Showing posts with label Crimean War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Crimean War. Show all posts

Monday, August 22, 2016

John Dickerson On, Yes, The Double Standard

A timely post from http://www.hughhewitt.com about the Media ADMITTING Bias. This follows this post about Hillary's e-mails and Obama's ransom. This follows this post about rap songs referencing Donald Trump.
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John Dickerson On, Yes, The Double Standard

posted by Hugh Hewitt
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It’s the oldest complaint of conservatives about Manhattan-Beltway media elites, but has new legs this week.  I discussed it with Face the Nation’s John Dickerson Friday:
Audio:
08-19hhs-dickerson
Transcript:
HH: Joined now by CBS News’ John Dickerson, host of Face the Nation. Good morning, John, and a good Friday to you. August is usually the month where nothing happens except in the last 15 years that I’ve been doing this radio show, everything happens in August. Yesterday, U.S. conceded yesterday $400 million dollar payment was delayed as “leverage”. We’re calling it a ransom. Russia is building up its army near the Ukraine border in Crimea. This terrible picture of Omran Daqneesh in Syria is breaking hearts. A rabbi in Strasbourg, France, stabbed by a man shouting Allah Akbar this morning, coffins floating in Baton Rouge, what in the world are you going to cover on Sunday, and with who?
JD: Well, I’ll talk to Jeff Sessions about some of those issues, and what the Donald Trump worldview, where he fits into all this. The Ukraine picture obviously is quite interesting on that front. Donald Trump obviously taking a new tone last night in his speech, you know, he’s facing the commander-in-chief test. And so is that what the new tone is a part of in terms of making people feel comfortable about him in the Oval Office? We’re also going to talk to other Washington Post reporters who have written that new book about Trump, Kranish and Fisher, about the extensive interviews with Donald Trump, extensive look at his life, what’s the more complete picture of Donald Trump than the one we see that gets chopped up and shredded in the campaign cycle. And then we’ll have some new poll numbers from those battleground states, get a sense of where voters are.
HH: Now I believe the polls are going to begin to close, and that the story of September is going to be Trump comeback, because it’s just the way American elections make. But if I can, I want you to indulge me in an old saw. Conservatives have complained forever about double standards. And I have in front of me two stories. One of them is the Gilbert Chagoury story. Bill Clinton pardoned Marc Rich on the last day of his presidency. Marc Rich was business partners with Gilbert Chagoury. Gilbert Chagoury donates to the Clinton Foundation. We knew that some time ago. But last week, we find out that he asked for and received help from the Clinton Foundation in touching Hillary Clinton’s State Department for favors. There’s a denial by the then-Lebanese ambassador that he ever heard from Chagoury, but Huma Abedin said oh, we’ll get on it. How is that not dominating the news cycle? That’s a pay for play going back 16 years, John Dickerson, to the original sin of why did they pardon Marc Rich?
JD: Yeah, well, I think that’s why you see the Clinton Foundation, Bill Clinton saying that, I mean, I think it’s part of why Bill Clinton is saying that the Clinton Foundation will, that he’ll separate himself from it, and they won’t take any money if Hillary Clinton is elected president. And I think the pressure of those stories is what caused that response. I think that’s, you know, I mean, it’s been covered. I think, and is going to continue to be covered. I think the, I guess the other story that you would pair that with is the, is Paul Manifort’s connection to the, to Ukraine and Russia, which is getting, which is getting more coverage than the Clinton one. So you know, I think it’s a fair comparison to whether which one is more important in terms of people’s, making people’s decisions about who they want to elect president.
HH: Yeah, Paul Manifort is a real story, and there is a real amount of reporting to be done there. I would guess it’s a ten to one column inch differential between Chagoury and Manifort. And the Chagoury story is the principal as opposed to the staffer who arrives on the scene six months ago.
JD: Sure.
HH: So I am just flabbergasted that the Rich to Chagoury to Band to Huma Abedin to Hillary, Tinkers to Evers to Chance connection has not dominated.
JD: (laughing)
HH: But let me ask you about the second one. I’m looking at the story that is in this morning’s, I think it’s the Express, maybe it’s the Telegraph, of coffins floating down Baton Rouge streets. And the flooding there is so awful, they say it’s, we’ve never seen anything like this. It’s worse than Hurricane Katrina. Anna Johnson of Denham Springs near the state capital is quoted as saying that in the Express. Why is the President getting a pass on not going to Louisiana, and George Bush was, you remember this, John, roasted for not doing so?
JD: Yeah. I don’t know. I don’t know. I think it, it’s, you know, I don’t know whether the, what the, why the coverage is different. I don’t know whether the, you know, the response, the federal response is, could have done anything here, whether one is being considered more of a disaster that’s just a disaster the way you would have floods and wildfires, and you know, there’s only so much a federal response can do. I don’t know. It obviously also has to do with the kind of, you know how this goes, where a president is in their presidency. And you know, George Bush at the time was on, you know, on his heels in terms of the aftermath of the Iraq War, and so that had a narrative in place that, that those facts fell into. But I don’t know that there’s, I don’t know that there’s a substantive argument for why one’s getting covered more than another.
HH: I have one theory and it’s tentative. I was at the movies last night, and I saw the preview of the movie, the First Date, which looks like a wonderful movie about President Barack Obama and Michelle Obama’s first date 25 years ago in Chicago. He’s a folk hero, and therefore, he’s a little bit above what we normally do to presidents. What do you think?
JD: Well, he’s not a folk hero for a lot of people. I mean, you know, for a lot of people, he’s changed the culture and set the country in the totally wrong direction. So I mean, he might be a folk hero for the people who make, you know, those kind of movies. I think…
HH: And the news, the people who make the news, he’s a folk hero. I should have said that, the media, the mainstream Beltway-Manhattan media elite.
JD: I don’t know. I mean, I think, I think, I don’t know, folk hero is an interesting concept. I think as the first African-American president, I think that adds to what I’m interpreting you to mean by folk hero in terms of his story is, has more to it than just simply his…
HH: His narrative, his politics…
JD: Yes. Yeah.
HH: …his struggle, it’s all resonating.
JD: I don’t have, yeah, yeah, I don’t know, the rise of the first African-American president has a narrative arc to it that I, that is different. I think you’re, I think that makes, I think that’s, that’s probably right.
HH: We’ll follow more…
JD: And that’s, certainly to people who make movies, find him to be more than a folk hero. They find him to be, you know, a great, the greatest president perhaps of their lifetime.
HH: Yeah, yeah, we’ll follow this story for years to come. John Dickerson, have a great Face the Nation on Sunday. I appreciate you dropping by.
End of interview.

Tuesday, March 17, 2015

Hillary Distraction

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about Hillary Clinton's e-mails. This follows this post about Spring Break. This follows this post about the Madrid bombings anniversary.For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.
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Distraction


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The controversy over Hilary Clinton’s e-mail arrangement while Secretary of State points out how easy it is for us to be distracted from bigger events in the world. There are two items in the news that we should note.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi called for the U.S. to play a greater role in helping Egypt and other Middle Eastern nations fight terrorism. He has urged the creation of an "Arab ready force" to confront the Islamic State and similar groups. Ever since the Egyptian military ousted the elected President Mohamed Morsi from office, and installed el-Sisi, the U.S has delayed shipment of critical weapons to the country. Relations between the two allies have also cooled. The rise of ISIS in the region has highlighted the need to maintain good relations with the governments in the region to prevent further regional instability.
In an exclusive interview with Fox News, el-Sisi said the need for weapons and equipment remains "dire," and Egyptians "would like to feel that the United States is standing by them.” America under President Obama has chosen to “lead from behind” in this conflict. The speed with which ISIS has come on the scene has stirred fears and reactions from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt to push back at this terrorist state. El-Sisi emphasized the critical need for a "big response from capable countries”—an obvious reference to America. Leading from behind is causing America to look like a reluctant dwarf.
European Commission President Jean Clause Juncker has called for the creation of an EU army in order to show Russia “that we are serious about defending European values”. Mr Juncker said an EU army would “help us to develop a common foreign and security policy, and to fulfil Europe’s responsibilities in the world.” A standing army without a common foreign policy is impossible. Europe is still grappling with the reality of a common currency, the euro, without having a common economic policy guiding the union. The idea to develop a European army is beyond credible thinking at the moment.
This would be an quantum leap beyond the current mindset of Europe. Some say it could take 5-10 years to form. But unexpected events can dictate otherwise. Europe, taken together, accounts for 1/3 of total world defense spending. Should this happen, Europe, Inc. would be an overnight superpower. This suggestion begs the obvious question: What has happened to American-led NATO? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that President Vladimir Putin understands the application of hard power, something his European counterparts do not.
These two developments illustrate that America matters in today’s world. Its absence of firm leadership is creating concern among its allies. Events of the past 12 years, since America’s invasion of Iraq, have revealed deep problems in America’s ability to shape the world in its image. While the U.S has the power—both hard military and firm economic—it has squandered good will and opportunity. That is why the distraction over a potential president’s e-mail is a major problem.
We thought the 2012 election was ground shaking. We are watching a 2016 election develop that will highlight the bankruptcy of American politics and leadership. It's going to be a long 20 months.

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Wednesday, September 24, 2014

The Shofar, the Rapture and the Feast of Trumpets

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/ about the Feast of Trumpets. This follows this post about the Oil Chessboard. For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632.
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The Shofar, the Rapture and the Feast of Trumpets





What do these terms have to do with Christ's return? You need to separate truth from fiction.


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Every autumn the Jewish community observes a holiday called Rosh Hashanah, also called the Feast of Trumpets. On this day a shofar, or ram’s horn, is blown.
Most Christians find little meaning in the Feast of Trumpets, but this day holds an important message for you and your future?
There are connections between this ancient holy day, the idea of the Christian Rapture and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Join us on Beyond Today as we explore The Shofar, the Rapture and the Feast of Trumpets.
Jackie has been a Christian all of her life. She believes that we are fast approaching a time of massive war, disease epidemics and natural calamities.
She also believes that God is going to save her by the “Rapture.” Many Christians believe that the Rapture is a prophesied event where Christ “raptures” away Christians into the clouds before the time of the Great Tribulation.
She worries about her husband, who isn’t concerned with any church or the Bible. Will he be left behind to suffer and possibly die?
At a synagogue down the street a group of Orthodox Jews meet to celebrate the Feast of Trumpets.
Part of this ceremony will be the blowing of the shofar, or ram’s horn. In ancient times the shofar was blown for various reasons, including a call to waror the heralding of an important event.
It would appear that these two events: a Christian woman thinking about the Rapture and a group of Orthodox Jews observing the Feast of Trumpets have nothing in common.
The truth is that the Feast of Trumpets is a celebration of one of the most important times for both Jews and Christians. It is a day that celebrates events that are yet to happen!
On Beyond Today we’re going to explore the wonderful meaning of the Feast of Trumpets and how—for Christians—understanding what this day pictures can change your understanding of God’s plan for all humanity…and for you personally.
The book of Revelation tells of a time when seven angels will blast seven trumpets, each one heralds a great event during the time leading to the return of Jesus Christ as the King of Kings.
A careful study of these events shows that Jackie’s concern about the Rapture is based on a wrong understanding of the prophecies.
If you’re a Christian who believes in the Rapture, about this time you’re saying, “I know this guy is wrong. The Rapture is mentioned in the Bible by the Apostle Paul in 1 Thessalonians.”
Let’s take a look at those verses. If you don’t have a Bible in front of you get one and follow along. Let’s turn to 1 Thessalonians:4:13. Here the Apostle Paul writes to the church in Thessalonica
Let’s look at what Jesus taught about His Second Coming and the gathering of the saints: Matthew:24:29-31.
We can see that there are remarkable similarities between what Paul wrote and what Jesus says about the events that take place at the end of the tribulation.
Are Jesus and Paul talking of two different events? Are they contradicting themselves?
To answer these questions we have two other passages to explore, but before we do I want to personally offer you a free booklet that explains what the Bible really teaches about the Feast of Trumpets and its importance for Christians.
God’s Holy Day Plan will take you step by step through the annual holy days given by God to ancient Israel and observed by Jesus and the early Church. You’ve probably heard that these are Jewish observances and are not important to Christians. It’s not true! These divinely ordained holy days reveal God’s plan of salvation for humanity.
God’s Holy Day Plan will show you the deep spiritual meaning of the Passover, Feast of Unleavened Bread, Pentecost, Feast of Trumpets, Day of Atonement and the Feast of Tabernacles. In reading this booklet your walk with God will change forever!
Go online right now to beyondtoday.tv to read or order your free copy of God’s Holy Day Plan. Or, call toll-free 1-triple-eight-886-8632. That's, 1-triple-eight-886-8632, or go online to beyondtoday.tv.
What does the Bible really teach about the Rapture? So far we’ve compared what Paul taught in 1 Thessalonians with what Jesus taught in Matthew 24. Now, let’s go to another passage by Paul where he writes of this same future event.
The book of Revelation states that there will be seven major events that happen toward the end of the Tribulation. These events are called the “Seven Trumpets.” At the last, or seventh trumpet, Christ returns.
Let’s compare one last passage. This time from the book of Revelation.
REVELATION 20:4-6
When we look at these scriptures it is plain that there is little support for the pre-Tribulation Rapture. Jesus Christ is returning for His followers, but it will be at the end of the Tribulation, at the sound of the last, or seventh, trumpet, when all the elect and dead are changed together.
We’ve seen the importance of the blowing of the shofar, or trumpet, and how it fits into understanding the Rapture.
But what does this have to do with you and the Feast of Trumpets? We’ll be back to explain something you’ve probably never heard and help you understand God’s grand design for the future of humanity.

Tuesday, September 9, 2014

Ukraine, ISIS and a Black Sea Strategy

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about Ukraine and ISIS. This follows this post about what non-Muslims need to know about Islam. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries. For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE.
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Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy

By George Friedman
The United States is, at the moment, off balance. It faces challenges in the Syria-Iraq theater as well as challenges in Ukraine. It does not have a clear response to either. It does not know what success in either theater would look like, what resources it is prepared to devote to either, nor whether the consequences of defeat would be manageable.
A dilemma of this sort is not unusual for a global power. Its very breadth of interests and the extent of power create opportunities for unexpected events, and these events, particularly simultaneous challenges in different areas, create uncertainty and confusion. U.S. geography and power permit a degree of uncertainty without leading to disaster, but generating a coherent and integrated strategy is necessary, even if that strategy is simply to walk away and let events run their course. I am not suggesting the latter strategy but arguing that at a certain point, confusion must run its course and clear intentions must emerge. When they do, the result will be the coherence of a new strategic map that encompasses both conflicts.
The most critical issue for the United States is to create a single integrated plan that takes into account the most pressing challenges. Such a plan must begin by defining a theater of operations sufficiently coherent geographically as to permit integrated political maneuvering and military planning. U.S. military doctrine has moved explicitly away from a two-war strategy. Operationally, it might not be possible to engage all adversaries simultaneously, but conceptually, it is essential to think in terms of a coherent center of gravity of operations. For me, it is increasingly clear that that center is the Black Sea.

Ukraine and Syria-Iraq

There are currently two active theaters of military action with broad potential significance. One is Ukraine, where the Russians have launched a counteroffensive toward Crimea. The other is in the Syria-Iraq region, where the forces of the Islamic State have launched an offensive designed at a minimum to control regions in both countries -- and at most dominate the area between the Levant and Iran.
In most senses, there is no connection between these two theaters. Yes, the Russians have an ongoing problem in the high Caucasus and there are reports of Chechen advisers working with the Islamic State. In this sense, the Russians are far from comfortable with what is happening in Syria and Iraq. At the same time, anything that diverts U.S. attention from Ukraine is beneficial to the Russians. For its part, the Islamic State must oppose Russia in the long run. Its immediate problem, however, is U.S. power, so anything that distracts the United States is beneficial to the Islamic State.
But the Ukrainian crisis has a very different political dynamic from the Iraq-Syria crisis. Russian and Islamic State military forces are not coordinated in any way, and in the end, victory for either would challenge the interests of the other. But for the United States, which must allocate its attention, political will and military power carefully, the two crises must be thought of together. The Russians and the Islamic State have the luxury of focusing on one crisis. The United States must concern itself with both and reconcile them.
The United States has been in the process of limiting its involvement in the Middle East while attempting to deal with the Ukrainian crisis. The Obama administration wants to create an integrated Iraq devoid of jihadists and have Russia accept a pro-Western Ukraine. It also does not want to devote substantial military forces to either theater. Its dilemma is how to achieve its goals without risk. If it can't do this, what risk will it accept or must it accept?
Strategies that minimize risk and create maximum influence are rational and should be a founding principle of any country. By this logic, the U.S. strategy ought to be to maintain the balance of power in a region using proxies and provide material support to those proxies but avoid direct military involvement until there is no other option. The most important thing is to provide the support that obviates the need for intervention.
In the Syria-Iraq theater, the United States moved from a strategy of seeking a unified state under secular pro-Western forces to one seeking a balance of power between the Alawites and jihadists. In Iraq, the United States pursued a unified government under Baghdad and is now trying to contain the Islamic State using minimal U.S. forces and Kurdish, Shiite and some Sunni proxies. If that fails, the U.S. strategy in Iraq will devolve into the strategy in Syria, namely, seeking a balance of power between factions. It is not clear that another strategy exists. The U.S. occupation of Iraq that began in 2003 did not result in a military solution, and it is not clear that a repeat of 2003 would succeed either. Any military action must be taken with a clear outcome in mind and a reasonable expectation that the allocation of forces will achieve that outcome; wishful thinking is not permitted. Realistically, air power and special operations forces on the ground are unlikely to force the Islamic State to capitulate or to result in its dissolution.
Ukraine, of course, has a different dynamic. The United States saw the events in Ukraine as either an opportunity for moral posturing or as a strategic blow to Russian national security. Either way, it had the same result: It created a challenge to fundamental Russian interests and placed Russian President Vladimir Putin in a dangerous position. His intelligence services completely failed to forecast or manage events in Kiev or to generate a broad rising in eastern Ukraine. Moreover, the Ukrainians were defeating their supporters (with the distinction between supporters and Russian troops becoming increasingly meaningless with each passing day). But it was obvious that the Russians were not simply going to let the Ukrainian reality become a fait accompli. They would counterattack. But even so, they would still have moved from once shaping Ukrainian policy to losing all but a small fragment of Ukraine. They will therefore maintain a permanently aggressive posture in a bid to recoup what has been lost.
U.S. strategy in Ukraine tracks its strategy in Syria-Iraq. First, Washington uses proxies; second, it provides material support; and third, it avoids direct military involvement. Both strategies assume that the main adversary -- the Islamic State in Syria-Iraq and Russia in Ukraine -- is incapable of mounting a decisive offensive, or that any offensive it mounts can be blunted with air power. But to be successful, U.S. strategy assumes there will be coherent Ukrainian and Iraqi resistance to Russia and the Islamic State, respectively. If that doesn't materialize or dissolves, so does the strategy.
The United States is betting on risky allies. And the outcome matters in the long run. U.S. strategy prior to World Wars I and II was to limit involvement until the situation could be handled only with a massive American deployment. During the Cold War, the United States changed its strategy to a pre-commitment of at least some forces; this had a better outcome. The United States is not invulnerable to foreign threats, although those foreign threats must evolve dramatically. The earlier intervention was less costly than intervention at the last possible minute. Neither the Islamic State nor Russia poses such a threat to the United States, and it is very likely that the respective regional balance of power can contain them. But if they can't, the crises could evolve into a more direct threat to the United States. And shaping the regional balance of power requires exertion and taking at least some risks.

Regional Balances of Power and the Black Sea

The rational move for countries like Romania, Hungary or Poland is to accommodate Russia unless they have significant guarantees from the outside. Whether fair or not, only the United States can deliver those guarantees. The same can be said about the Shia and the Kurds, both of whom the United States has abandoned in recent years, assuming that they could manage on their own.
The issue the United States faces is how to structure such support, physically and conceptually. There appear to be two distinct and unconnected theaters, and American power is limited. The situation would seem to preclude persuasive guarantees. But U.S. strategic conception must evolve away from seeing these as distinct theaters into seeing them as different aspects of the same theater: the Black Sea.
When we look at a map, we note that the Black Sea is the geographic organizing principle of these areas. The sea is the southern frontier of Ukraine and European Russia and the Caucasus, where Russian, jihadist and Iranian power converge on the Black Sea. Northern Syria and Iraq are fewer than 650 kilometers (400 miles) from the Black Sea.
The United States has had a North Atlantic strategy. It has had a Caribbean strategy, a Western Pacific strategy and so on. This did not simply mean a naval strategy. Rather, it was understood as a combined arms system of power projection that depended on naval power to provide strategic supply, delivery of troops and air power. It also placed its forces in such a configuration that the one force, or at least command structure, could provide support in multiple directions.
The United States has a strategic problem that can be addressed either as two or more unrelated problems requiring redundant resources or a single integrated solution. It is true that the Russians and the Islamic State do not see themselves as part of a single theater. But opponents don't define theaters of operation for the United States. The first step in crafting a strategy is to define the map in a way that allows the strategist to think in terms of unity of forces rather than separation, and unity of support rather than division. It also allows the strategist to think of his regional relationships as part of an integrated strategy.
Assume for the moment that the Russians chose to intervene in the Caucasus again, that jihadists moved out of Chechnya and Dagestan into Georgia and Azerbaijan, or that Iran chose to move north. The outcome of events in the Caucasus would matter greatly to the United States. Under the current strategic structure, where U.S. decision-makers seem incapable of conceptualizing the two present strategic problems, such a third crisis would overwhelm them. But thinking in terms of securing what I'll call the Greater Black Sea Basin would provide a framework for addressing the current thought exercise. A Black Sea strategy would define the significance of Georgia, the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Even more important, it would elevate Azerbaijan to the level of importance it should have in U.S. strategy. Without Azerbaijan, Georgia has little weight. With Azerbaijan, there is a counter to jihadists in the high Caucasus, or at least a buffer, since Azerbaijan is logically the eastern anchor of the Greater Black Sea strategy.
A Black Sea strategy would also force definition of two key relationships for the United States. The first is Turkey. Russia aside, Turkey is the major native Black Sea power. It has interests throughout the Greater Black Sea Basin, namely, in Syria, Iraq, the Caucasus, Russia and Ukraine. Thinking in terms of a Black Sea strategy, Turkey becomes one of the indispensible allies since its interests touch American interests. Aligning U.S. and Turkish strategy would be a precondition for such a strategy, meaning both nations would have to make serious policy shifts. An explicit Black Sea-centered strategy would put U.S.-Turkish relations at the forefront, and a failure to align would tell both countries that they need to re-examine their strategic relationship. At this point, U.S.-Turkish relations seem to be based on a systematic avoidance of confronting realities. With the Black Sea as a centerpiece, evasion, which is rarely useful in creating realistic strategies, would be difficult.

The Centrality of Romania

The second critical country is Romania. The Montreux Convention prohibits the unlimited transit of a naval force into the Black Sea through the Bosporus, controlled by Turkey. Romania, however, is a Black Sea nation, and no limitations apply to it, although its naval combat power is centered on a few aging frigates backed up by a half-dozen corvettes. Apart from being a potential base for aircraft for operations in the region, particularly in Ukraine, supporting Romania in building a significant naval force in the Black Sea -- potentially including amphibious ships -- would provide a deterrent force against the Russians and also shape affairs in the Black Sea that might motivate Turkey to cooperate with Romania and thereby work with the United States. The traditional NATO structure can survive this evolution, even though most of NATO is irrelevant to the problems facing the Black Sea Basin. Regardless of how the Syria-Iraq drama ends, it is secondary to the future of Russia's relationship with Ukraine and the European Peninsula. Poland anchors the North European Plain, but the action for now is in the Black Sea, and that makes Romania the critical partner in the European Peninsula. It will feel the first pressure if Russia regains its position in Ukraine.
I have written frequently on the emergence -- and the inevitability of the emergence -- of an alliance based on the notion of the Intermarium, the land between the seas. It would stretch between the Baltic and Black seas and would be an alliance designed to contain a newly assertive Russia. I have envisioned this alliance stretching east to the Caspian, taking in Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Poland-to-Romania line is already emerging. It seems obvious that given events on both sides of the Black Sea, the rest of this line will emerge.
The United States ought to adopt the policy of the Cold War. That consisted of four parts. First, allies were expected to provide the geographical foundation of defense and substantial forces to respond to threats. Second, the United States was to provide military and economic aid as necessary to support this structure. Third, the United States was to pre-position some forces as guarantors of U.S. commitment and as immediate support. And fourth, Washington was to guarantee the total commitment of all U.S. forces to defending allies, although the need to fulfill the last guarantee never arose.
The United States has an uncertain alliance structure in the Greater Black Sea Basin that is neither mutually supportive nor permits the United States a coherent power in the region given the conceptual division of the region into distinct theaters. The United States is providing aid, but again on an inconsistent basis. Some U.S. forces are involved, but their mission is unclear, it is unclear that they are in the right places, and it is unclear what the regional policy is.
Thus, U.S. policy for the moment is incoherent. A Black Sea strategy is merely a name, but sometimes a name is sufficient to focus strategic thinking. So long as the United States thinks in terms of Ukraine and Syria and Iraq as if they were on different planets, the economy of forces that coherent strategy requires will never be achieved. Thinking in terms of the Black Sea as a pivot of a single diverse and diffuse region can anchor U.S. thinking. Merely anchoring strategic concepts does not win wars, nor prevent them. But anything that provides coherence to American strategy has value.
The Greater Black Sea Basin, as broadly defined, is already the object of U.S. military and political involvement. It is just not perceived that way in military, political or even public and media calculations. It should be. For that will bring perception in line with fast-emerging reality.


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Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Azerbaijan: A key to defeating Russia! (and Iran)

A very interesting post from www.Stratfor.com about the strategic country of Azerbaijan. This follows this post about Jews in Chicago. This follows this article about American energy independence and preventing money from going to hostile countries. For more about what you can do to get more involved click here and you can read two very interesting books HERE. You can follow me at blogspot here and at twitter here https://twitter.com/brianleesblog. Please consider following both in case one goes down!


Borderlands: The View from Azerbaijan

By George Friedman
I arrive in Azerbaijan as the country celebrates Victory Day, the day successor states of the former Soviet Union celebrate the defeat of Germany in World War II. No one knows how many Soviet citizens died in that war -- perhaps 22 million. The number is staggering and represents both the incompetence and magnificence of Russia, which led the Soviets in war. Any understanding of Russia that speaks of one without the other is flawed.
As I write, fireworks are going off over the Caspian Sea. The pyrotechnics are long and elaborate, sounding like an artillery barrage. They are a reminder that Baku was perhaps the most important place in the Nazi-Soviet war. It produced almost all of the Soviet Union's petroleum. The Germans were desperate for it and wanted to deny it to Moscow. Germany's strategy after 1942, including the infamous battle of Stalingrad, turned on Baku's oil. In the end, the Germans threw an army against the high Caucasus guarding Baku. In response, an army raised in the Caucasus fought and defeated them. The Soviets won the war. They wouldn't have if the Germans had reached Baku. It is symbolic, at least to me, that these celebrations blend into the anniversary of the birth of Heydar Aliyev, the late president of Azerbaijan who endured the war and later forged the post-Soviet identity of his country. He would have been 91 on May 10.
Baku is strategic again today, partly because of oil. I've started the journey here partly by convenience and partly because Azerbaijan is key to any counter-Russian strategy that might emerge. My purpose on this trip is to get a sense of the degree to which individual European states feel threatened by Russia, and if they do, the level of effort and risk they are prepared to endure. For Europe does not exist as anything more than a geographic expression; it is the fears and efforts of the individual nation-states constituting it that will determine the course of this affair. Each nation is different, and each makes its own calculus of interest. My interest is to understand their thinking, not only about Russia but also about the European Union, the United States and ultimately themselves. Each is unique; it isn't possible to make a general statement about them.
Some question whether the Caucasus region and neighboring Turkey are geographically part of Europe. There are many academic ways to approach this question. My approach, however, is less sophisticated. Modern European history cannot be understood without understanding the Ottoman Empire and the fact that it conquered much of the southeastern part of the European peninsula. Russia conquered the three Caucasian states -- Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan -- and many of their institutions are Russian, hence European. If an organic European expression does exist, it can be argued to be Eurovision, the pan-continental music competition. The Azerbaijanis won it in 2011, which should settle any debate on their "Europeanness."
But more important, a strategy to block Russia is hard to imagine without including its southern flank. There is much talk of sanctions on Russia. But sanctions can be countered and always ignore a key truth: Russia has always been economically dysfunctional. It has created great empires and defeated Napoleon and Hitler in spite of that. Undermining Russia's economy may be possible, but that does not always undermine Russia's military power. That Soviet military power outlived the economically driven collapse of the Soviet Union confirms this point. And the issue at the moment is military.
The solution found for dealing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was containment. The architect of this strategy was diplomat George Kennan, whose realist approach to geopolitics may have lost some adherents but not its relevance. A cordon sanitaire was constructed around the Soviet Union through a system of alliances. In the end, the Soviets were unable to expand and choked on their own inefficiency. There is a strange view abroad that the 21st century is dramatically different from all prior centuries and such thinking is obsolete. I have no idea why this should be so. The 21st century is simply another century, and there has been no transcendence of history. Containment was a core strategy and it seems likely that it will be adopted again -- if countries like Azerbaijan are prepared to participate.
To understand Azerbaijan you must begin with two issues: oil and a unique approach to Islam. At the beginning of the 20th century, over half the world's oil production originated near Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. Hence Hitler's strategy after 1942. Today, Azerbaijani energy production is massive, but it cannot substitute for Russia's production. Russian energy production, meanwhile, defines part of the strategic equation. Many European countries depend substantially on Russian energy, particularly natural gas. They have few alternatives. There is talk of U.S. energy being shipped to Europe, but building the infrastructure for that (even if there are supplies) will take many years before it can reduce Europe's dependence on Russia.
Withholding energy would be part of any Russian counter to Western pressure, even if Russia were to suffer itself. Any strategy against Russia must address the energy issue, begin with Azerbaijan, and be about more than production. Azerbaijan is not a major producer of gas compared to oil. On the other side of the Caspian Sea, however, Turkmenistan is. Its resources, coupled with Azerbaijan's, would provide a significant alternative to Russian energy. Turkmenistan has an interest in not selling through Russia and would be interested in a Trans-Caspian pipeline. That pipeline would have to pass through Azerbaijan, connecting onward to infrastructure in Turkey. Assuming Moscow had no effective counters, this would begin to provide a serious alternative to Russian energy and decrease Moscow's leverage. But this would all depend on Baku's willingness and ability to resist pressure from every direction.
Azerbaijan lies between Russia and Iran. Russia is the traditional occupier of Azerbaijan and its return is what Baku fears the most. Iran is partly an Azeri country. Nearly a quarter of its citizens, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are Azeri. But while both Azerbaijan and Iran are predominantly Shiite, Azerbaijan is a militantly secular state. Partly due to the Soviet experience and partly because of the unique evolution of Azeri identity since the 19th century, Azerbaijan separates the private practice of Islam from public life. I recall once attending a Jewish Passover feast in Baku that was presided over by an Orthodox rabbi, with security provided by the state. To be fair, Iran has a Jewish minority that has its own lawmaker in parliament. But any tolerance in Iran flows from theocratic dogma, whereas in Azerbaijan it is rooted in a constitution that is more explicitly secular than any in the European Union, save that of France.
This is just one obvious wedge between Azerbaijan and Iran, and Tehran has made efforts to influence the Azeri population. For the moment, relations are somewhat better but there is an insoluble tension that derives from geopolitical reality and the fact that any attack on Iran could come from Azerbaijan. Furthering this wedge are the close relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. The United States currently blocks most weapons sales to Azerbaijan. Israel -- with U.S. approval -- sells the needed weapons. This gives us a sense of the complexity of the relationship, recalling that complexity undermines alliances.
The complexity of alliances also defines Russia's reality. It occupies the high Caucasus overlooking the plains of Azerbaijan. Armenia is a Russian ally, bound by an agreement that permits Russian bases through 2044. Yerevan also plans to join the Moscow-led Customs Union, and Russian firms own a large swath of the Armenian economy. Armenia feels isolated. It remains hostile to Turkey for Ankara's unwillingness to acknowledge events of a century ago as genocide. Armenia also fought a war with Azerbaijan in the 1990s, shortly after independence, for a region called Nagorno-Karabakh that had been part of Azerbaijan -- a region that it lost in the war and wants back. Armenia, caught between Turkey and an increasingly powerful Azerbaijan, regards Russia as a guarantor of its national security.
For Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh remains a critical issue. Azerbaijan holds that U.N. resolutions have made it clear that Armenia's attack constituted a violation of international law, and a diplomatic process set up in Minsk to resolve the crisis has proven ineffective. Azerbaijan operates on two tracks on this issue. It pursues national development, as can be seen in Baku, a city that reflects the oil wealth of the country. It will not endanger that development, nor will it forget about Nagorno-Karabakh. At some point, any nation aligning itself with Azerbaijan will need to take a stand on this frozen conflict, and that is a high price for most.
Which leads me to an interesting symmetry of incomprehension between the United States and Azerbaijan. The United States does not want to sell weapons directly to Azerbaijan because of what it regards as violations of human rights by the Azerbaijani government. The Americans find it incomprehensible that Baku, facing Russia and Iran and needing the United States, cannot satisfy American sensibilities by avoiding repression -- a change that would not threaten the regime. Azerbaijan's answer is that it is precisely the threats it faces from Iran and Russia that require Baku to maintain a security state. Both countries send operatives into Azerbaijan to destabilize it. What the Americans consider dissidents, Azerbaijan sees as agents of foreign powers. Washington disputes this and continually offends Baku with its pronouncements. The Azerbaijanis, meanwhile, continually offend the Americans.
This is similar to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Most Americans have never heard of it and don't care who owns it. For the Azerbaijanis, this is an issue of fundamental historical importance. They cannot understand how, after assisting the United States in Afghanistan, risking close ties with Israel, maintaining a secular Islamic state and more, the United States not only cannot help Baku with Nagorno-Karabakh but also insists on criticizing Azerbaijan.
The question on human rights revolves around the interpretation of who is being arrested and for what reason. For a long time this was an issue that didn't need to be settled. But after the Ukrainian crisis, U.S.-Azerbaijani relations became critical. It is not just energy; rather, in the event of the creation of a containment alliance, Azerbaijan is the southeastern anchor of the line on the Caspian Sea. In addition, since Georgia is absolutely essential as a route for pipelines, given Armenia's alliance with Russia, Azerbaijan's support for Georgian independence is essential. Azerbaijan is the cornerstone for any U.S.-sponsored Caucasus strategy, should it develop.
I do not want to get into the question of either Nagorno-Karabakh or human rights in Azerbaijan. It is, for me, a fruitless issue arising from the deep historical and cultural imperatives of each. But I must take exception to one principle that the U.S. State Department has: an unwillingness to do comparative analysis. In other words, the State Department condemns all violations equally, whether by nations hostile to the United States or friendly to it, whether by countries with wholesale violations or those with more limited violations. When the State Department does pull punches, there is a whiff of bias, as with Georgia and Armenia, which -- while occasionally scolded -- absorb less criticism than Azerbaijan, despite each country's own imperfect record.
Even assuming the validity of State Department criticism, no one argues that Azerbaijani repression rises anywhere near the horrors of Joseph Stalin. I use Stalin as an example because Franklin Roosevelt allied the United States with Stalin to defeat Hitler and didn't find it necessary to regularly condemn Stalin while the Soviet Union was carrying the burden of fighting the war, thereby protecting American interests. That same geopolitical realism animated Kennan and ultimately created the alliance architecture that served the United States throughout the Cold War. Is it necessary to offend someone who will not change his behavior and whom you need for your strategy? The State Department of an earlier era would say no.
It was interesting to attend a celebration of U.S.-Azerbaijani relations in Washington the week before I came to Baku. In the past, these events were subdued. This one was different, because many members of Congress attended. Two guests were particularly significant. One was Charles Schumer of New York, who declared the United States and Azerbaijan to be great democracies. The second was Nancy Pelosi, long a loyalist to Armenian interests. She didn't say much but chose to show up. It is clear that the Ukrainian crisis triggered this turnout. It is clear that Azerbaijan's importance is actually obvious to some in Congress, and it is also clear that it signals tension over the policy of criticizing human rights records without comparing them to those of other countries and of ignoring the criticized country's importance to American strategy.
This is not just about Azerbaijan. The United States will need to work with Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary -- all of whom have been found wanting by the State Department in some ways. This criticism does not -- and will not -- produce change. Endless repetition of the same is the height of ineffectiveness. It will instead make any strategy the United States wants to construct in Europe ineffective. In the end, I would argue that a comparison between Russia and these other countries matters. Perfect friends are hard to find. Refusing to sell weapons to someone you need is not a good way to create an alliance.
In the past, it seemed that such an alliance was merely Cold War nostalgia by people who did not realize and appreciate that we had reached an age too wise to think of war and geopolitics. But the events in Ukraine raise the possibility that those unreconstructed in their cynicism toward the human condition may well have been right. Alliances may in fact be needed. In that case, Roosevelt's attitude toward Stalin is instructive.
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Thursday, July 24, 2014

Riddles

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/  about Russia and Great Britain. This follows this post about big city crime. For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632. You can follow me at blogspot here and at twitter here https://twitter.com/brianleesblog. Please consider following both in case one goes down!


Riddles





One of the greatest statesmen the world has known stated, "Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside of an enigma" (Winston Churchill).

I am sure that some Russian statesmen feel they can say the same about Britain. In fact, almost every nation seems almost impossible to understand. The Italians are unique, as are the Greeks. The French differ from the Germans—and nobody understands the other it seems.
The kind of understanding that can prevent wars comes only from the long and steady exchange of ideas and thoughts and clarification of motives, plans and actions that are taken. Mankind has rarely found that—but there are nations who do live peacefully side by side. God promises the time will come when nations will no longer learn war (Isaiah:2:3-4). They will have learned His ways and flow towards His holy temple. Then riddles will no longer exist among nations.

Friday, July 18, 2014

Crisis in Ukraine: Why It Matters

An interesting article from http://www.ucg.org/  about Ukraine. This follows this post about creation.  For a free magazine subscription or to get the books recommended for free click HERE! or call 1-888-886- 8632. You can follow me at blogspot here and at twitter here https://twitter.com/brianleesblog. Please consider following both in case one goes down!








Crisis in Ukraine: Why It Matters

Wednesday, March 19, 2014 (All day)

Most Americans have little understanding of the critical importance of Ukraine in the balance of power in Europe.


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[Darris McNeely] The news right now is transfixed with news out of the Ukraine because of the revolutions that has been going on there in recent weeks, and now the vote in Crimea to separate from Ukraine and to realign itself with the Russian republic. Many people are watching and trying to understand what's taking place, but I think that the biggest question that we should understand and focus on is why Ukraine matters within the context of a massive geopolitical fight between Russia, Europe, and America's posturing and roles that it's taking right now with the threat of sanctions. Why does this matter? What's taking place?
These three maps on the board here help us to at least begin to understand that. At least geographically, it's important to understand that Ukraine borders Russia, Poland, some of the Baltic states, and Western Europe. Ukraine has recently wanted to become a part of the European Union, but that was blocked last fall, and now with the overthrow of the government there, and the redistribution that's taking place, Russia has now moved in and a vote has taken place in Crimea to realign itself with Russia. What this means is that there is a major shake-up taking place within this very critical country. These other maps show, again, a little bit more of the agricultural and industrial importance of Ukraine to Europe, Russia especially. It's interesting to note that agriculturally, western Ukraine represents some of the richest, most productive soil in the world – probably within the top three agricultural areas in terms of the value of the land to agricultural production in all of the world. This is important to Russia as well as to Europe.
This other map shows the crossing of energy pipelines from Russia, across Ukraine, into Western Europe. Western Europe gains the majority of its natural gas and petroleum from Russia. And the lines, the pipelines that carry that petroleum and that natural gas go through Ukraine. Who controls Ukraine is going to control the heat in Germany, in Poland, and other parts of Western Europe. So you see the stranglehold that is there. And of course, with Russia involved in this right now, it's impacting its relationship with other European nations and the United States – financial ties, political ties, especially with the role that Russia is playing with the other great powers in the Middle East, Syria in particular – the relationships between all of these nations – the United States, Europe, and Russia – is very, very critical and very important. That's why it matters.
There's a couple of – there's a few other issues for us to consider as to why this matters, as well. What is taking place in front of us, really, is the biggest crisis since the end of the Cold War over twenty years ago. And for most of us in the United States especially, we've been having a holiday from history. We have not been all that interested. We're more interested, perhaps, in the sports events, the next NCAA tournament that's now just gearing up in the United States, other matters, and we're not really interested in what's taking place in other parts of the world. But this is big. This is the biggest in over twenty years. And should Russia – which it looks like it's going to do – annex Crimea ( this was recorded before Russia annexed Crimea ), possibly eastern Ukraine, because of the ethnic Russian majority in this part of Ukraine, it would also represent the biggest land grab since Adolf Hitler in the late 1930s, and what he began doing in Europe that triggered World War II. That's important. That's why what is taking place over there matters.