Showing posts with label sunni. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sunni. Show all posts

Thursday, May 12, 2016

Insurmountable Challenges Plague the Middle East Today

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about Mideast turmoil. This follows this post about Facebook and Transgendered people. For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.

While the Arab-Jewish conflict remains the greatest threat to peace in the Middle East, other grave conflicts that torment this region have their origins in ancient history.
The division between the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam goes back to shortly after the death of the prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632 and centers on who were to be his rightful successors. While they are at times at peace, centuries of dislike and distrust between the two sometimes breaks out into violence, as the world has witnessed in recent years in Iraq.
About 85 percent of Muslims are Sunni, but some countries in the Middle East are predominantly Shiite, notably Iran, Yemen, Azerbaijan and Bahrain. Iraq is also about 60 percent Shiite, but was ruled by a Sunni for decades—Ahmad Al-Bakr and then Saddam Hussein. The U.S.-led invasion of the country has led to Shiites playing a more significant role and could mean a close relationship between Iraq and Iran in the future.
Iran has been under the rule of Islamic fundamentalists since 1979 and is now trying to acquire nuclear weapons, which would drastically alter the balance of power in the region. Not only does Israel feel threatened by this development, but so do the countries adhering to Sunni Islam, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
Iran's influence extends far beyond its borders, into Iraq and other countries. In Lebanon, the infamous Shiite terrorist organization Hezbollah is supported by Iran. The Iranians also support the radical Hamas movement, which rules the Palestinians in Gaza and also has considerable support among those in the West Bank. Many Western nations, including the United States, Canada and the European Union, have declared Hamas a terrorist organization.
Radical Islam first gained world attention in modern times in the 1979 Iranian revolution that overthrew the pro-Western shah of Iran. Iran became a theocratic republic under the domination of the ayatollahs, the religious leaders. Iran's influence has spread far and wide, even into Sunni Islam.
Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, is of radical Sunni origin. It operates to the east of Iran in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The former rulers of Afghanistan, the Taliban, gave refuge to al-Qaeda before, during and after the attacks of 9/11, but were defeated during the U.S.-led invasion of the country later the same year. Still, the Taliban continues to fight against coalition forces in the country.
At the same time, there are various other regional conflicts. Egypt's southern neighbor Sudan has had an ongoing civil war for most of the years since independence from Britain in 1956. Somalia has spent the last two decades in an ungovernable state. Yemen suffers from intertribal conflict. And Lebanon's various factions often flare up.
In addition to these ongoing conflicts that could explode and become far worse at any time, many Islamic nations in the region suffer under cruel and despotic dictatorships that lack the support of their own people. This has enabled radical Muslims to gain influence as they work among the common people and provide them with needs their governments don't. So there's an ever-present danger of radical Islam spreading and gaining power in different countries.
It is difficult to find a country in the region that is truly stable other than Israel, which is constantly threatened by external conflict. Israel is so small it has to win every single war it fights—for if it loses one, it may cease to exist!
We should also note that Turkey, the country with the closest ties to the West after Israel (and formerly a good friend of the Jewish state), seems to be changing course and turning away from the West. A member of NATO since 1952, Turkey has been seeking membership in the European Union for more than 20 years, having first applied for acceptance on April 14, 1987. Although there is considerable support from some European countries to Turkey's membership, there is also a lot of opposition, notably from Germany.
On top of the divisive rejection from Europe, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives voted March 5 to proclaim Turkey's suppression of Armenians in 1915 an act of genocide rather than an act of war, as the Turks claim. This will undoubtedly have a negative effect on U.S.-Turkish relations. Turkey for some months has been pursuing closer relations with other Islamic nations at the expense of the United States, the European Union and Israel. This is likely to continue.
The entire Middle East region, culturally and religiously extending into North Africa and South Asia, continues to be very volatile, with no sign of this abating.
While the biblically prophesied end-time “king of the South” could arise as a result of tumult in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a separate issue, one which has caused a number of wars since the birth of Israel in 1948. It remains the world's most dangerous unresolved issue in the world's most dangerous region. GN

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Tuesday, January 5, 2016

Shi'ite or Sunni: Who Will Dominate the Middle East?

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict. This follows this post about Armageddon. This follows this post about Star Wars. For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.
 
 
With the shifting sands of the Middle East and North Africa, the United States appears to be losing its ability to shape events in the region. Things are certainly looking bad for the state of Israel. In fact, with so many contending over this region, things are looking bleaker and more dangerous for everyone.
Last year's so-called “Arab Spring” saw dissident groups of vastly different overall aims coming together to remove dictatorial regimes. But that temporary unity based on sharing a common enemy is already beginning to unravel.
Where are the geopolitical changes in the region headed? Let's consider five factors underlying the major power shifts underway.

Islamists dominate newly elected parliaments

Post-uprising elections have swept political Islamists into office. These have garnered the vast majority of seats in parliaments in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Kuwait.
The same will likely occur in the up-coming Libyan elections, where Islamist strains run through almost all parties. And Yemen's new Muslim president will likely be joined by Islamists coming to power in parliamentary elections.
Egypt's presidential elections scheduled for May 23 and 24 may see the Islamists' newfound political power in parliament at work as kingmakers push for their selected candidate. Furthermore, Islamists in parliament are determined to curtail the president's powers in the next constitution, giving more say in the running of the country to the legislature they now dominate.
(The interim caretaker prime minister and cabinet the military rulers installed are expected to relinquish power this summer. But the diminishing of the military's power in dominating the government is expected to be a gradual process.)
In Egypt and elsewhere Islamists are winning because they have the most organized networks to mobilize voters, are the most trusted public or political groups, and have a track record of challenging oppressive or autocratic regimes.
Muslim Brotherhood offshoots in Libya and Syria, where they have suffered persecution from the government for decades, recently established political parties in anticipation of future elections.
Cairo-based journalist John Bradley, authorof After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolutions (2012), argues that the Islamist groups that have taken power in the Middle East are here to stay—with dire prospects for liberal democracy anywhere in the region. Asked in Zócalo Public Square online magazine whether some Islamist groups have already peaked, giving room for secular agendas to grow in the future, he responded:
“The opposite is true. It's secularism and liberalism that have peaked in the Arab world. Remember, [Iraq's] Saddam Hussein was a secularist, as was [Yemen's] Ali Abdullah Saleh, [Egypt's] Hosni Mubarak, [Libya's] Colonel Gaddafi, and [Tunisia's] Ben Ali. It's therefore not difficult to understand why most Arabs now associate secularism and liberalism with corruption, torture, tyranny, poverty, and a lack of dignity … That's the vacuum now being filled by political Islam. What will happen in the long-term nobody can predict. But the medium-term belongs to the Islamists” (“What Moderate Islamism?” March 4, 2012).
This does not bode well for the West in general and Israel in particular. Islamists in general are more hostile than secularists to peace with Israel and are supportive of Hamas, the terror organization now governing the Gaza Strip.

Sunni Crescent vs. Shiite Crescent

Regional geopolitics pit the powerful “Sunni Crescent” led by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates against the beleaguered “Shiite Crescent” states—Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.
Barry Rubin, director of global research in the International Affairs Center in Israel, sizes up the strategic battle for influence in The Jerusalem Post: “The new Middle East strategic battle is heating up, and this is only the start. It has nothing to do with Israel and everything to do with two more serious lines of battle: Arabs versus Persians [of Iran] and Sunni versus Shia Muslims …
“The real struggle is over who will control each Muslim majority country and who is going to lead the Middle East … The Sunni Arab position was stated very clearly by Amr Moussa, a veteran Arab nationalist and candidate for Egypt's presidency: '(The) Arab Middle East will not be run by Iran or Turkey'” (“The Region: The New Middle East's Internal Divisions,” March 4, 2012).
Rubin later clarifies what is emerging: “What we are seeing again, for the first time in three decades … is an Egyptian bid to lead the Arabic-speaking world and even the whole region. On this point, Egyptian leftists, nationalists and Islamists are united.
“And in the first round, the battle over control of the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, Egypt won and Iran lost.” (See “Hamas' Shifting Allegiance Reflects New Mideast Dynamics”)
Egypt is the largest Arab country, with a population of 83 million, and has long had a major influence on the region. Now that Islamists have won 72 percent of the seats in the lower house and nearly as many in the upper, this fundamentalist orientation will likely be a major influence on the growing number of Islamic governments in the region.

Regional geopolitical jockeying

As Hamas and Egypt push for regional influence, other regional players are doing the same. In its annual forecast, the global intelligence service Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting) pointed out that Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are involved in a dance for dominance in the shifting political sands of the region:
“Iran's efforts to expand its influence will be the primary issue for the Middle East in 2012. The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq has rendered Iran the pre-eminent military power in the Persian Gulf … Turkey, Iran's natural regional counterweight, is rising steadily, albeit slowly” (“Annual Forecast 2012,” Jan. 20, 2012).
Turkey, the report states, will continue to face significant challenges to its regional ascendency due to instability near its borders. It continues its efforts to mold an opposition in Syria, counterbalance Iranian sway in Iraq and influence the rise of political Islamists, particularly in Egypt and Syria. But analysts don't see it making much headway.
Stratfor also explains how Iran affects Saudi Arabia's push for regional dominance: “Iran's regional expansion will be felt most deeply by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi royals now doubt that the United States has the ability or the willingness to fully guarantee Riyadh's interests. Adding to Saudi Arabia's vulnerabilities, the Gulf Cooperation Council states fear that if Iran is not contained within Iraq, it will exploit continued Shiite unrest in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia's Shia-concentrated, oil-rich Eastern Province.”
Saudi Arabia is leading efforts to shore up and consolidate the defenses of Gulf Cooperation Council members to try to ward off the threat posed by Iran. But those efforts will not be a sufficient replacement for America's role as a security guarantor.
Stratfor goes on to examine the tug-of-war underway in Iraq and Syria: “The effects of Iran's expansion efforts will be most visible in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, Iran's main challenge is to consolidate Shiite power among several competing groups.
“As Iraq's fractured Shiite leadership tries to solidify its influence with Iranian support, Iraq's Sunni and Kurdish factions increasingly will be put on the defensive. This ethno-sectarian struggle and the security vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal will degrade Iraq's overall security conditions.
“Meanwhile, Turkey will attempt to contain the spread of Iranian influence in northern Iraq by building up political, economic, military and intelligence assets.”
The fight in Syria is really two contests in one. It's a struggle between Syrians over the nature of their government and society, but it's also a regional rivalry between Iran and its adversaries, as Stratfor explains:
“In Syria, the ultimate goal of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States will be to disrupt Iran's Shiite arc of influence by trying to crack Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime. However, without direct foreign military intervention, the Syrian regime is unlikely to collapse.”
Even the normally feeble 22 nations of the Arab League took unprecedented actions in calling for the Assad regime to leave and hosted a “Friends of Syria” meeting to try to gain support for boycotts and possible military assistance.
The League pushed hard for a resolution from the United Nations Security Council calling on Assad to step aside, but even a watered-down version calling for a cease-fire and talks was blocked by Russia and China.
Also, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are all calling on Assad to go. But as of this writing they remain ambivalent about direct military action, although Saudi Arabia is providing some arms to the rebels.
Syria's ties to Iran complicate its status in the Middle East's power balance. The two countries are commercial partners, have signed a mutual defense agreement and in the past have supported the terror groups Hezbollah and Hamas, which act against Israel. As pointed to above, the tie to Iran is undoubtedly a major factor in the Arab states calling for Assad's departure.
Unlike the other Arab Spring uprisings, Syria's rebels do not reflect a sweeping cross-culture movement. There is still a large segment of the populace remaining loyal to Assad, so the fighting is likely to be protracted.
Writing in Foreign Policy, journalist Nir Rosen explains the Islamic base of the revolt in Syria: “Syria's uprising is not a secular one. Most participants are devout Muslims inspired by Islam. By virtue of Syria's demography most of the opposition is Sunni Muslim and often come from conservative areas. The death of the Arab left means religion has assumed a greater role in daily life throughout the Middle East” (“Islamism and the Syrian Uprising,” March 8, 2012).

Big stakes for the big powers

In addition to the regional forces vying for dominance in the Middle East, the Arab Spring has sparked a global tussle as well. It has become a springboard for big-power geopolitics among the world's greatest military powers—America, Russia and China.
Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West has yet to adjust to the post-Soviet reality, and Russia has not settled on its relationship with the rest of the world. And China's growing economic and military prowess means it has a greater need for vital Middle East oil but also the means to secure what it needs.
Syria has emerged as a key battleground for a Cold War–style tug-of-war between these powers. Russia sent warships to discourage foreign intervention in Syria. China has sent emissaries to Syria to try to broker a cease-fire deal and is being drawn more deeply into Iran's confrontation with the West. And America has less and less influence in the region.
Syria is often called Russia's last remaining ally in the Middle East. The relationship between them goes back four decades. It formed the centerpiece of the Soviet position in the region during the Cold War, the Soviets then equipping and training the Syrian military.
Moscow today continues to arm and politically shield the Assad regime. The Russians are intent on keeping their only military base outside the old Soviet Union in Syria's Mediterranean port of Tartus. In addition, Russia is thought to have major economic interests in Syria, including arms contracts and plans for nuclear energy cooperation.
But America seems equally determined to see a pro-Western regime in Damascus. This has created diplomatic tensions with Russia and China who oppose measures that could lead to military intervention or forced regime change in Syria.
Russia sent at least three guided missile frigates—reportedly loaded with anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles—to Syria. Russia's main interest in blocking UN sanctions against the Assad regime is to prevent NATO intervention in Syria and to keep the country in its sphere of influence.

The threat of nuclear attack and proliferation

Just as Russia's approach to the Middle East is at a turning point, Iran seems as determined as ever to move ahead with its nuclear program in defiance of America, Israel and the rest of the West—and the broader world. Even Russia and China oppose Iran getting a nuclear weapon.
Iranian society 33 years ago was steeped in revolutionary fervor. Today it suffers from revolutionary fatigue. This is one reason Iran's 2009 uprising did not have the same durability as the popular uprisings that have unsettled and unseated numerous Arab dictatorships. People may aspire for revolutionary ends, but there's no romanticism about it and a limited appetite for it.
Iran has been a quasi-theocracy since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It has been at odds with America and the West for much of that time.
Israel sees the prospect of a nuclear Iran that calls for its annihilation as an existential threat. Israeli leaders maintain that a decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities will have to occur by the time Iran is on the verge of shielding these facilities from attack—what they call the “zone of immunity.”
Some experts oppose an attack because they claim that even a successful strike would, at best, delay Iran's nuclear program for only a few years.
Many experts believe the greatest threat associated with the Iranian nuclear program is that it might trigger a regional nuclear arms race that would be deeply destabilizing and would dramatically increase the risk of a weapon falling into irresponsible or fanatical hands.
The president of the United States, Barack Obama, has said that nothing is off the table when it comes to preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, after meeting with Obama, acknowledged that differences still exist in the Israeli and American timetables for contending with the Iranian nuclear program, as reported by The New York Times:
“Mr. Netanyahu reiterated the point he had sought to make forcefully in Washington: that if Iran did not change course, Israel, which considers a nuclear Iran a threat to its existence, would not allow itself to be in a position where its fate was left in others' hands” (“Netanyahu Says U.S. and Israeli 'Clocks' Differ on Iran's Threat,” March 9, 2012).
Negotiation efforts are underway to try to come to a diplomatic solution. The six-power talks with Iran include the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany. Obama was hoping talks would help quiet the “drums of war.” But others think the Iranians' agreement to these talks is just a false show of cooperation while their nuclear development still goes on.
Reuters news agency reports on the U.S. stance: “'Military action is the last alternative when all else fails,' [U.S. Defense Secretary Leon] Panetta told the annual policy conference of the biggest U.S. pro-Israel lobbying group, AIPAC. 'But make no mistake, when all else fails, we will act'” (“Obama Says New Iran Talks Should Calm 'Drums of War,'” March 6, 2012).

Regional transformation will lead to what is foretold

What all this adds up to is that these multilayered shifting sands of domestic, regional and global forces blowing through the Middle East and North Africa are changing the region more dramatically than at any time in the last half century.
The factors underlying the major power shifts carry long-term effects, creating a dramatically different Middle East than what this generation has known.
And there's another source to help us see what's happening. Bible prophecy reveals how all these shifting forces will eventually play out.
The Arab Spring uprisings, in the short term, have focused the Arab world's attention on the changes swirling around them and away from their longtime nemesis—Israel. But, as prophecy lays out, the persistent hatred of Israel will in the long run grow exponentially as Islamic influence grows. Prophecies indicate that a more united group of Arab nations, perhaps sparked by religious zeal, will focus their rekindled hostility toward Israel.
This hostility will grow to a major crescendo leading to all-out war as we approach the end of this age. Psalm 83 contains an intriguing prophecy that shows a number of Middle Eastern countries forming a confederation of nations determined to cut off Israel from being a nation (verses 3-8).
Out of this region will arise a strong end-time leader Daniel the prophet calls “the king of the South”—successor to the ancient Greek rulers of Egypt (Daniel 11:40). This ruler, probably backed by other Islamic nations joined in confederacy with him, will start the cascade of terrifying events leading to a massive war with the power and ruler the Bible refers to as “the king of the North”—successor to the ancient Greek rulers of Syria.
This power is synonymous with the final revival of the Roman Empire referred to in Scripture as the Beast—which will consist of a brief union of 10 nations (Revelation 17:12-14).
The forces of the North, Europe at this time, will sweep down through the Middle East in a major military counterattack that will overthrow the southern power and occupy key portions of the Middle East (Daniel 11:40-41). (See also “The Middle East: Focus of End-Time Bible Prophecy”)
Ultimately, however, this European power and other eastern forces arrayed against it will resist the return of Jesus Christ as coming King and will suffer utter defeat (Revelation 16:12-14; 17:14; 19:11-21). (Our free Bible study aid booklet The Middle East in Bible Prophecy gives more details.)
In the meantime, Jesus tells all of us to stay on the alert to events heralding His coming (Matthew 24:42; Luke 21:36). One major indicator we should be watching for is the rise of a unifying force and leader in the Middle East. Keep your eyes and interests fastened on significant developments in this critically important region.

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Monday, March 30, 2015

Editorial: Whose side is the U.S. on in the Middle East?

Editorial

After attacking the ally of the U.S., Israel, the U.S. seems indecisive about whose side to be on in the Sunni vs. Shi'ite war in the Middle East! Or even if we should be there at all.

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

20-Year Plan for a Global Caliphate

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about the plans for a global caliphate. This follows this post about the birth of Jesus. This follows this post about the movie Exodus: Gods and Kings. For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.
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20-Year Plan for a Global Caliphate





It's remarkable to see what's been happening in the world in light of the al-Qaeda master plan from back in 2000 for establishing a world-dominating Islamic caliphate in seven steps over the course of 20 years.


In a driving conquest ISIS has taken over sizable parts of Syria and Iraq, sweeping through in a brutal blitzkrieg.

Source: Shaun Venish
This plan was revealed to the world in 2005 by Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein in his book Al-Zarqawi: al-Qaida's Second Generation. He had spent time in prison with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (who went on to head up al-Qaeda in Iraq before his death in a U.S. bombing strike) and interviewed a wide range of al-Qaeda members.
The plan was questioned and belittled at the time, but the timeline has continued on track in various respects despite setbacks for al-Qaeda and other Islamists over the years.
Here are the steps as reported in a Der Spiegel article dated Aug. 12, 2005 (Yassin Musharbash, "The Future of Terrorism: What al-Qaida Really Wants"):
"The First Phase . . . 'The awakening' . . . supposed to have lasted from 2000 to 2003, or more precisely from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . . . The aim of the attacks of 9/11 was to provoke the US into declaring war on the Islamic world and thereby 'awakening' Muslims . . . '. . . judged . . . as very successful . . . The Americans and their allies became a closer and easier target.'"
"The Second Phase 'Opening Eyes' . . . [2003] until 2006 [the period this report came out] . . . [making the West] aware of the 'Islamic community' . . . [and] recruiting young men during this period. Iraq [was to then] become the center for all global operations, with an 'army' set up there and bases established in other Arabic states."
"The Third Phase . . . 'Arising and Standing Up' . . . from 2007 to 2010 [which was yet future when this was written]. 'There will be a focus on Syria' . . . The fighting cadres are supposedly already prepared and some are in Iraq. Attacks on Turkey and . . . in Israel are predicted . . . Countries neighboring Iraq, such as Jordan, are also in danger." ( The focus on Syria should be noted, though it did not become a great rallying point until the Arab Spring came at the end of this period. )
"The Fourth Phase Between 2010 and 2013 . . . al-Qaida will aim to bring about the collapse of the hated Arabic governments . . . '. . . lead[ing] to a steady growth in strength within al-Qaida' . . . [And] attacks will be carried out against oil suppliers and the US economy will be targeted using cyber terrorism." ( Consider that the Arab Spring uprisings against various despots occurred in 2011-2012 .)
"The Fifth Phase This will be the point at which an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared. The plan is that by this time, between 2013 and 2016, Western influence in the Islamic world will be so reduced and Israel weakened so much, that resistance will not be feared. Al-Qaida hopes that by then the Islamic state will be able to bring about a new world order." ( This is when a caliphate was declared, in 2014. The al-Qaeda old guard sees this as premature but still has a window of a few years. )
The Sixth Phase . . . From 2016 onwards there will [be] a period of 'total confrontation.' As soon as the caliphate has been declared, the 'Islamic army' . . . will instigate the 'fight between the believers and the non-believers.'"
The Seventh Phase . . . ' Definitive victory' . . . The rest of the world will be so beaten down by the 'one-and-a-half billion Muslims,' the caliphate will undoubtedly succeed. This phase should be completed by 2020, although the war shouldn't last longer than two years."
Whether the fifth and sixth phases pan out remains to be seen, but the seventh can't happen, as Bible prophecy makes it clear that Islam will not come to dominate the world (though not for lack of trying).
In any event, more attention should have been paid to what Fouad Hussein wrote nearly a decade ago. It demonstrates that Islamists take the long view, realizing it will take decades to attain their goals. This thinking is foreign to Western leaders, who in their shortsightedness have grossly misjudged what's been happening over the past many years.
[ See the related article:  Islamic Caliphate Declared: What Does It Mean? ]

Tuesday, September 9, 2014

Islamic Caliphate Declared: What Does It Mean?

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about the new Caliphate. This follows this post about the Feast of Trumpets. For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.
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Islamic Caliphate Declared: What Does It Mean?







A new caliphate—a transnational Islamic state commanding the allegiance of all Muslims—has been declared by the leader of insurgents in Iraq and Syria. What does this portend for the rest of the world in the days ahead?


Source: Reuters/Newscom
On the first day of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan this year, June 29, 2014, the al-Qaeda breakaway group ISIS or ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (i.e., Greater Syria or the Levant)—which has seized vast tracts of Iraq and much of northern Syria—formally declared the creation of an Islamic transnational state, or caliphate. In doing so, the group changed its name to just the Islamic State (IS), as the caliphate is to rule Muslims the world over.
The group's chief, who's borne the pseudonym Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was declared to be the new caliph or leader of the Islamic State—now Caliph Ibrahim. A spokesman for the group "called on those living in the areas under the organization's control to swear allegiance to al-Baghdadi and support him. 'The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations becomes null by the expansion of the caliph's authority and the arrival of its troops to their areas,' [the spokesman] said" ("ISIS Declares Creation of Mideast Caliphate Across Iraq and Syria," CBS News, June 29, 2014).
Baghdadi then called for Muslims to rally to his new state and to conquering the Christian West, saying: "Those who can immigrate to the Islamic State should immigrate, as immigration to the house of Islam is a duty . . . Rush O Muslims to your state . . . This is my advice to you. If you hold to it you will conquer Rome and own the world, if Allah wills" (quoted by Damien McElroy, "Rome Will Be Conquered Next, Says Leader of 'Islamic State,'" The Telegraph, July 1, 2014).

Longtime desire to reestablish the caliphate

The desire to reestablish the caliphate is driven by the goal of joining all Muslims under a single rule—as in the days of Islam's founder, Muhammad, and his immediate successors or caliphs in the seventh century. Under that rule everyone is to strictly adhere to sharia—Islamic law and jurisprudence—and follow the way of jihad or holy war to conquer the globe.
The caliphate was declared by a succession of Muslim empires over the centuries, the latest being that of the Ottoman Turks, which ended with World War I. Yet these are viewed as corrupt, and the desire of the Islamists today is to restore the initial "righteous" caliphate.
Islamist terror groups the world over, including Hamas, al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc., "all profess the revival of the caliphate, the regime that was installed by Muhammed's righteous successors, the caliphs, and has become the iconic model to be emulated by all future generations of Muslims" (Raphael Israeli, From Arab Spring to Islamic Winter, 2013, p. xiii). (See "20-Year Plan for a Global Caliphate ".)
During and after the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011-2012, momentum seemed to be building toward the formation of a caliphate, particularly with the ascendance of a Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi, to the presidency of Egypt. Yet with the military coup in Egypt last year that ousted Morsi and instigated a major crackdown against the Brotherhood, the momentum toward a caliphate appeared to have stalled.
But now, with millions of Islamic extremists across the Middle East still pressing for that Muslim dream, where one door closes another opens (although the door in Egypt is by no means truly closed, as the population there remains predominantly Islamist).
So what are we to make of this new development?
A number of Islamist groups and prominent clerics are not supportive of the declaration of the Islamic State, as it's viewed as premature and a cause for infighting between Muslim groups and states. But significant support has come in from far quarters. No doubt a great deal of blood will be shed over this among Muslims and between Muslims and the non-Islamic world.
In considering the matter we should ask: How did the new Islamic State come to be, and what are its prospects for success as a revived caliphate? Or might another group receive wider acceptance in the role? And does Bible prophecy tell us anything regarding such developments?

The rise of ISIS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

The al-Qaeda contingent in Iraq, headed up by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the mid-2000s, went through several incarnations before eventually becoming the Islamic State of Iraq, or ISI, which came to be headed up by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2010, when American forces were withdrawing from the country.
The group's extreme brutality and killing of fellow Muslims created a divide between it and al-Qaeda's international leadership, which considered Zarqawi and his followers too extreme and criticized them for alienating people from the Islamist cause.
Furthermore, Osama bin Laden's successor Ayman al-Zawahiri maintained, as do many Islamist scholars now opposed to the current caliphate declaration, that a caliphate must follow the purification of the wider Muslim world, being then based on the consent of the public.
But, as Margaret Coker explains in The Wall Street Journal, Baghdadi and his supporters "reject this doctrine of an evolving religious and social consensus. They believe instead that a pure Islamic regime can be more swiftly imposed by force" ("The New Jihad," July 11).
And in fact, this is the way the caliphate has been imposed in past centuries.
The struggle came to a head in April 2013, when Baghdadi declared a takeover of the Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda-linked rebel militia fighting against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, stating that it would be merged with ISI to form ISIS. The Nusra Front rejected the takeover bid and Zawahiri ordered Baghdadi to leave Syria and maintain operations in Iraq. But in a huge affront to al-Qaeda, Baghdadi said he would follow Allah instead and maintained the ISIS merger, whereupon Zawahiri formally disowned the group.
ISIS went on to take over sizable parts of Syria and Iraq, sweeping through in a brutal blitzkrieg. It took to social media to demoralize resistance by displaying its extreme brutality. This tactic helped ISIS to wrest control of the large city of Mosul and its environs in June of this year when the Iraqi army had to retreat due to massive numbers of desertions.
The conquest of this area put huge amounts of advanced U.S. weaponry into the hands of ISIS, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars looted from banks—making it far wealthier than al-Qaeda ever was. And with U.S. forces now gone from Iraq, the new Islamic State has a great deal of room to maneuver. It thus seems poised to change the Middle East, if not the greater world scene, in a dramatic fashion.

Striking fear in the hearts and minds of opponents

Joseph Farah, editor in chief of WND (the former WorldNetDaily), commented prior to the caliphate announcement: "Do I expect to see ISIS conquer the Middle East, North Africa, part of Europe and Asia in the 21st century? No, I don't. But I do expect to see enormous carnage and destruction and bloodshed as a result of this movement—far more, perhaps, than most other analysts project. There is a ferocity to ISIS that makes even al-Qaida uncomfortable. It has already captured more wealth and armaments, including chemical weapons, than all but a handful of countries in the world possess . . .
"Brutality difficult for Westerners to even imagine is the modus operandi of ISIS. It calls for a scorched-earth policy against its enemies—which includes Christians, Shiites, Alawites, Jews, non-believers and all non-Sunnis. ISIS leadership advocates and practices barbarism designed to strike fear into the hearts and minds of its opponents and anyone who doesn't stand with them in their strict Shariah Sunni code.
"Already the ISIS marauders have crucified victims, beheaded them and conducted mass executions of Iraqi soldiers and civilians. No atrocity is beneath them" ("ISIS Rising—What It Portends," June 23, 2014).
Farah compares the speed of their conquest with the original march of Islam and even Alexander the Great. "The success of campaigns like that requires that superior forces faint in fear of the coming hordes. You can see it's working already in Iraq" (ibid.).

Is the new caliphate viable?

BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner gave a helpful analysis of the situation, dealing with the question of whether ISIS can maintain its rule and viability: "Analysts point out that seizing territory is one thing, governing it is quite another" ("'Jihadistan': Can Isis Militants Rule Seized Territory?" July 8, 2014).
Despite its remarkable military success in the wake of its psychological warfare, "Isis has effectively been 'punching above its weight,' to use a boxing analogy," its numbers of between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters being low compared to competing forces. Gardner quotes a pan-Arab newspaper stating, "Isis' ability to control lands has been based on deals with local militants willing to do the 'ruling' for them."
He further notes that Baghdadi and his followers do not seem, on one hand, to have learned from the mistakes of their predecessors under Zarqawi in Iraq in their brutal treatment of the populace, which failed to win hearts and minds. Regarding ISIS, "stories abound of harsh punishments imposed for the slightest of offences, women being confined to the home, public crucifixions, kidnappings and extortionate levies imposed on businesses . . ."
While Gardner on the other hand points out ISIS taking care of municipal needs like garbage collection, the mask of public service has since come off.
Gardner further states: "To succeed as a viable state, let alone as a transnational 'caliphate,' Isis will need access to oil and water." And ISIS/IS now has both, controlling refineries and major dams in Syria and Iraq.
Gardner argues that the new Islamic state is not going away: "The only force capable of permanently ejecting Isis will be the tribes in those regions [they rule], and they have little incentive to do so while the Syrian civil war rages on . . .
"Which leaves the prospect of a violent, extremist, well-armed, well-funded and religiously intolerant militia becoming a permanent part of the Middle East landscape, a sort of de facto 'jihadistan.'" And, he notes, like Afghanistan it would also be a springboard for increased attacks against neighboring countries and the Western world.

Several key advantages and others to carry on the cause

In spite of the denunciation received from some Islamic scholars and disapproval from al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations, this group nevertheless has much going for it in the Muslim world. One advantage is in the very declaration of the caliphate, as it's unlikely that a number of claimants would start declaring their own since that would minimize the whole idea of the pan-Islamic state.
Furthermore, the fact that ISIS/IS is actually carrying out major exploits and making massive gains, with the caliphate proclamation on top of that, can capture the imagination of the younger generation of jihadists.
As noted in Newsweek: "The brutal attacks of 9/11 were almost 13 years ago; many of the jihadist fighters on the front lines now were children then. They have grown up seeing Al-Qaeda on the defensive, with few successes of its own, while ISIS has stunned the world with its victories in Syria and Iraq" (Kurt Eichenwald, "Iraq's ISIS Is Eclipsing Al-Qaeda, Especially With Young Jihadists," July 7, 2014).
Indeed, at his site Intelwire author J.M. Berger points out regarding al-Qaeda that "one of its few practical remaining plays would be to squander the entirety of whatever resources it has left on an attack against the West, in the hopes of regaining its reputation" ("A New Day for ISIS," June 11). That should serve as a stark warning of great danger for the world even in the short term.
Since the proclamation of the new Islamic State, it has seen increasing voices of support by Islamists around the world. But even if the group falters in its bid to rule the broader Islamic nation, there are others who could still try to establish the caliphate.
There remains al-Qaeda of course. Then there's the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan—by which the caliphate potentially could acquire nuclear weapons. The Muslim Brotherhood still maintains a vast network of support in the Islamic world—and Egypt may yet eventually revert to rule by the Islamist majority, the economy there being presently in shambles. And Turkey's prime minister Recep Erdogan still dreams of a Turkish-led caliphate, as was the Ottoman Empire.
But with the caliphate already declared, a broad spectrum of Muslims from around the world may try to come together to help it succeed—and this could sway other Islamist leaders to support it. On the other hand, what some see as Baghdadi's big gamble in proclaiming the caliphate could backfire in a big way if things don't pan out for him. We will have to wait and see how matters develop.
As a preview of where things are headed, one of the first acts of the new caliphate was to issue a fatwa, or religious edict, ordering that "all women between the ages of 11 and 46 must undergo genital mutilation" (Agence France-Presse, July 24).
Again, it seems very likely that a lot of blood will flow because of the declared caliphate—both Muslims killing other Muslims and attacks being launched on non-Muslims.

Turning to the only reliable source for advance news

In the face of these events, if we want to know where the world is ultimately headed, we must turn to the only sure source of knowledge about the future—the Holy Bible, the very Word of God. Bible prophecy does seem to say, in Psalm 83, that a confederation of Middle Eastern peoples will come together with the intent of destroying Israel—apparently involving Arabs, Palestinians, Turks and others in the region.
Moreover, Daniel 11 refers to an end-time "king of the South" who will instigate a conflict with a power to the north—a revival of the Roman Empire centered in Europe—with the Holy Land caught in between.
Might the confederation and southern power in these prophecies be a restored caliphate? It seems quite likely. After all, the principal unifying factor among all these peoples is Islam—so a new Islamic empire bringing them together is not at all far-fetched.
Is the current Islamic State that power? Its leaders are so extreme that gaining a mass following among other Muslims poses a great challenge. Also, it does not yet encompass Egypt, which the southern power in Daniel 11 seems to include or even be based from. And perhaps the Islamic State won't reach that far in its current form.
Yet it could be that, just as the European Union of today seems to be the embryonic form of the coming European superpower, so the current Islamic State could be the embryonic form of a much greater caliphate to come. These developments certainly illustrate the desire of millions of Muslims to establish a caliphate.
Note again particularly the goal stated by the Islamic State to "conquer Rome and own the world." It could well be that this long-held desire of Muslims will lead to the conditions described in the latter part of Daniel 11, where the end-time king of the South provokes the king of the North into an invasion of North Africa and the Middle East.
Momentous and dangerous times lie ahead. Stay alert and turn to God and His Word with all your heart. No matter what happens, He will see you through!
[ See the related article:  20-Year Plan for a Global Caliphate ]

Tuesday, July 8, 2014

The Sunni Ramadan Offensive and the Lessons of Tet

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about The Sunni Offensive. This follows this post about the Islamic State's opinion of Mecca. This follows this post about Michigan bringing in Muslim refugees.  This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries. For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE. You can follow me at blogspot here and at twitter here https://twitter.com/brianleesblog. Please consider following both in case one goes down!




The Sunni Ramadan Offensive and the Lessons of Tet

By George Friedman
In February 1968, the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong launched a general offensive in Vietnam during Tet, the Vietnamese New Year. From mid-1966 onward, the North Vietnamese had found themselves under increasing pressure from American and South Vietnamese forces. They were far from defeated, but they were weakening and the likelihood of their military victory was receding. The North Vietnamese decided to reverse the course of the war militarily and politically by marshaling available forces, retaining only limited reserves and going on the offensive throughout South Vietnam.
The attack had three strategic purposes. First, the North Vietnamese wanted to trigger a general uprising against the Americans and the South Vietnamese government. Second, they wanted to move the insurgency to the next stage by seizing and holding significant territory and resisting counterattack. And third, they wanted to destabilize their enemy psychologically by demonstrating that intelligence reports indicating their increasing weakness were wrong. They also wanted to impose casualties on the Americans at an unprecedented rate. The American metric in the war was the body count; increasing the body count dramatically would therefore create a crisis of confidence in the U.S. public and within the military and intelligence community.

General Offensives and Crises of Confidence

From a military standpoint, the offensive was a failure. The North Vietnamese military was crippled by its losses. While seizing Hue and other locations, the North Vietnamese were unable to hold them. But they succeeded psychologically and politically by raising doubts about U.S. intelligence and by creating a political crisis in the United States. In war, perception of the enemy's strength and will, and confidence in your own evaluation of those things, shifts the manner in which one fights. The U.S. intelligence estimate before Tet was more right than wrong, but by marshaling all forces for a general offensive, the North caused U.S. trust in that evaluation to collapse. Even though the North Vietnamese were militarily far weaker after the offensive, the military failure proved less relevant than this creation of a crisis of confidence.
The use of a general offensive to reverse military decline is not unique to Tet. The Germans did the same in their offensive in 1944 at the Battle of the Bulge. While the Germans also had a military intent, their psychological intent was as important. Before the battle, the Allies thought the Germans were finished. They were, and so the Germans had to show they still had power. They accordingly threw their reserves into a battle to break the Allies' nerve.
When launched at a time when it is assumed it could not be launched, the general offensive is a powerful weapon. Such an offensive is now underway in Iraq. When we step back, we see a broad offensive by Sunni jihadists underway in a range of countries. In Afghanistan, a massive summer offensive is underway in parts of the country once regarded as secure. To the south, the Pakistani Taliban launched a major offensive a few weeks ago that sparked a Pakistani counteroffensive, putting the Pakistani Taliban on the defensive. In Syria, while the Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) has not surged, it also has not declined. Southern Jordan has meanwhile seen clashes between jihadists and government forces. In the Palestinian territories, Hamas has announced, though not launched, a third intifada. To the west, Egypt is experiencing terrorism, while in Libya jihadists have asserted themselves in various ways.

The Question of Coordination

Like the Vietnamese and Germans, the jihadists have, broadly speaking, been on the defensive in recent years, and in many cases they had been dismissed as broken. They differ from the Vietnamese and Germans in the sense that they do not constitute a single force. The question remains, however, whether there has been coordination between these offensives. Clearly, the Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi offensives are linked. Not so clear is whether they are operationally linked to events in Afghanistan and Pakistan or North Africa. To the extent there was coordination, it would have come from Saudi Arabia. As one might imagine, Saudi actions are deliberately murky, so it is difficult to establish anything definitive here. But the Saudis are most threatened by the prospect of a U.S.-Iranian entente. The Saudis also find the jihadists useful for domestic political purposes and as a lever to maximize regional Saudi influence.
There are small hints here and there of coordination, such as this video. But mysteries always have small hints that one can pretend combine to prove something. So far, we see nothing definitive indicating overall coordination. But in a certain sense, it doesn't matter. These uprisings have occurred close enough to each other that they have had the same effect regardless of whether they were coordinated -- giving rise to a sense that the situation in the region is destabilizing dramatically and that jihadist strength has been underestimated.
In a sense, there was no need for coordination because in each theater jihadists were responding to the same three processes. First, there was the increasing evidence that the United States is drawing down its forces such that the door is open to broader jihadist military action. Second, American negotiations with Iran have created a fear among Sunnis, including in Saudi Arabia, that the entire political structure of the region is about to tilt massively against them. And third, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt and even Syria all saw recent elections intended to create lasting regimes unfriendly to the jihadists. Within the past few months, these factors combined to force action by the jihadists with or without overt coordination.

Redefining Politics

Jihadists in particular -- and many Sunni populations in mixed countries like Iraq -- either individually, regionally or in coordination launched an offensive designed to make their military power appear as large as possible and thereby redefine politics in areas where their political influence has declined in recent years. Iraq is the most obvious example of this.
The country is divided into three regions. The Shia, the largest group, control the Baghdad government and massive oil reserves in the south. In the north, the Kurds are well-organized and well-defended and also control oil supplies. The Sunnis have little access to oil, are smaller in numbers than the Shia and have become increasingly marginalized since the creation of the post-Saddam Iraqi government. Given that a new government was being formed after recent elections with the same structure as before, the Sunnis had to throw their reserves into the battle. If taken seriously, the threat of a Sunni military force that can seize the country gives the Sunnis a seat at the table, both politically and economically.
From news reports, it would appear that a massive Sunni army is marching in the country -- exactly the image the Islamic State wants to portray. The reality is more modest. This is less an invasion of Shiite or Kurdish territory than an uprising within the Sunni regions in favor of the Islamic State, which is limiting itself to consolidating power within the Sunni region. It is not clear how the group will cope if the Shia reorganize their military and strike north and west or if the Kurds were to attack. Still, the Sunni offensive has hit Iraqi Shiite self-confidence hard. Shiite self-confidence could shatter, or the Shia could draw together and counterattack. If the latter, the Islamic State might fight poorly or well against the Shia. The Islamic State hopes Shiite confidence collapses in the face of all this uncertainty.
This uncertainty has had the same effect on the Americans and Iranians that it has had on the Shia. Neither the United States nor Iran seems to have expected an attack of this magnitude. Both seemed to be operating on intelligence evaluations that made it appear that Iraq was stabilizing under a Shiite-dominated government and that the real issue was how to manage Kurdish oil sales. The Islamic State wants to make the United States and Iran wary of their respective intelligence estimates, and therefore wary of taking any political or military action in Iraq. So far, the Islamic State has succeeded in creating panic in Iraq and wariness in outside countries.

Gauging an Offensive's Success

We will soon start to learn if the general offensive has worked, destroying old assumptions and creating uncertainty. This will be measured differently in each country. Will the fighting in Jordan spread? Can the Afghan Taliban seize and hold territory as the United States draws down to limited forces? If the Pakistani military puts the Pakistani Taliban on the run but they survive, does their mere survival threaten the regime?
The general offensive from a position of weakness can work, but it takes a combination of fragmentation, indifference and misunderstanding. The Tet offensive is the classic success. The Bulge is the classic failure. The North Vietnamese made the American media vastly overestimate northern military strength. At the Battle of the Bulge, Patton was not impressed by the German offensive and urged that the Germans be allowed to roll on to Paris so as to burn up all their fuel. As with both earlier general offensives, first reports of jihadist military success should be taken with a grain of salt.
Evaluating the offensive will give us a better sense of Iraq as the Iraqi army tries to mount a counteroffensive. But we must not focus on Iraq: This is a broader general offensive from Pakistan to the Mediterranean, whether coordinated or not. Some theaters will see failure, others success as Tet did. And though Tet serves as an imperfect historical comparison, there is a powerful parallel: At a time when reasonable people thought that the fighting had been contained in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, they have discovered that there was no basis for that assumption. And that reminds us of Tet.
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