we need to recognize that there are several components necessary for such groups to conduct successful operations, including finances, logistics, planning, training and intelligence. But at a higher level, there is also the distinction between those elements of the group that are dedicated to operations on the physical battlefield and those who are focused on operations on the ideological battlefield. While physical operations are important for obvious reasons, the ideological component is also critically important because it allows a group to recruit new members, maintain the ideological commitment of those already in the group and help shape public perception through propaganda. Because of this, the ideological component is especially important for the long-term viability and continuity of a group or movement.



Groups such as the al Qaeda core and AQAP appreciate the importance of the ideological struggle. Published three days before the airstrike against Khan and al-Awlaki, the seventh edition of Inspire contains an article written by Khan titled “The Media Conflict,” wherein he quotes AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi (aka Abu Basir) as stating, “media work is half of the jihad.”



The role of the media in propagating militant ideology has been revolutionized by the Internet, which allows small groups in remote corners of the globe to produce and broadcast material that is almost instantly available to people all around the world. Indeed, jihadists have succeeded in radicalizing and recruiting people from disparate countries. Products such as Inspire or the video and audio recordings of militant leaders such as al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri are a giant leap forward from the way militants communicated 25 years ago, when groups like November 17 would send communiques to the newspapers and Hezbollah would release videos via major television networks of Western hostages they had kidnapped.



Interestingly, militant groups quickly recognized the significance of this media democratization and were early adopters of the Internet. By the mid-1990s, white supremacists in the United States had established Stormfront.com, and in 1996, jihadists inaugurated azzam.com, a professional-looking website that allowed them to provide inspiration, news and instruction to adherents to their ideology and to potential recruits. Azzam.com eventually became an important mechanism through which funds for jihadist groups could be raised and willing volunteers could find ways to link up with jihadist groups in places like Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia.



Thus, the Internet began to serve as a bridge that connected the ideological battlefield with the physical battlefield. When we look back at AQAP’s media activities, we can see that they, too, were intended to bridge this gap. For example, the group’s Arabic language magazine Sada al-Malahim (meaning “Echo of Battle”) regularly contained not only articles intended to propagate and defend the jihadist ideology but also articles designed to give practical and tactical guidance. And when al-Wahayshi in October 2009 began advocating that jihadists in the West practice a leaderless-resistance style of operations rather than traveling to places like Yemen or Pakistan for training, they promoted that tactical shift via Sada al-Malahim.





Khan’s and Al-Awlaki’s Significance for Inspire



In July 2010, AQAP launched the first edition of Inspire magazine. Khan, a longtime publisher of jihadist material, was chosen to spearhead the Inspire project for AQAP. (Khan was born in Saudi Arabia to Pakistani parents but raised in the United States.) Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Khan began to publish an English-language pro-jihadist blog and eventually established jihadist websites and an Internet magazine called Jihad Recollections. It was the artistic similarities between Jihad Recollections and Inspire that helped identify Khan as the editor of Inspire. Khan left his parents’ home in Charlotte, N.C., in 2009 to move to Yemen after he learned the FBI was investigating him for his connections to jihadist groups.



Inspire was established intentionally to help further al-Wahayshi’s vision of jihadists adopting the leaderless resistance model. Its stated purpose was to radicalize and recruit young, English-speaking Muslims and then inspire and equip them to conduct attacks in the West.



Khan was only 16 years old when he began his jihadist propaganda activities in 2002, and he essentially grew up on the ideological battlefield. By the time he immigrated to Yemen in 2009, he was an experienced cyber-jihadist. In addition to his advanced computer security skills, Khan also energized the Inspire magazine project, and his youth, colloquial American English competency, graphic design flair and knowledge of American pop culture gave Inspire magazine an edgy quality that appealed to young, English-speaking Muslims.



Notably, Khan did not produce most of the written content for Inspire. In fact, he relied heavily on the speeches of al Qaeda figures such as al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, the books of Abu Musab al-Suri and interviews with AQAP figures such as al-Wahayshi and al-Awlaki. However, it was the way in which Khan packaged these materials that made them so appealing. Certainly, there may have been others working with Khan to produce Inspire, and other people undoubtedly can continue to translate portions of al Qaeda speeches or interview AQAP leaders, but Khan was the driving creative force behind the project. His death thus likely will have a substantial impact on the content and feel of Inspire — if the magazine continues at all.



AQAP’s Arabic-language propaganda efforts suffered a blow in December 2010 when Nayf bin Mohammed al-Qahtani, the founder and editor of Sada al-Malahim and the founder of Malahim media, was killed in a battle with Yemeni security forces. Sada al-Malahim had been publishing an edition roughly every two months since its inception in January 2008. However, since the release of its 16th edition in February 2011, possibly an edition al-Qahtani had worked on, the promised 17th edition has yet to be published. It is possible Inspire will meet the same fate.



However, Khan was not the only American-born jihadist living in Yemen who possessed unique talents that were useful to AQAP’s outreach efforts to English-speaking Muslims. Al-Awlaki had been the imam of congregations in Denver, San Diego and Falls Church, Va., but left the United States in 2002 after being investigated for his ties to two of the 9/11 hijackers and links to a number of other jihadist figures and plots. Al-Awlaki initially moved to the United Kingdom, where he continued to preach, but as authorities began to clamp down on radical preachers in what has been termed “Londonistan,” al-Awlaki moved to Yemen, his ancestral homeland, in 2004.



During his years in the United States and the United Kingdom, al-Awlaki had become a high-profile imam known for his intellect, charisma and ability to appeal to young, English-speaking Muslims. His sermons became very popular, and audio recordings of those sermons were widely distributed on the Internet via his personal website as well as several other Islamic websites. (Thousands of these videos have been posted to YouTube and have received tens of thousands of hits.) Despite his being under investigation by the U.S. government, in 2002 al Awlaki was asked to lead a prayer service at the U.S. Capitol and to speak at the Pentagon on the topic of radical Islam. These engagements reflected al-Awlaki’s popularity and added to the mystique that surrounded him. He was seen as a bit of a celebrity in the English-speaking Muslim world, and his presence in Yemen undoubtedly played a big factor in al-Wahayshi’s decision to expand AQAP’s outreach to al-Awlaki’s audience.



Through his work on the ideological battlefield, Al-Awlaki was able to draw men to the physical battlefield. These men could be sent on on suicide missions, such as would-be Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, or encouraged to conduct simple attacks where they live, as in the case of Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan.



It is important to remember that al-Awlaki was not AQAP’s primary theological authority. The group’s mufti, Suleiman al-Rubaish, a Saudi cleric with a degree in Islamic law, fought with al-Wahayshi and bin Laden at Tora Bora in 2001 before being captured and spending five years in captivity at Guantanamo Bay. After being returned to Saudi Arabia in 2006, al-Rubaish completed the Saudi rehabilitation program and then promptly fled the country to Yemen after his release. Moreover, AQAP’s Shariah Council, of which al-Awlaki was a member, is chaired by a Yemeni cleric named Adel bin Abdullah al-Abab.



Al-Rubaish maintains serious credibility among jihadists because of his friendship with bin Laden, his survival at Tora Bora and his time served in Guantanamo, and al-Abab is a respected Yemeni cleric. However, neither of the men possesses the native-English language ability of al-Awlaki. They also lack the ability to culturally relate to and motivate Muslims in the West in the same way that al-Awlaki did — and continues to do, via his messages that live on in cyberspace. Because of this, al-Awlaki will not be easily replaced.





AQAP’s Operational Ability Intact



This brings us to the ideas of leadership and succession in militant groups. Some have argued that arresting or killing key members of militant networks does not impact such groups, but experience seems to indicate that in many cases the removal of key personnel does indeed make a difference, especially in the near term and if pressure is maintained on the organization. This dynamic has been reflected by the ongoing post-9/11 campaign against the al Qaeda core and their inability to conduct their oft threatened, and purportedly more deadly, follow-on attacks to 9/11. It has also been demonstrated by the operations mounted against regional jihadist franchise groups in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The removal of key personnel such as Saudi leader Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin and Indonesian jihadists Hambali and Noordin Top have had substantial impacts on those regional franchises.



Of course, while AQAP’s English-speaking outreach will be severely crippled following Khan’s and al-Awlaki’s deaths, the core of its physical battlefield operational leadership remains intact. Al-Wahayshi is a competent and savvy leader. His military commander, Qasim al-Raymi, is an aggressive, ruthless and fierce fighter, and his principal bomb maker, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri is creative and imaginative in designing his innovative explosive devices. There were rumors circulating that al-Asiri had been killed in the airstrike directed against al-Awlaki, but they proved to be unfounded. If al-Asiri had been killed, the airstrike would have impacted both the ideological and operational abilities of the group.



The recent increase of U.S. airstrikes, including the one that killed al-Awlaki and Khan, will serve to keep AQAP’s leaders focused on survival, as will the conventional warfare in which the group is currently engaging as it fights for control over areas of Yemen. However, the AQAP leadership undoubtedly still desires to attack the United States and the West — perhaps even more so now to avenge their fallen comrades. If they are given the time and space to plot and plan, the AQAP leadership will continue their efforts to attack the United States. They certainly retain the capability to do so, despite the loss of two ideological leaders.







Read more: Yemen: Fallout from the al-Awlaki Airstrike
STRATFOR